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Apuntes sobre la sociedad carcelaria de España

LUIS A. EDO (*)

LA PRISION, PROBLEMA NACIONAL

Uno de los aspectos que con mayor relieve sure, automáticamente, a la atención de cualquier observador ímparcial, al abordar el problema de las relaciones penitenciarias en España, es la liberalidad — mas aparente y teórica que real — de determinados aspectos del Reglamento de Prisiones por el que deberían regularse esas relaciones.

En efecto, es suficiente compararlo con las ordenanzas vigentes en otros países de Europa occidental, para quedar parádójicamente confundidos por una tal liberalidad en un país como el nuestro donde nunca ha podido hablarse de un Régimen político democrático, en contraste con una reglamentación más severa y más absolutista existente en los países donde las libertades llamadas democráticas se hallan establecidas. Esta paradoja no es más que aparente. Encuentra su explicación lógica al analizar el proceso histórico de último siglo en el interior de los recintos penitenciarios del Estado español.

La presencia masiva en los casos carcelarios del preso por « delito de convicción » es un fenómeno que en España alcanza niveles de *problema nacional*. Arranca desde las Cortes de Cádiz y adquiere un carácter permanente, manifestándose desde entonces hasta el presente sin solución de continuidad.

La constancia del fenómeno no conoce paralelo en los

(*) Militante de la Confederación Nacional de Trabajo. Ha transcurrido muchos años en los carceles españoles por su pertenencia a la CNT, bajo la imputación de « asociación ilícita ». Puesto en libertad en el 1976, después del indulto a los presos políticos, es actualmente secretario del Comité Regional de Cataluña.

ERRATA: En la página 97, el título exacto del libro de Carlos Moya Valgañón es "El Poder Económico en España".

países europeos. Se ha nutrido siempre de « delincuentes de convicción » de un mismo signo: progresistas y revolucionarios, de matrices diferentes si se quiere: liberales, demócratas y libertarios, siendo estos últimos sobre los que en mayor número y en más dilatado lapso de tiempo se basa este fenómeno. El « preso fascista » no se conoce en las prisiones salvo excepciones, esporádicas en el tiempo, e incipientes en número.

La presencia ininterrumpida y masiva, en los recintos carcelarios del « delincuente por convicción » ha mantenido en torno al tema penitenciario la atención activa de múltiples sectores sociales y particularmente las capas populares, convirtiéndose por este hecho en un auténtico *problema nacional*. Traducida en la práctica por una presión, sostenida a lo largo de todo el siglo, contra los organismos estatales encargados de la custodia carcelaria.

En los países de Europa occidental, llamados democráticos, los « delitos políticos » no quedan reflejados en el interior de los recintos más que por una presencia insignificante, cuando no totalmente inexistente, y en cualquier caso nunca masiva, factor imprescindible para convertirla en fenómeno y en tradición histórica.

En España son legión los que igualan el record del francés Blanqui y millares los que superan los años de cárcel del anarquista Louis Lecoin, también francés. Existe en ese país, Francia, una población reclusa masiva, cierto: los presos comunes, la « escoria de la sociedad ». ¿Para qué ocuparse de ellos? El tema penitenciario no es un problema nacional: se trata de los « comunes ». Las relaciones penitenciarias y las ordenanzas que las regulan pueden continuar tan severas y tan absolutistas como hace un siglo. Nadie se ocupa de ellas. La opinión pública, los partidos políticos, las organizaciones obreras se desentienden del tema, no presionan a los organismos estatales. ¿Los « comunes »? Un problema marginal.

La pretendida liberalidad del régimen penitenciario « semiabierto », establecido con carácter general en las prisiones del Estado español, non ha sido una concepción gratuita de los organismos estatales, sino consecuencia de una larga e intensa lucha de toda la población reclusa. Es altamente significativo que uno de los factores en presencia que componen el conjunto de la población reclusa, haya sido la figura del « preso anarquista ». No ha constituido un factor accesorio en esa lucha. Primero porque su presencia en los recintos hallaba su con-

tinuidad y su réplica en el exterior, en la calle, por la acción propagandística, informativa, del tema penitenciario, de una amplia corriente popular afinitariamente inclinada a solidarizarse con el preso anarquista. Segundo, porque esta figura de preso no se ha considerado nunca « preso político », sino « preso social », equivale decir que ha unido su situación penitenciaria a las condiciones que afrontaba el « preso común ».

Estos dos factores se complementaban y toda presión de la opinión pública y de las corrientes populares en favor del preso anarquista — el « preso social » — se traducía también en beneficio del « preso común ». Es esta complementariedad entre ambas figuras de « delincuentes » la causa fundamental que fuerza y arranca la liberalidad de las ordenanzas.

Al margen de la excepcional situación penitenciaria de la postguerra, sin precedente histórico alguno, surge a principios de la década de los años 1960, una nueva figura de preso político. Las « sacas » para el perdón hace algunos años que han remitido, una nueva generación de presos políticos empieza a poblar los recintos, su actuación no va encaminada a abordar globalmente los problemas que afronta toda la población reclusa. No les interesa una visión social del tema penitenciario. Su actuación es ofrecer un incentivo suplementario, a la actividad política de la oposición en la calle. Se desentienden del « preso común »; se rompe así la solidaridad que había venido presidiendo la lucha penitenciaria durante largas décadas desde antes de los albores del siglo.

Se trata del « preso comunista ». Esta ruptura entre las distintas figuras de preso se traduce por un sensible mejoramiento de la situación del preso político — en general, salvo excepciones — que centrará su actuación para la consecución del « Estatuto del Preso político ». Considerándose así la aristocracia de la población reclusa. Mientras tanto el « preso común » atraviesa una de las épocas de mayor insolidaridad y desamparo. La ruptura se acrecienta entre ambos grupos sociales. Hoy este divorcio es completo. He ahí el primer resultado de la actuación del « preso comunista ».

EL PATIO, FIGURA BÁSICA DEL SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO

Entre los aspectos del carácter general, que diferencian mayormente las relaciones carcelarias establecidas en el Estado español, de las existentes en los países de Europa occidental,

el más importante es sin duda el llamado régimen « semiabier-to », es decir, el régimen de Patio, en el que el recluso permanece en covivencia colectiva durante 5 o 6 horas diarias, obligatoriamente, bajo el frío o el sol tórrido.

Los servicios carcelarios obligados a conceder este régimen, consecuencia de una resistencia total de toda la población reclusa, mantenida y proyectada promoción tras promoción, han conseguido instrumentalizarlo por procedimientos sofisticados de la confidencia, que adquiere por medio del Patio categoría de « Ley penitenciaria ». La « Ley de la confidencia », « regla-miento » real que regula la vida de la prisión, instrumento priori-tario utilizado por los directores, actua en el seno de los « ghettos » del patio, garitos de juego, sabiamente fomentados y tolerados, el montaje de « envolados », a través de los cuales el recluso se ve implicado — incluso judicialmente — de forma inopinada en otros delitos. Estas actuaciones dirigidas por el Cuerpo de Funcionarios de Prisiones, a través de la « ley de la confidencia », quedan facilitadas por una figura básica: *El Patio*. Este constituye el conducto ideal para desarrollar esta actividad represiva. Contrariamente al clásico método de introducir en una misma celda al chivato que intenta arrancar declaraciones comprometedoras para sus consortes de conviven-cia celular. El Patio aparece a primera vista como el marco opuesto, donde el recluso por el espaciamiento colectivo de que disfruta, se confía con mayor facilidad y establece relaciones de afinidad. Es precisamente en este marco en el que los servicios carcelarios hacen actuar los equipos de confidentes que se desenvuelven con mayor facilidad cuanto que se introducen en los *ghettos* del Patio con más soltura. Esta actuación de la « ley de la confidencia » adquiere niveles muy graves en casi todos los Centros, especialmente en los más multitudinarios, de prisión preventiva, como son Carabanchel (Madrid) y la « Mo-delito » (Barcelona). En estos Centros, son numerosos los re-clusos que ingresando por determinado delito, poco después se encuentran implicados judicialmente en otros expedientes. El Patio se convierte así en un instrumento policíaco manejado por los Servicios Penitenciarios, que en teoría no deberían ocu-parse más que de la custodia. El método clásico de la intro-ducción de un chivato en la celda releva de una visión artesanal de la « ley de la Confidencia », ésta adquiere con la manipula-ción del Patio un nivel de funcionamiento industrial. El sistema de relaciones penitenciarias español supera así todas las for-mas represivas por su refinamiento degradante.

El « chivato de celda » limita sensiblemente el trabajo de la « ley de confidencia », no rinde bastante. En el patio el con-fidente actúa en equipo, posee un margen de maniobra ilimi-tado, su « rendimiento » se contabiliza por múltiples formas de actuación. No se trata únicamente de obtener datos concretos, empíricos, directamente comprometedores. Las misio-nes que los servicios penitenciarios les encomiendan tienen, ademas, un carácter mucho más sutil: las relaciones, con quién hablan, qué temas abordan, por qué « registros » se interesan, (« registros », en la jerga quiere decir cada una de las especializaciones de un delincuente), lecturas que utilizan y sobre todo con quién pasean.

Un completo servicio de fichaje. Un funcionario, general-mente de Cuerpo Técnico — o Especial — agregado a la Jefatura de Servicio se encarga de llevar al día el « dossier » bien nutrido de cada recluso. Habitualmente es este funcionario quien maneja el equipo de confidentes « oficiales », reconocidos por la Dirección. El mismo funcionario tiene a la policía al corriente de lo más substancial de estos « dossiers ». Sin el Patio este trabajo policíaco sería muy superficial.

EL PASEO EN EL PATIO

El patio queda configurado por una serie de imágenes que cubren una amplia gama de inclinaciones humanas, personales y colectivas. La composición de las celdas no siempre permite la reagrupación — 3 o 4 por celda — de reclusos cuyas caracte-rísticas congenien. Esta composición es generalmente impuesta por los Servicios. El Patio, sin embargo, ofrece la posibilidad de escoger.

Así se constituye toda una serie de grupos en razón de determinadas actividades: la « mafia » del frontón, los garitos de juego de dados, la « petanca »...

De todas estas imágenes, existe, sin embargo, una que re-presenta el « indicativo » más precioso para el confidente: El Paseo. ¿Con quién pasea el preso? El Paseo es algo muy íntimo, posee, con frecuencia, una dimensión privada, interior. En una prisión donde ni el cagar puede efectuarse de otra forma que en presencia de los consortes de celda, — salvo en las horas de Patio —, el Paseo adquiere un relieve primordial en la exis-tencia carcelaria del recluso.

El sentarse en grupo, el llevar una actividad colectiva cual-

quiera, puede deberse a razones puramente materiales, física. Nadie puede impedir que alguien se siente a su lado, que juegue al frontón, que participe en un garito. El confidente no tiene grandes dificultades para introducirse en estos grupos.

El Paseo en el Patio es otra cosa. Las facetas psicológicas que reúne el acto del Paseo penitenciario, al margen del ejercicio mecánico y físico, permiten que el preso se « aisle », se interiorize, piense... Cuando un preso pasea, el hecho de andar es accesorio, el acto más importante que realiza es otro: *está pensando*. Esta imagen del paseo es una de las más inabordables para el confidente.

Cuando un preso acepta pasear con otro admite que éste entre en un terreno interiorizado. El confidente aquí no puede más que sondear, observar a distancia, como le es imposible adquirir datos, los imagina. Existe múltiples precedentes en que una prueba de acusación por irregularidades de conducta penitenciaria contra un recluso se basa en el haber paseado con cierta frecuencia con determinados presos.

El Patio, una de las ventajas, acaso la más importante, lograda por la población reclusa en larga lucha, es así, instrumentalizada por los Servicios Penitenciarios a través de la « ley de confidencia ».

MANIPULACIÓN CIENTÍFICA DE LA LEY DE LA CONFIDENCIA

Cuando en 1965 Oriol sucede a Iturmendi, como ministro de Justicia, se inicia una nueva fase en la aplicación de la « Ley de la confidencia ». Ni artesanal, ni industrial: la fase científica.

A la cabeza de la Institución quedan reunidas varias « líneas de acción », que pueden ser reflejadas por un militar, Jesús del Yerro; un « chusquero », Fernando Arnaud, y dos tecnócratas, José Antonio Barrera, especialista en derecho, y Enrique de la Morena, criminólogo.

— *El Coronel del Yerro*, accede al cargo político de *Director General*; sería ascendido a General al cesar en ese cargo en 1971, en mérito de su obra represiva efectuada como Director de la Institución.

— *Fernando Arnaud*, el « chusquero », cubre todos los ascensos y escalafones, desde simple funcionario auxiliar, hasta el máximo cargo de la Institución a que puede acceder un funcionario: *Inspector Central*. Debe sus ascensos a Fernández

Cuesta, antiguo ministro de Justicia. En julio de 1936 encontrándose éste preso en Madrid, son abiertas las puertas de la Prisión por las milicias para liberar a los presos, Arnaud, entonces simple auxiliar, escamotea a Fernández Cuesta de la búsqueda de las milicias en el propio interior de la prisión. El posteriormente Ministro de Justicia de Franco, gratificará a Arnaud, una vez terminada la guerra, promocionándole en todos los ascensos hasta situarlo en el máximo cargo de Inspector Central. Arnaud personifica la línea más dura del cuerpo de Prisiones. En los años de las « sacas » diarias hacia el patrón lo encontramos sucesivamente como Director de varios centros, notablemente al final de la década de los años 40 y principios de los 50, en la « Modelo » de Barcelona, prisión que conoce la más dilatada época de fusilamientos y ejecuciones de toda la Península.

— *José Antonio Barrera*, jefe de la sección jurídica de la Dirección General. A él se debe la puesta en fórmula del « sistema de grados », a través del cual se pretende que el preso se vaya rehabilitando socialmente.

— *Enrique de la Morena*, ilustre desconocido que se hará famoso durante su gestión 1967-1972, como Director de la « Modelo » de Barcelona. Bajo su mandato esta prisión volverá a conocer los tétricos años de terror impuesto por Fernando Arnaud. De la Morena, institucionalizará las tristemente famosas palizas en los sótanos de la « Modelo ». Será considerado como el realizador del « milagro » de los Talleres Penitenciarios. Los Talleres de la « Modelo » los más grandes y los de mayor volumen de facturación de todas las prisiones de la Península, conocerán, bajo la gestión de De la Morena, su mayor auge. Su método: palo, disciplina, cerrojo y explotación. Posteriormente, en 1972, será mutado a la Dirección de la Escuela de Funcionarios.

En torno a la acción mancomunada de estos cuatro personajes, sabiamente dirigidos y apoyados por Antonio M. de Oriol y Urquijo, ministro de Justicia, la población reclusa conocerá en todos los recintos penitenciarios del Estado español una de las fases de represión más duras de la historia carcelaria.

El « sistema de grados » facilitará una degradación, jamás imaginada, de la dignidad y de la moral del preso.

La explotación de los reclusos en los talleres penitenciarios alcanzará niveles comparables con el régimen concentracionario. Oriol no concederá indulto alguno durante su seis primeros años de mandato, hecho sin precedentes en los 36 años de

Régimen franquista. El ministro, junto con del Yerro y Arnau, serán los responsables de una aplicación de « libertad condicional », prácticamente nula, durante su mandato.

Este hecho constituye una de las más graves transgresiones de las leyes debidamente codificadas ya que en efecto el Código Penal ofrece a todo recluso el derecho a disfrutar de la libertad condicional. La anulación arbitraria de este derecho se traduce, en la práctica por una agravación de la pena no dictaminada por los Tribunales que puede contabilizarse en varios millares de año-cárcel considerada globalmente toda la población reclusa. Este es el aspecto más nefasto de la gestión ministerial de Antonio M. de Oriol y Urquijo. Más adelante veremos que es lo que debe hacer el preso para acceder a la libertad condicional.

EL GRADO « 0 »

Existe una situación penitenciaria que escapa de la clasificación regulada por el « sistema de grados »: las *Celdas de castigo*.

Por el crecido número de presos que las sufren, por el tratamiento de severidad que no respeta los mínimos vitales de las condiciones físicas, alimentación, higiene y mucho menos la dignidad de la condición humana, las *Celdas de castigo* constituyen una de las figuras penitenciarias, de mayor alcance represivo, dentro de las relaciones carcelarias.

Las *Celdas de castigo* son una institución dentro de los recintos penitenciarios. Un tercio de la población reclusa sufre esta situación, por lo menos durante un tercio de su respectiva condena. Todas las prisiones, ya sean Centros de Cumplimiento o Preventivos poseen un departamento especial habilitado para el « Régimen Especial de Celdas de castigo ». El funcionamiento de este Departamento no se halla regulado por ningún reglamento escrito, no existe ley, nada más que la voluntad impuesta por los carceleros: no es respetado ningún derecho, es en este departamento donde se ejecutan, generalmente, las agresiones físicas y las palizas con técnicas muy depuradas. La existencia de los reclusos en este departamento se desenvuelve en torno a una relaciones absolutamente diferentes. Es una « sociedad aparte » sin similitud con la situación general de los recintos penitenciarios: es el grado « 0 ».

El recluso pasa las 24 horas del dia en la celda, completa-

mente solo; sin cama, se le facilita una colchoneta a las 10 de la noche y se le retira a las 7 de la mañana. No le está permitido recibir ningún paquete de comida, se halla sometido al rancho seco y el pan, no puede fumar y según los Centros, no se les facilita lectura alguna.

La Junta de régimen entiende sobre las infracciones trás el consiguiente parte del funcionario. El recluso no tiene ningún medio de defensa. Puede ser castigado a « falta leve », « grave » y « muy grave ». Las dos últimas conducen al recluso fatalmente al régimen de Celdas de castigo; de 1 a 20 días si la falta es grave y de 21 a 40 si es muy grave. La acumulación de varias de estas faltas en una misma acusación puede conllevar 80, 120 o más días de celdas. Es en estas condiciones que los reclusos adquieren una serie de dolencias y enfermedades. El paso prolongado por el régimen de celdas puede marcar nefastamente al recluso para toda su existencia.

La clasificación por grados ha olvidado el grado « 0 ». El de más graves consecuencias para la población penitenciaria.

EL SISTEMA DE LOS TRES GRADOS

El sistema de los tres grados es el gran descubrimiento, consecuencia del establecimiento de una categoría nueva en el seno del Cuerpo de Funcionarios de Prisiones: El Cuerpo Técnico. Compuesto, fundamentalmente, por universitarios, sociólogos, licenciados en Derecho, criminólogos, psiquiatras...

El Cuerpo Técnico se señaló un objetivo: la reinserción social del delincuente. ¿Puede existir un objetivo más loable para un funcionario de Prisiones?

El Cuerpo Técnico ya tiene señalada su finalidad. Se trata de poner en fórmula el procedimiento para conseguirla. Estos intelectuales, especialistas, teóricos de la ciencia del comportamiento, hallarán una fórmula; provocarán una dinámica en la voluntad del preso, un incentivo, propulsarán un deseo imparable en la mentalidad del recluso; inventarán una fórmula a través de la cual lo irán aproximando a la escarcelación: la libertad.

Entienden estos especialistas que en el proceso hacia la libertad, ambición imparable de todo recluido, la fórmula gradual creará en el sistema mental del delinquente la necesidad de regenerarse, desencadenará unos mecanismos cerebrales que tendencialmente lo conducirán a la reinserción social. He aquí, en substancia, el contenido teórico sobre cuya

base el especialista jurídico José Antonio Barrera elaborará los textos que regulan « El sistema de los tres grados ».

Esta es la teoría, veamos como se traduce en la práctica.

El primer grado reúne a los reclusos en un Centro de Cumplimiento donde los derechos del penado son sensiblemente recortados, mayor represión, disciplina más dura, comunicaciones orales y escrita menos frecuentes, régimen celular, menor espaciamiento. Para salir del primer grado el recluso debe « hacer meritos ». Si cualquier concepto de la ética, considera que la mayor dignidad humana, el apoyo, la solidaridad entre presos, la ayuda a los más desesperados, el impedir que los represores carceleros se ensañen con el vencido, son *meritos*, que lógicamente, según los presupuestos enunciados deberían aproximar al preso a la libertad. Pues bien, este concepto de la ética se equivoca. Sucede todo lo contrario, este comportamiento aleja al recluso de la libertad: No alcanzará jamás el 2º grado, mucho menos el 3º.

La fórmula de los 3 grados desencadenará una dinámica opuesta. Si el preso se vende, si colabora con los Servicios, si delata a sus vecinos de celda, a sus consortes de expediente, o a su propio hermano; si acepta colaborar en el montaje de « embolados » a través de los cuales los Servicios se basarán para agravar las penas de otros reclusos. Si el preso se degrada, el preso irá acercándose cada día más a libertad. Estos son los *meritos* que los Servicios exigen al recluso para acceder al 2º y al 3º grado. Es así, degradándose, que el delincuente adquiere la « Libertad Condicional ».

Vemos pues, que las especialistas del Comportamiento, el Cuerpo Técnico, no sólo fallan en su objetivo de la reinserción, sino que además desencadenarán una dinámica mental, individual y colectiva de degradación moral y social. Es así como el Cuerpo Técnico ha elevado « La ley de la Confidencialidad » a categoría de científica. En el presente la población reclusa de los Recintos Penitenciarios de todo el Estado Español es la más degradada de Europa.

La finalidad del Cuerpo Técnico no ha fallado más que en apariencia. En efecto, la reinserción social del delincuente al traducirse por una mayor degradación moral consecuencia del Sistema de Grados, no ha hecho más que aproximarse al recluso a los basamentos de una cárcel mayor: *la sociedad*.

Una Sociedad cimentada sobre la degradación y la inmoralidad. Un gran éxito del Cuerpo Técnico.

Marzo 1977.

RESUME

L'organisation pénitentiaire espagnole est actuellement caractérisée par un régime défini « demi-ouvert », marqué au coin d'une certaine libéralité, qui peut paraître en opposition avec le totalitarisme politique en vigueur dans le pays. En effet, il ne s'agit pas d'une concession du pouvoir, mais c'est le résultat d'une continue bataille contre les règlements et les restrictions de la vie pénitentiaire, conduite à l'intérieur des prisons, par la totalité de la population des reclus, sans distinction entre « politiques » et « communs ». Les détenus anarchistes ont toujours donné une remarquable contribution à cette solidarité, tandis que les communistes, notamment dès qu'ils ont commencé à être nombreux dans les galères espagnoles, ont représenté un élément de fracture. En effet, en se considérant tout court comme des détenus « politiques » et pour cela différents des « communs », ont fêlé le front de la lutte des prisons.

L'article prouve en outre comme la liberalité du régime « demi-ouvert » soit plus apparente que réelle, puisque les autorités des prisons ont su adapter efficacement ses propres systèmes de répression à la nouvelle situation. Un de ces systèmes est constitué par l'emploi massif des mouchards et des espions, qui profitent de la plus ample liberté de mouvement des détenus pour obtenir des informations qui souvent sont utilisées pour étendre ou consolider les chefs d'accusation.

De cette façon, la prison cesse d'être un simple lieu de garde et devient un complément de l'activité de police.

On analyse aussi le « système des dégrés » qui, officiellement, devrait servir pour réintégrer les détenus dans la société, mais qui est en réalité seulement un instrument de dégradation et d'abrutissement des individus, pour les rendre plus soumis et dociles.

RIASSUNTO

L'organizzazione penitenziaria spagnola è attualmente caratterizzata dal cosiddetto regime « semi-aperto », improntato ad una certa liberalità, che può apparire in contrasto col totalitarismo politico vigente nel paese. In realtà, questo non è un regalo del potere, ma l'effetto di una continua battaglia contro i regolamenti e le restrizioni della vita carceraria, condotta all'interno delle prigioni da tutta la popolazione reclusa, senza distinzione tra « politici » e « comuni ». I detenuti anarchici hanno sempre dato un notevole contributo a questa solidarietà, mentre i comunisti, specie da quando hanno cominciato ad essere numerosi nelle galere spagnole, hanno rappresentato un elemento di frattura. Infatti, reputandosi puri e semplici detenuti « politici » e quindi diversi dai « comuni », hanno incrinato il fronte della lotta carceraria.

L'articolo dimostra inoltre come la liberalità del regime « semi-aperto » sia più apparente che reale, in quanto le autorità carcerarie hanno saputo adattare efficacemente i propri sistemi di repressione alla nuova situazione. Uno di questi sistemi è costituito dall'uso mas-

siccio di confidenti e spie, che approfittano della maggiore libertà di movimento dei detenuti per ottenere informazioni che spesso vengono usate per estendere o consolidare i capi d'accusa. In questo modo, la prigione cessa di essere un semplice luogo di custodia e diventa un complemento dell'attività poliziesca.

Viene anche analizzato il cosiddetto « sistema dei gradi » che, ufficialmente, dovrebbe servire al reinserimento dei reclusi nel tessuto sociale, mentre in realtà non è che uno strumento di degradazione e abrutimento degli individui, per renderli più remissivi e docili.

SUMMARY

To-day, Spanish prison organisation is said to be « semi-open », it is characterized by a sort of liberality, which could seem strange in a strict totalitarian régime was Spain has been until very recent days. Actually, this is not a gift granted by the State, but the consequence of a continuous struggle against rules and restriction of prison life, undertaken by all the convicts together without any separation between « political » and « common » offenders. Anarchist convicts contributed greatly to this solidarity, while Communist ones represented a clearage element, especially when they began to be numerous inside Spanish prisons. In fact, Communist convicts consider themselves as strictly « political » convicts, separated from « common » offenders, and in this way they break the front of the struggle inside jails.

The article demonstrates also that the liberality of the « semi-open » régime is only apparent because prison officers have been able to adapt their means of repression to the new situation. For instance, they use extensively police confidants and spies who take advantage of the greater movement freedom enjoined by the convicts, in order to get informations which are often used to extend convictions and confirm charges of offence. In this way, the prison ends being a simple place of conviction and becomes a complement of police activity.

The article analyzes also the so-called « system of degrees » which, officially, aims to re-abilitate convicts into the society, while actually it is only a mean of degradation and umiliation of men, in order to make them more submissive and docile.

Faits divers et socialisme^(*)

EDMOND TRIFON

L'information sur les pays de l'Est se limite d'habitude à la politique étrangère de ses représentants et aux mésaventures, souvent tragiques, de ses « intelligentsia ». La presse quotidienne, en France par exemple, permet très rarement une approche des agissements de ceux qui, de par leur condition sociale, subissent les bureaucraties étatiques qui y règnent. Mais cette lacune n'est pas facile à combler: il y a toute une série d'obstacles dûs principalement au caractère trop laconique ou trop général de l'information qu'on peut avoir officiellement d'une part, et trop subjectif, difficilement contrôlable, de l'information qui peut nous parvenir par d'autres voies. C'est pourquoi l'intérêt s'est porté sur l'information-même en cours dans ces pays comme source d'information. Pour cela on ne peut pas faire l'économie d'une description, même sommaire, du système d'information « socialiste ».

L'information a un fonctionnement tout à fait différent de celui qu'on connaît en France, mais aussi de celui qu'on pourrait imaginer pour un pays socialiste. Le problème ne se pose pas (seulement) en termes de plus ou moins d'informations: c'est plutôt du côté de la conception sous jacente de l'information qu'il faut chercher la différence. Il s'agit grossièrement de la priorité qu'il faut accorder au processus (social, politique ou idéologique) par rapport à l'événement, dont le rôle se réduit à illustrer fidèlement le premier. Dans un pays où l'utilisation criarde de l'événement s'accompagne d'une occultation systématique du processus qu'il est censé faire accepter (c.f Parisien Libéré ou France-Soir) on a du mal à s'imaginer comment le contraire peut être tout aussi abrutissant sinon plus.

* Ce texte a été écrit à partir de quelques résultats ponctuels d'une recherche socio-linguistique en cours de l'auteur sur les rapports rhétorique de pouvoir/masse parlante dans le « socialisme » étatique.

C'est pourquoi il faut rappeler un aspect essentiel de la mise en pratique de cette conception: l'unique autorité, de fait et de droit, qui décide de l'existence de tel ou tel processus et de la nécessité d'informer de telle façon à la mettre en évidence est le Parti-Etat.

Il est évident que le plus souvent, ces processus n'existent que par rapport aux besoins du Parti-Etat de se légitimer et de faire accepter des décisions prises selon ses propres intérêts. Ainsi, pour que les lecteurs soient informés d'un événement quelconque, il faut que celui-ci s'inscrive positivement dans un processus en cours auquel correspond une rubrique particulière du journal ou bien qu'il puisse illustrer telle ou telle campagne que ce journal doit appuyer. On n'informe jamais de ce qui est nouveau pour les lecteurs, mais de ce qui devrait l'être. Les gens, qui n'ont pas pour autant perdu le besoin de s'informer, ont mis au point spontanément une institution de l'information fondée sur le « bruit »: inutile de rappeler les inconvénients de cette institution orale qui peut à tout moment être manipulée.

A partir de cette situation de l'information, on peut déjà détecter sur quelques points des éléments significatifs, susceptibles de constituer des informations sur la situation globale du pays. Il s'agit des écarts aux normes (les rubriques sont très hiérarchisées: politique du Parti, production, situation internationale, vie culturelle, etc, mais pas immuables; leur contenu est très prévisible, ce qui n'empêche pas des surprises) et du contenu de certaines campagnes sur des thèmes spécifiques. Mais les informations que l'on peut déduire de ce type de contradictions dans la presse officielle ont l'inconvénient de rendre compte plutôt des manœuvres du pouvoir en place et de ses divisions que des manifestations de ceux qui le subissent (sauf exceptionnellement à travers certaines campagnes de presse).

Un autre type de brèche est en train d'apparaître sous la pression de l'action, souvent inconsciente et généralement défensive, de certaines catégories de la population. Il s'agit de toute une série d'attitudes et de comportements individuels et collectifs que le pouvoir ne peut plus maîtriser par ses moyens classiques de répression. Leur multiplication met en danger le bon fonctionnement de la société gérée par la bureaucratie étatique. C'est pourquoi cette dernière fait appel aux moyens d'information pour tenter, sinon de les éliminer, du moins de limiter leur portée subversive. Il s'agit d'événements présentés

comme des faits divers, à partir desquels on essayera de rendre compte de ce qui se passe quotidiennement en Roumanie.

LES BONS ET LES MAUVAIS

Il y a principalement trois raisons qui font que l'on considère que les faits divers, ou plutôt ce qui nous est présenté comme tel par les quotidiens socialistes, peuvent être significatifs de ce qui se passe à l'Est du côté de ceux qui subissent le régime (d'une façon assez inconfortable pour ce dernier).

Primo: il s'agit d'un certain type de faits, qui ne s'inscrivent pas dans les journaux en question, et qui ne font pas forcément, lors de leur publication, l'objet d'une campagne nationale. Malgré cela, ils sont rapportés quotidiennement et d'une façon suivie. Secundo: la manière dont ils sont présentés et qualifiés traduit une attitude répressive vis-à-vis de ce type de faits. L'absence de toute tentative d'explication ou d'interrogation autre que rhétorique sur les causes de ces faits et le ton ironique-cynique de leur présentation montrent clairement la fonction de cette rubrique: faire appel aux réflexes les plus réactionnaires de l'opinion publique (bien gardés en réserve par les campagnes idéologiques du Parti-Etat). Tertio: il y a une somme d'informations qui passent à travers ce genre de faits divers qui contredisent une certaine image de marque qu'on pourrait avoir de ce type de régime à partir des autres façons dont il est présenté.

On a traduit plusieurs petits articles figurant dans une rubrique intitulée « le fait divers » du quotidien « Scînteia », organe du Comité Central du P.C. roumain. Afin d'éviter toute extrapolation, on a tenu à une traduction intégrale; pour les noms propres, seules figurent les initiales.

Comme ailleurs, aucune exception au traditionnel manichéisme socialiste: les bons-auteurs-de-faits-divers y figurent en même nombre que les mauvais-auteurs-de-fait-divers. Les premiers sont les bons sujets se sacrifiant pour la production, accomplissant des actions civiques exemplaires, ou ayant des « initiatives constructives ». C'est ce dernier cas qui sera illustré par l'article qui suit, traduit uniquement à titre d'exemple:

« Une idée originale de la mairie de B.: réunir toute la promotion de jeunes mariés de cette année. Les officiels de la mairie, des médecins, des professeurs, des juristes ont participé à la rencontre avec les jeunes couples. Il y a eu un dialogue fructueux dans une atmosphère de jeunesse et de bonnes dispositions. Les chefs de famille et les jeunes ménagères ont

déclaré à l'unisson que la meilleure entente règne dans leur foyer. On leur souhaite que cette entente reste la même dans les années à venir. Bonne chance » (25 novembre 1975).

Finie la belle époque où des ouvriers représentatifs pouvaient échapper à la production en servant de décorum dans les mondanités étatiques! c'est aux juristes, aux professeurs et aux médecins de consacrer le bonheur du couple. Mais apparemment tout le monde n'est pas capable de goûter ce bonheur socialiste:

Au tribunal de T.J., on prononce la sentence: 3 individus sont condamnés à une peine de 3 à 4 ans pour viol. Tous ceux qui étaient présents dans la salle considèrent la peine comme parfaitement méritée. En même temps, ces mêmes gens de la salle jettent des regards hostiles vers la partie "endommagée", c'est-à-dire vers R.H. Pourquoi? Parce que R.H., une femme de 34 ans, avait quitté son foyer, ses quatre enfants pour avoir une aventure amoureuse avec un jeune homme de T.J. qu'elle avait connu par hasard. Naturellement, les circonstances dont elle a été victime la protègent de l'indiscience de la loi. Mais elles ne l'absolvent pas de l'opprobre publique! » (14 sept. 1975).

Ainsi, si la femme qui refuse sa condition de mère dévouée(1) et de bonne ménagère a des ennuis (le viol + l'opprobre public), l'homme qui ne s'assume pas comme chef de famille a un destin encore plus tragique: il ne travaille plus, il boit, se bat, etc... Et lorsque les parents vont « bien », c'est leur enfant qui déconne. En voici un exemple: « Dans une lettre envoyée par l'entreprise d'industrialisation de la betterave à sucre de R., on prie nos lecteurs de venir au secours de l'ouvrier A.C. "qui travaille chez nous depuis 30 ans et qui est un homme capable et appliqué". De quoi s'agit-il? L'un de ses fils, I.C., a terminé l'école professionnelle de l'entreprise, a appris le métier d'électricien, et a été embauché dans la même entreprise à un très bon poste; mais il s'est enfui quelques mois après. Son père est maintenant obligé de supporter les frais de scolarisation. Mais outre cet aspect, la lettre attire notre attention sur le fait que le très jeune I.C. ne veut pas suivre l'exemple de son père ni de ses deux frères plus âgés — eux aussi ouvriers appliqués et élevés dans des principes d'honnêteté. Ils attendent tous qu'il retrouve sa raison » (3 septembre 1975).

(1) Rappelons qu'en Roumanie il n'y a pas de moyens contraceptifs et que l'avortement y est interdit.

Lorsque les intérêts de l'Etat se confondent avec ceux du père (ce qui n'est pas un hazard puisque le dernier doit duplifier les frais de scolarisation) quel excellent argument pour le rappel à l'Ordre! A propos des frais de scolarisation, il est écrit noir sur blanc dans la constitution que l'enseignement est gratuit; je mentionne ceci afin que l'on se fasse une idée de l'écart existant entre le juridique « théorique » et son application quotidienne.

L'ETAT FAIT SEMBLANT DE NOUS PAYER NOUS FAISONS SEMBLANT DE TRAVAILLER!

Aussi particuliers et accidentels que peuvent nous paraître les faits divers qu'on est en train d'analyser, il ne faut à aucun moment perdre de vue le fait que leur publication, qui entre souvent en contradiction avec le système d'information « socialiste » en vigueur, n'est due qu'à leur prolifération, à leur existence quotidienne et subversive à la longue. Surtout que lorsque ces comportements « pathologiques », « associaux », « antisocialistes » touchent le monde du travail, leur accumulation et l'hypothèse de leur généralisation représentent un potentiel subversif contre l'Etat-Partie, ce qui le rend impuissant et l'oblige à agir seulement pour en limiter les dégâts. Ce n'est qu'en ce sens qu'on peut considérer que ces faits constituent une forme de lutte dont l'efficacité ou l'inefficacité défensives ne doivent pas cacher le contenu subversif et les possibilités offensives. C'est beaucoup plus dans ces comportements que dans les conflits opposant les différentes fractions de la bureaucratie qu'il faut chercher les perspectives d'un changement social réel.

Si la répression des petits vols ne soulève pas forcément les objections des gens, — encore qu'on puisse s'inquiéter de la façon dont cette répression est présentée — le problème se pose différemment lorsqu'il s'agit de récupération proprement dite. La société accepte, non par charité ou générosité, mais par nécessité, que le travailleur (mal payé et privé de toute organisation réellement défensive) s'approprie une partie du produit de son travail; il s'agit souvent d'une question de survie. En ce sens, l'Etat-Partie essaie, à travers la presse, beaucoup moins de faire appel à l'opprobre public que de rappeler la répression qui existe pour ce genre de délit.

« Les phares du tracteur perçaient la nuit sur un des chemins de B. Dans la remorque se trouvaient plusieurs mécaniciens de la ferme N. qui rentraient à la maison, dans la com

mune T. A un moment donné, le tracteur fut arrêté par la milice. Après un bref contrôle, on a découvert que les mécaniciens avaient avec eux 30 à 40 kilogs de maïs dérobés à la ferme où ils travaillaient. Inutile de préciser qu'on a confisqué le maïs à ces malhonnêtes. Ajoutons qu'on a condamné chacun d'eux à une amende de 200 lei. Encore un détail: citons tuellement l'un d'entre eux. "Si j'avais su, je n'aurai pas fait cette connerie, mais je pensais qu'à cette heure-ci la milice ne courrait pas les rues!" Et voilà que pour des gens comme lui elle court! » (9 sept. 1975).

Et puisque l'ironie qui termine l'article précédent n'est pas obligatoirement efficace pour le travailleur qui enfreint la loi, on ne se gêne pas, à l'occasion, pour faire appel au hazard qui sévit contre les malhonnêtes, afin de déjouer les tentatives d'autres récupérateurs en puissance:

«Les chauffeurs de tracteurs I.S. et I.P. se sont mis d'accord: le premier s'est engagé vis-à-vis du deuxième à lui amener de la pierre pour la construction de sa maison. La nuit, en circulant en douce dans les champs pour ne pas être aperçus des miliciens, ils ont écrasé par erreur un villageois venu lui aussi les aider. Une vie... pour un transport en douce! » (10 septembre 1975).

Mais il n'y a pas que les paysans (dont les penchants vicieux peuvent toujours expliquer le comportement antisocial pour les fins idéologues du Parti) pour transgresser les lois: les ouvriers récupèrent aussi.

« En quittant l'atelier de l'usine "Le Tracteur", I.N. se félicitait déjà de sa réussite. Il a même souri au gardien en serrant le pain sous son bras. Mais ce n'était pas un pain comme les autres puisqu'il y avait introduit une bobine. Et voilà que I.S., un gardien, lui demande: « Pourquoi as-tu acheté du pain ce matin et non pas en sortant du travail? oui, mais... alors le gardien prit le pain qui pesait un peu trop lourd! » (10 septembre 1975).

Dans ce contexte, la désertion du travail (collective ou individuelle) prend une nouvelle dimension:

« E.M., chauffeur dans une entreprise de bâtiment de Z., s'est fait remettre une feuille de transport nécessaire pour effectuer un voyage jusqu'à C.T. Alors que la course en question aurait pu être faite en huit heures, E.M. n'était toujours pas de retour à l'entreprise au bout de trois jours. Ceux du garage et ses collègues de travail l'ont cherché partout. Quelqu'un en a déduit qu'il avait vraisemblablement eu un acci-

dent grave, qu'il s'était renversé dans un quelconque ravin. Personne n'en savait rien, tout le monde le cherchait. En vain. Mais le chauffeur a été retrouvé là où personne ne s'y attendait: chez lui, à la maison. Interrogé sur le pourquoi et le comment, E.M. a répondu candidement « jai pris moi aussi quelques jours de vacances. Et bien quoi? ». Mais justement, ce n'est pas bien du tout! On le lui a clairement dit, et maintenant, il va en redonner de sa poche » (16 décembre 1975).

Lorsqu'il y a complicité évidente entre les travailleurs et les usagers, dans le cas des transports publics par exemple, on peut s'imaginer le danger que cela représente pour le bon fonctionnement moral et économique de l'Etat bureaucratique. Voici un bel exemple de « désobéissance civique » (situation assez fréquente):

« L'autobus n° x circule sur la route S.G. Pendant le trajet, quelques personnes montent. Le chauffeur V.R. encaisse l'argent, mais ne délivre pas de billets. 10 km avant le terminus, on fait une vérification; sur 20 passagers, 13 n'avaient pas de billet. Mais pour payer, ils avaient payé quelque chose: en tout celà faisait plus de 100 lei. Somme que s'était attribué le chauffeur. Et les autres voyages, les autres jours? Alors comment s'étonner que de tels voyages soient considérés par l'entreprise de transport comme non rentables! Evidemment, avec de tels chauffeurs! » (25 novembre 1975).

Et comme par hazard, lorsque les déviations sont l'oeuvre des bureaucrates eux-mêmes, c'est le travailleur qui paye, comme l'avoue l'article suivant — qui pourrait constituer une bonne introduction au labyrinthe bureaucratique:

« C.A., chef-comptable d'une fabrique de chaudières de B., est tombé en panne avec sa voiture personnelle. Il a téléphoné au chantier en priant l'ingénieur N.N. de lui envoyer d'urgence une voiture de remorquage. L'ingénieur charge le contremaître de résoudre le problème. Celui-ci dicte ses ordres au chauffeur D.A. qui doit aller dépanner le chef-comptable; mais pas seul, accompagné de mécanicien S.V., qui est censé assurer l'assistance technique. Dons une voiture de l'Etat et deux hommes ont été utilisés pendant le temps de travail pour résoudre un problème qui n'avait rien à voir avec le travail. Surpris dans sa course, le chauffeur a été — légalement — pénalisé par les organes de la milice. Donc il était coupable de ne pas avoir lui aussi un subalterne? » (16 décembre 1975).

On a beaucoup insisté sur le caractère quotidien de ce type de faits divers. Pour comprendre leur impact réel il faudrait

ne pas perdre de vue que ne sont publiés que les faits qui ont déjà subi la répression. Mais combien réussissent à échapper à cette répression? Le fait divers suivant le prouve tout à fait:

« En observant systématiquement l'utilisation qui est faite des voitures propriété de l'Etat afin de pouvoir prévenir et sanctionner les infractions, la milice du département de M. a établi des statistiques « à jour » sur les phénomènes constatés. Et qu'ont-ils constaté? 104 camions se sont mis en route sans autorisation; 451 voitures ont été repérées circulant sur d'autres trajets que ceux légalement établis; pas moins de 645 voitures étaient garées devant les domiciles de certains chefs d'unités ou de certains chauffeur; 365 autres voitures circulaient sur des chemins détournés, qui n'étaient pas inscrits sur les feuilles de route habituelles, en d'autres mots effectuaient des transports clandestins... La question: qui supporte les dégâts? » (27 août 1975).

Et bien la réponse n'est pas difficile à trouver: c'est l'Etat. Or pour les chauffeurs en question, comme pour les travailleurs roumains en général, l'Etat, avant d'être ouvrier (dégénéré ou pas!) ou bourgeois, démocratique ou populaire, l'Etat c'est « l'Autre », le Patron qu'il faut combattre pour (sur) vivre. Ce n'est pas un hazard si l'un des mots d'esprit les plus courants chez les travailleurs roumains est « l'Etat fait semblant de nous payer nous on fait semblant de travailler ».

QUELQUES CONCLUSIONS

On disait au début que la règle de la presse socialiste, c'est que l'information doit exemplariser les processus déclenchés et contrôlés par le Parti-Etat, mais qu'il existe néanmoins des brêches, que nous avons essayé de mettre en évidence à travers ces faits divers. En ne s'inscrivant pas dans les processus que la bureaucratie contrôle, les faits divers sont souvent les signes d'un processus social dont la bureaucratie est certainement la cause, mais qui cette fois-ci va à son encontre. La désertion de la production, la récupération du produit du travail, le détournement de l'outil de travail, mais aussi la révolte contre la famille, l'école ou la condition de la femme constituent des formes de lutte qui prouvent une remise en question permanente de la bureaucratie étatique, de sa production et de ses institutions.

L'approche de ce type de « faits divers », combat quotidien nullement spectaculaire, mais non moins significatif pour au-

tant, pourra peut-être permettre l'avènement d'une nouvelle relation entre les travailleurs, les jeunes ou les femmes en lutte en France et leurs camarades de l'Est. Une relation non plus de charité ou d'étonnement devant les Goulags, mais de véritable solidarité.

Ceux qui seraient intéressés par ce type de travail sur l'information dans les pays de l'Est (surtout autre que la Roumanie) peuvent écrire à « Lutter », B.P. 1902/45009, ORLEANS Cedex. Le débouché d'une telle démarche collective coordonné pourrait être la parution d'un bulletin d'information, libertaire, sur les pays de l'Est.

SUMMARY

In the so-called Socialist countries news reporting is not a major feature of the mass-media, unlike that of the western countries. The « facts » are reported by the press with the sole purpose of illustrating that image of social, political and economic reality which serves to legitimise the Party/State. Therefore, in order to inform readers about something that has happened, the information must either be inserted into the typical articles which the papers carry, on topics such as party politics, industrial production, culture, and so forth, or be included in press campaigns on a national level.

Despite all this, every day the papers carry news of « various events » which can be derived from these contrived viewpoints and can be useful in shedding light on the real nature of society and its problems. The author has translated a series of these article from SCINTEIA, the organ of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party, and here presents a sort of anthology in which it is possible to find much interesting information on absenteeism, the reappropriation by people of the fruits of their labour, rebellion against the family, or against the State-controlled schools, all of which provides us with a « sectional » view of the struggle carried on from day to day in small ways by the people against oppression by the authorities.

RIASSUNTO

A differenza dei paesi occidentali, il carattere principale dell'informazione nei paesi che si dicono socialisti non è la cronaca degli avvenimenti. I « fatti » vengono riportati dalla stampa unicamente allo scopo di illustrare quell'immagine della realtà sociale, politica, economica, che è funzionale ai bisogni di legittimazione del Partito-Stato. Così, perché i lettori vengano informati di qualche avvenimento, è necessario che esso possa essere inserito o tra gli argomenti di una delle rubriche di cui sono composti i giornali (politica di partito, produzione, vita culturale, ecc.) o in una campagna di stampa a livello nazionale.

Nonostante ciò, tutti i giornali riportano quotidianamente alcuni « fatti vari » che spesso escono da queste prospettive programmate e possono essere utili a gettare luce sulla natura reale della società ed i suoi problemi. L'autore ha tradotto una serie di questi articoli da SCINTEIA, organo del Comitato Centrale del P.C. rumeno, e ne offre qui un florilegio, dal quale si possono ottenere interessanti notizie su fenomeni di assenteismo dal lavoro, riappropriazione dei frutti della propria attività, rivolta contro la famiglia o la scuola di stato, che costituiscono una specie di « spaccato » della lotta, umile e quotidiana, della popolazione contro l'oppressione del potere.

RESUMEN

Contrariamente a lo de los países occidentales, el carácter principal de la información en los países que se dicen socialistas no es la crónica de los acontecimientos. Los « hechos » son referidos por la prensa solo si sirvien a la ilustración de aquella imagen de la realidad social, política, económica, que sirve, a su vez, a las necesidades de legitimación del Partido/Estado. Así, por que los lectores sean informados de algo, es necesario que eso pueda insertarse o entre los objetos de algunas de las rúbricas que componen los periódicos (política de partido, producción, vida cultural, etc.) o en una campaña de prensa de nivel nacional.

A pesar de esto, todos los diarios informan cada día de algunos « hechos diversos » que frecuentemente están fuera de esta perspectiva de programación y pueden ser muy útiles para la comprensión de la real naturaleza de la sociedad y sus problemas.

El autor ha traducido muchos de estos pequeños artículos desde el organo oficial del P.C. de Rumanía, Scinteia, y ofrece aquí una selección de noticias muy interesantes sobre fenómenos de ausencia del trabajo, re-apropiación de los productos, rebelión contra la familia o la escuela de Estado, que constituyen una « corte vertical » de la lucha, modesta y cotidiana, de la población contra la opresión del poder.

Bruno Rizzi e il collettivismo burocratico

E' recentemente scomparso, nell'indifferenza quasi generale, Bruno Rizzi, che pure è stato, tra i figli « degeneri » del marxismo, una delle intelligenze più vivaci e, a suo tempo, più note. A testimonianza dell'interesse che tuttora rivestono alcune delle « intuizioni » di questo pensatore, pubblichiamo qui alcuni brani tratti dal suo libro « Il collettivismo burocratico », preceduti da una breve nota di Bruno Bongiovanni, che di Rizzi è oggi uno dei conoscitori più esperti.

Il previsto articolo di Claudio Venza sul potere militare in Italia verrà pubblicato in altra occasione.

Negli anni trenta, davanti all'enigma della natura sociale dell'URSS, il marxismo si trovava, nelle sue varie correnti, tutt'altro che concorde: è naturalmente fuori questione il marxismo sovietico, che andava esaltando, con il fragore dei piani quinquennali, il socialismo realizzato e compiuto, garantito dalla costituzione e difeso dall'Armata Rossa. Si allude qui al marxismo dell'opposizione comunista ed al marxismo della socialdemocrazia, che negavano entrambi un contenuto socialista al regime sovietico. I socialdemocratici ritenevano con Kautsky l'URSS una sorta di dittatura di partito su un paese che cercava di uscire dall'arretratezza agraria e con Otto Bauer ritenevano l'URSS una società quasi socialista, anche se viaggiata da una struttura politica antidemocratica. Nel campo antiriformista dell'opposizione comunista le posizioni erano egualmente differenziate: i comunisti dei consigli tedeschi ed olandesi ritenevano l'URSS uno Stato capitalistico di tipo burocratico, dove la controrivoluzione staliniana aveva rapidamente spazzato le tracce dei contenuti minoritariamente operai — e prevalentemente contadini — della rivoluzione del 1917: i bolscevico-leninisti, meglio conosciuti come trockisti, ritenevano invece l'URSS uno Stato operaio degenerato, una formazione sociale post-capitalistica e pre-socialistica, dove una burocrazia feroce — casta e non classe — aveva espropriato il potere del proletariato usurpandone la dittatura. I comunisti della frazione italiana all'estero — quelli che sarebbero poi diventati più noti come bordighisti — negli anni trenta non negavano ancora la natura proletaria dello Stato sovietico, ma ritenevano che la sua politica fosse già entrata nell'orbita degli Stati capitalistici e di conseguenza rifiutavano, a differenza dei trockisti, ogni forma di sostegno alla politica sovietica. Nell'ambito di queste valutazioni, Bruno Rizzi, un militante comunista italiano ritiratosi dalla politica attiva, fece alcune riflessioni di penetrante acume che servirono, se non a dare delle certezze, a mettere in luce le difficoltà che incontrava il marxismo — sia pure quello che non aveva ceduto alla degenerazione staliniana — di fronte alla questione della natura sociale e dello Stato sovietici. Bruno Rizzi, a differenza di Trockij, che continuava alla vigilia della guerra a sperare imminente e possibile la rivoluzione proletaria mondiale, prendeva atto implicitamente che con la stabilizzazione succeduta alla grande crisi e con il consolidamento dei vari regimi autoritari si era aperta una lunga fase controrivoluzionaria: si poteva dunque continuare a considerare, come faceva Trockij, la burocrazia una casta e cioè una semplice escrescenza mo-

mentanea, una sorta di effimero parassita, o non doveva questa essere considerata come un'entità storicamente più importante e cioè una nuova classe dominante?

Queste valutazioni sulla nuova classe dominante, in modo non sempre univoco, le formulavano già da anni i comunisti dei consigli, quel che rimaneva del *Linksradikalismus* tedesco, ma costoro ritenevano che la nuova classe dominante, la burocrazia di partito e quella dell'amministrazione, esercitasse un potere dittoriale su una società capitalistica, anzi su una società che, nel 1917, aveva appena compiuto la sua rivoluzione borghese, pur nell'assenza di una borghesia di tipo tradizionale. Per Bruno Rizzi, al contrario, la nuova classe dominante esercita la propria dittatura su una società di tipo nuovo, il collettivismo burocratico, formazione storico-sociale inedita e destinata, proprio in virtù della fase controrivoluzionaria in atto, ad essere qualcosa di più che un semplice incidente storico sulla strada del socialismo.

Il collettivismo burocratico è un modo di produzione che s'interseca, contro ogni speranza di emancipazione, tra il capitalismo ormai in declino ed il socialismo ancora lontano: l'URSS non è altro che l'avanguardia di un processo storico-sociale, è *il nostro futuro*. La strada del collettivismo burocratico la stanno già percorrendo, secondo il Rizzi del '37-'39, l'Italia fascista e la Germania nazista, gli Stati Uniti del New Deal e la Francia dei Fronti popolari. Variano le forme politiche, univoca è la sostanza sociale: i nuovi padroni del nuovo sistema sono i tecnici ed i burocrati, i controllori dell'economia e dell'amministrazione. Bruno Rizzi, partendo dalle analisi di Trockij, porta alle estreme conseguenze la dottrina della usurpazione burocratica dello Stato operaio ed arriva a sconvolgere dall'interno l'edificio concettuale trockista nonché a mettere in discussione punti non secondari dello stesso marxismo. Non è possibile in questa breve nota discutere in tutti i suoi punti lo schema interpretativo del Rizzi. Resta comunque un fatto che il potere politico e sociale degli organismi burocratici è andato aumentando in misura enorme dal 1939 ad oggi, erodendo progressivamente, anche in Occidente, le forme di potere tradizionalmente borghesi, fondate su sempre più obsolete forme di proprietà individuale. Le intuizioni di Bruno Rizzi restano oggi della massima importanza per tutti coloro che vedono nella « burocratizzazione del mondo » la definitiva espropriazione, da parte della classe dei nuovi padroni, di ogni libertà e di ogni prerogativa individuale e collettiva.

BRUNO BONGIOVANNI

Da «Il collettivismo burocratico»

BRUNO RIZZI

LA PROPRIETA' DI CLASSE

Dato che Trotzky conferisce un valore incommensurabile al fatto che la contraddizione non è passata dal dominio della ripartizione a quello della produzione, vien fatto di pensare che egli concepisca la produzione sovietica come di marca socialista. Ci sembra che questa volta ci sia ancora un'illusione ottica che non è dalla nostra parte.

Pel solo fatto che la proprietà è nazionalizzata e l'economia pianificata, si pensa che la produzione sia di una qualità sufficientemente socialista onde assicurarci il permanere dello « Stato Operaio ». In realtà tutto il sistema di produzione resta collettivo come nella organizzazione delle grandi imprese capitaliste, mentre la proprietà passa dalla forma privata a quella collettiva. Ne viene quindi che se le caratteristiche economiche sono le sole determinanti della natura dello Stato, per quanto riguarda l'U.R.S.S., noi siamo ridotti alle nazionalizzazioni ed ai piani statali.

Resta a vedere che cosa rappresenti effettivamente la nazionalizzazione della proprietà nell'U.R.S.S. e qui anche noi, senza avere la pretesa di essere marxisti ortodossi, ci permettiamo di esaminare il disotto dei fatti. Certamente essa è stata la prima misura rivoluzionaria decretata dalla classe operaia al potere nel fine della costruzione socialista, ma questa si è arrestata con la degenerazione staliniana ed è logico indagare che cosa sia socialmente diventata quella nazionalizzazione che doveva concludere in una socializzazione della proprietà. In un modo semplicista ci si dice che la proprietà è « nazionalizzata ». È ben poco per dei marxisti scientifici. Chi la dirige? Non certamente il proletariato, ma bensì la burocrazia sovietica. Tutti sono d'accordo su questo punto nel campo di Agramante*, e Trotzky aggiunge

* Il campo d'Agramante è, per Rizzi, quello delle diverse « chiese » marxiste (Nd.R.).

che la ripartizione dei prodotti viene fatta in modo per cui la burocrazia si taglia la parte del leone. Noi ci domandiamo quale sorta di proprietà « nazionalizzata » sia questa, diretta in modo esclusivo da una classe che s'impossessa poi dei prodotti in modo altrettanto sfacciato di quello usato dalla vecchia borghesia. Negli effetti esiste in Russia una classe sfruttatrice che tiene in mano i mezzi di produzione e si contiene esattamente come una proprietaria di questi. Il suo possesso non è frazionato tra i suoi componenti ma, quest'ultimi, in blocco, come classe, sono i reali possessori di tutta la proprietà « nazionalizzata ».

Sembra che la proprietà dopo esser stata di tutti, quasi insistente per gli uomini dell'epoca selvaggia ed esser passata poi alle comunità per trasformarsi quindi in proprietà privata, riasuma ora una forma collettiva nella veste di proprietà di classe.

La classe sfruttatrice in Russia è diventata proprietaria ed ha concretizzata la sua essenza giuridico-sociale. Per sfuggire all'assalto dei lavoratori essa li incanta con la « nazionalizzazione » della proprietà, come se ciò rappresentasse negli effetti una proprietà di tutti. Ciononostante essa ha paura e non può sviluppare il suo lavoro in un ambiente democratico; è, almeno momentaneamente, condannata a costruire uno Stato poliziesco.

Le forme di proprietà devono mettersi al passo col sistema di produzione e se la classe sfruttata non è all'altezza del suo compito storico, dal dissolvimento della classe dominante ne esce una nuova classe, chiamiamola storicamente parassitaria, che nello Stato poliziesco forse manifesta la condanna della Storia.

La contraddizione tra il modo di produzione e la forma della proprietà, proprie della società capitalista, viene quindi ad essere risolta nell'U.R.S.S. anche senza il raggiungimento del Socialismo e l'elevarsi del proletariato a classe dominante. Lo sfruttamento resta e passa soltanto dal dominio dell'uomo a quello della classe sulla classe. Lo sfruttamento umano sotto la spinta dell'ineluttabile sviluppo economico ha assunta una nuova forma. La proprietà da privata è diventata collettiva, ma di classe; in modo diverso noi non sapremmo definire questa proprietà « nazionale » che non è di tutti, questa proprietà che non è né borghese, né proletaria, che non è privata, ma che non è neanche socialista.

Trotzky non riesce a concepire la nuova classe sfruttatrice in Russia, non riesce a concepire la progressiva polverizzazione della borghesia nel mondo, non intravvede la determinazione

sempre più rimarchevole della proprietà di classe non solo in Russia, ma anche nei paesi totalitari. Concepisce il mondo « come società borghese in disfacimento (pourissant) ».

Ben poca cosa per un marxista che pretende all'analisi scientifica. Da Mussolini a Labriola, da Tardieu a Wallace, tutta la letteratura di questo quarto di secolo non è che un'accusa ed un sarcasmo indirizzato alla vecchia società borghese. Il « de profundis » è stato cantato al capitalismo in tutte le lingue. A noi sembra che il compito dei marxisti « scientifici », depositari della dialettica della lotta di classe, non sia quello di svignarsela con una definizione banale, ma consista precisamente nel vedere qual è il movimento di classi che si avvera in quest'epoca della fine del capitalismo, e di fissare, oltre le nuove forme di proprietà, i nuovi rapporti sociali. Vediamo così che il celebre « plus valore » non è scomparso neanche in questo Stato-rebus che è l'Unione Sovietica, sulla qual cosa son tutti d'accordo. Le discordanze sopravvengono quando si tratta d'individuare dove va a finire. Va forse alla borghesia inesistente? No. Va forse agli operai? Neppure poichè allora si avvererebbe il fatto che il Socialismo è in costruzione in un solo paese e precisamente in quello della « grande menzogna ». Dobbiamo forse pensare che il plus-valore va allo « Stato Operaio »?

Per le ragioni sopradette sarebbe il trionfo dello stalinismo di cui Trotzky è il primo nemico e se qualcuno volesse pretendere che il plus-valore è scomparso nel paese dei Soviets, bisognerebbe dedurne che anche la forza-lavoro non è più comperata ed allora il Socialismo sarebbe un fatto contro ogni evidenza.

In realtà non vi è che una risposta possibile ed ammissibile: il plus-valore passa alla nuova classe sfruttatrice: la burocrazia in blocco.

Quando si ammette che la società è in via di decomposizione, già significa che essa sta perdendo le sue caratteristiche economiche; ciò precisa che le caratteristiche peculiari della classe dominante scompaiono e la Società diviene un'altra. Il fenomeno compiuto, nel così detto Stato Sovietico, si trova in via di formazione ovunque nel mondo. Quella proprietà di classe che in Russia è un fatto acquisito non risulta certamente registrata presso alcun notaio od in nessun catasto, ma la nuova classe sfruttatrice sovietica non ha bisogno di queste bagatelle, essa ha la forza dello Stato nelle mani e ciò vale ben più che le vecchie registrazioni giuridiche della borghesia. Essa salvaguardia la sua proprietà con le mitragliatrici del suo apparecchio d'oppressione onnipotente e non con documenti notarili.

Se per il fascismo, coi suoi concetti di collaborazione di clas-

se e di Stato al di sopra delle classi, è sostenibile la tesi della proprietà nazionalizzata noi non comprendiamo come dei marxisti, anche se scientifici, se la possono cavare su questo punto. Per Marx e Lenin lo Stato è l'organo di oppressione della classe dominante; fin che esiste lo Stato permangono le classi; e la proprietà sotto l'egida dello Stato è negli effetti gestita dalla classe dominante a mezzo del suo apparato di dominio. Marxitamente parlando, il concetto di proprietà nazionalizzata non ha senso, è antiscientifico e antimarxista. Per Marx la proprietà privata doveva divenire socialista e come tale l'intendeva, almeno in forma potenziale, anche nel periodo della dittatura proletaria. Seguendo la teoria marxista, dietro lo Stato c'è sempre la classe e se non fu preveduta la possibilità di una forma immediata di proprietà (la proprietà di classe), ciò dipende quasi certamente dal calcolo errato di una rapida scomparsa delle classi dopo che il proletariato avrebbe preso il potere. In realtà, anche durante la dittatura del proletariato, la proprietà assume il carattere di classe, appartiene ed è gestita dai burocrati, solo potenzialmente manifesta il suo carattere socialista. Che se poi la proprietà viene nazionalizzata in un regime non proletario, perde anche il suo carattere potenziale di proprietà socialista per restare unicamente proprietà di classe.

Nel caso dell'U.R.S.S., Stato ove la borghesia ha un peso sociale trascurabile, se l'organizzazione statale permane, ciò significa che almeno due classi devono essere ancora in vita ed efficienti. Se il buon senso si rifiuta di ritenere i lavoratori sovietici proprietari dei mezzi di produzione è logico pensare che la proprietà di questi appartenga effettivamente alla burocrazia. Altro che « commesso »; si tratta di un proprietario ben definito.

Molto probabilmente il fatto che non sia stata prevista una forma transitoria di proprietà tra quella privata e quella socialista sta alla base non solo della discordia nel campo di Agramante, ma anche della confusione politica ancora regnante nel mondo ove si valuta per Socialismo o Capitalismo l'operato di Stalin, Mussolini o Hitler mentre in realtà si tratta di Collettivismo Burocratico.

Nel campo di Agramante si fanno degli sforzi terribili per parare a queste logiche deduzioni.

Il luogotenente Naville richiesto « di quale differenza si tratti tra la proprietà privata e la proprietà collettiva se solo una burocrazia può approfittare di questa, risponde non esservi che una differenza di grado tra la proprietà privata capitalistica e la gigantesca proprietà « privata » della burocrazia.

Mirabolante trovata. La proprietà di svariati milioni di citta-

dini concepiti nel loro complesso sociale resterebbe ancora privata. Ma ci sa dire allora questo marxista scientifico che cosa intende per proprietà collettiva? E perché allora non resterebbe privata anche la proprietà di una società socialista, se è questione di grado soltanto? Forse che questo Solone scambia la Società Umana con una Società per azioni?

Le Società Umane vanno considerate in sintesi e non in somme. La proprietà privata è e resta tale finché con lo statizzarsi continuo non cambia le sue caratteristiche.

La legge dialettica di Hegel della trasformazione della quantità in qualità vale anche per la proprietà. La prima cristallizzazione della proprietà collettiva si identifica con la proprietà di classe anche se sotto l'egida del proletariato. Che i marxisti non l'abbiano previsto e non lo vedano, è un altro affare.

Se per Naville resta privata la proprietà delle statizzazioni fasciste, anche se questo processo sta per sommersere tutto il capitalismo, non vediamo per quale ragione non si debba considerare come privata anche la proprietà delle nazionalizzazioni sovietiche, dove il processo è completamente acquisito e la burocrazia ne è la grande beneficiaria. Seguendo il suo ragionamento questa deduzione è logica anche se errata. In realtà la nazionalizzazione dei mezzi di produzione nell'U.R.S.S. ha creato una forma di proprietà collettiva, ma di classe che risolve l'antagonismo capitalista della produzione collettiva e dell'appropriazione privata*. Noi non usiamo due pesi e due misure nell'esame dei fatti sociali ed affermiamo che anche il profondo travaglio economico degli Stati Totalitari con le nazionalizzazioni ed i piani economici porta alla risoluzione dello stesso antagonismo con la conseguenza sociale dell'apparizione della proprietà di classe, del dominio della burocrazia, del polverizzamento della borghesia e della trasformazione dei proletari in sudditi di Stato.

Riferendosi alla burocrazia in genere, Naville continua: « Che essa abbia o no dei titoli di proprietà, ed essa non ne ha, la burocrazia non può disporre (ripartire) liberamente, né di un capitale accumulato, né del plus-valore prodotto. Non si tratta per essa che di una proprietà capitalista privata, anche su scala di monopoli statali ».

A noi pare che la verità abbia proprio un senso contrario. La burocrazia sovietica in ispecie dispone dei capitali accumulati e

ripartisce il plus-valore. Trotzky arriva a dire: « Ciò che non era se non una deformazione burocratica si appresta ora a divorare lo Stato Operaio senza lasciar nulla e a formare sulle rovine della proprietà nazionalizzata una nuova classe possidente ». Ed aggiungiamo noi: chi dirige l'economia? Chi appresta i piani quinquennali? Chi fissa i prezzi di vendita? Chi decreta le opere pubbliche, gli impianti industriali ecc. se non la burocrazia sovietica? E se la proprietà non fosse a disposizione di questa, per chi dunque è a disposizione e chi è incaricato della ripartizione del plus-valore? Forse la sepolta borghesia tzarista, l'imperialismo mondiale od il proletariato russo? Naville non ci dà spiegazioni e continua: « Si tratta allora di una nuova forma di proprietà, dei rapporti stabiliti storicamente sulla base dell'appropriazione collettiva, ma a beneficio di una classe particolare, la burocrazia? In questo caso, bisognerebbe ammettere che la burocrazia gioisce del sistema « come una classe capitalista », poiché si approprierebbe del plus-valore come un'« impresa capitalista ».

Sì, perbacco, proprio si tratta di questo, ma bisogna ammettere che la burocrazia gioisce del sistema della Società divisa in classi, non già come classe capitalista, ma burocratica e che si appropria del plus-valore non già come una impresa capitalista, ma come una classe sfruttatrice.

Al contrario, alla domanda che il Naville timidamente si pone egli risponde in questo modo: « La storia dimostra che il fenomeno della produzione e della appropriazione del plus-valore non è proprio limitato al capitalismo liberale o al monopolio privato. La rendita fondiaria e il plus-valore che esistevano all'epoca del feudalesimo hanno preso il loro senso con l'economia mercantile e poi con lo sviluppo industriale. Essi continuano ad esistere nell'U.R.S.S. malgrado i dinieghi di Stalin, Boukharin e della loro scuola. "Solo essi sono nazionalizzati; e la differenza essenziale è qui". Se si vuole chiarire la natura della società sovietica attuale, bisogna evitare gli errori anche da questa parte ».

Messo al muro e nell'ineluttabile necessità di ammettere che il plus-valore « prende tutto il suo senso » anche nel Collettivismo Burocratico, il discepolo di Trotzky gira poco scientificamente l'ostacolo e sottolinea la posizione ambigua, antimarxista e reazionaria, per cui rendita fondiaria e plus-valore verrebbero nazionalizzate nella società sovietica. Vi riscontra anche una differenza essenziale.

Gli risponderemo con le parole del suo maestro che nella "Rivoluzione Tradita così si esprimeva: « Non è contestabile che

i marxisti, a cominciare da Marx stesso abbiano impiegato relativamente allo Stato Operaio i termini di proprietà "statale", "nazionale" e "socialista" come dei sinonimi. A delle grandi scale storiche, questo modo di parlare non presentava degli inconvenienti. Ma esso diviene la sorgente di errori grossolani e di inganni allorché si tratta delle prime tappe non ancora assicurate dell'evoluzione della nuova società isolata ed in ritardo dal punto di vista economico sui paesi capitalisti.

La proprietà privata, per divenire sociale, deve ineluttabilmente passare per la statizzazione, così come il bruco, per divenire farfalla deve passare per la crisalide. Ma la crisalide non è una farfalla. Delle miriadi di crisalidi periscono prima di trasformarsi in farfalle. La proprietà dello Stato non diviene quella del "popolo intero" che nella misura della scomparsa dei privilegi e delle distinzioni sociali, fase in cui lo Stato, per conseguenza, perde la sua ragione di essere. Detto altrimenti: la proprietà dello Stato diviene socialista via via che cessa di essere proprietà di Stato. Ma al contrario: più lo Stato sovietico si eleva al di sopra del popolo, più duramente egli si oppone come delapidatore guardiano della proprietà e più chiaramente egli testimonia contro il carattere socialista della proprietà statizzata».

Non sembra quindi che in seguito ad una cosiddetta nazionalizzazione della proprietà, la rendita fondiaria ed il plus-valore risultino effettivamente nazionalizzati ossia di tutto il popolo. Differenze essenziali non ne esistono se non quella per cui non è più la borghesia la classe sfruttatrice e che incassa il plus-valore, ma è la burocrazia che si è aggiudicata questo onore.

Naville gioca sull'identità tra la proprietà nazionalizzata e proprietà socialista il che non ci sembra, né troppo scientifico, né troppo marxista. Era scusabile un tale errore ai tempi di Marx, ma non più ai discepoli ora che le previsioni del maestro, anche se non chiare, prendono sostanza sociale.

Se si vuol appurare « la natura della società sovietica attuale » bisogna proprio evitare degli errori anche da questa parte e sviscerare che cosa realmente rappresenta socialmente parlando, la proprietà nazionalizzata. D'accordo che questo lavoro deve essere fatto in modo scientifico, marxista se così meglio agrada ai cavalieri d'Agramante. Noi non pretendiamo di averlo compiuto, ma solamente abbozzato.

Seguendo questa strada, anche l'avvento dello Stato Totalitario nel mondo risulterà un poco più chiaro a coloro che fin qui ci hanno dimostrata una totale incomprensione nei confronti del Fascismo ancora bollato quale salvatore e continuatore del capitalismo.

In questi regimi una nuova classe dirigente in formazione dichiara che il capitale è al servizio dello Stato. Fa seguire i fatti, fissa già in gran parte i prezzi delle merci ed i salari dei lavoratori, organizza su di un piano prestabilito l'economia nazionale.

Evidentemente la proprietà dei mezzi di produzione non è così semplice ad individuarsi come quella dei mezzi di consumo. Questi ultimi sono di uso personale, ma gli altri sono più fissi delle montagne. Non c'è alcun proprietario, né alcuna classe, né alcun Stato che se li possa collocare sulle spalle e trascinarli dove meglio gli piace. Niente da meravigliarsi quindi se si avverano momenti in cui è difficile determinarne la proprietà.

Per conto nostro, nell'U.R.S.S. i proprietari sono coloro che tengono la forza nelle mani: i burocrati. Sono coloro che dirigono l'economia così come era normale tra i borghesi. Sono coloro che si appropriano dei profitti come è regolare presso tutte le classi sfruttatrici. Sono coloro che fissano i salari ed i prezzi di vendita delle merci: i burocrati ancora una volta.

Gli operai non hanno che fare con la direzione sociale, tanto meno con gli incassi del plus-valore e tanto peggio per quanto riguarda la difesa di questa strana proprietà « nazionalizzata ». Gli operai russi sono ancora degli sfruttati ed i burocrati sono i loro sfruttatori.

La proprietà nazionalizzata dalla Rivoluzione di Ottobre appartiene ora come un « tutto » alla classe che la dirige, la sfrutta e... la salvaguardia: essa è proprietà di classe.

Col sistema di produzione collettivo integratosi durante l'evoluzione capitalista, la proprietà privata non poteva sfuggire alla collettivizzazione. La realtà è che la proprietà collettiva non si trova sotto la protezione della classe proletaria, ma bensì sotto quella di una nuova classe che nell'U.R.S.S. rappresenta un fatto sociale ormai compiuto mentre negli Stati Totalitari è in via di formazione.

LO SFRUTTAMENTO BUROCRATICO

Se è vero che l'U.R.S.S. si è fissata in una nuova forma sociale stabile, diversa dal capitalismo e dal socialismo e che al posto della vecchia borghesia è sopraggiunta un'altra classe dominante, ci spiegherete anche qual è la nuova forma di sfruttamento e per quali vie il plus-valore viene estorto ai lavoratori.

Così o presso a poco, hanno il diritto di esprimersi i marxisti scientifici e noi faremo del nostro meglio per venire incontro ai loro desideri. Se Trotzky è d'accordo con Naville sulla questione

della proprietà nazionalizzata ritenendola carattere peculiare dello Stato Operaio, non pare che il maestro la pensi come il discepolo in quanto al ritenere nazionalizzati nel paese di Stalin anche la rendita fondiaria ed il plus-valore. Ecco che cosa ci dice nella "Rivoluzione Tradita": « Se noi traduciamo per meglio esprimerci, i rapporti socialisti in termini di Borsa i cittadini potrebbero essere gli azionisti di un'impresa possedente le ricchezze del paese. Il carattere collettivo della proprietà suppose una ripartizione "equalitaria" delle azioni e, pertanto, un diritto a dei dividendi uguali per tutti gli azionisti. I cittadini peraltro, partecipano all'impresa nazionale e come azionisti e come produttori. Nella fase inferiore del comunismo, quella che noi abbiamo chiamato socialismo, la rimunerazione del lavoro si fa ancora secondo le norme borghesi, ossia secondo la qualificazione del lavoro, la sua intensità, ecc. Il reddito teorico di un cittadino è formato dunque da due o più parti, il dividendo più il salario. Più la tecnica è sviluppata, più l'organizzazione economica è perfezionata e più grande sarà l'importanza del fattore a) per rapporto a b) — e meno sarà l'influenza esercitata sulla condizione materiale delle differenze individuali del lavoro. Il fatto che le differenze di salari nell'U.R.S.S. non sono minori, ma più considerabili che nei paesi capitalisti, c) impone la conclusione che le azioni sono inequamente ripartite e che il reddito dei cittadini comporta nel medesimo tempo che un salario ineguale delle parti ineguali di dividendi. Mentre il manovale non riceve che b), salario minimo che, poste eguali tutte le altre condizioni egli riceverebbe anche da un'impresa capitalista, lo stakanovista e il funzionario ricevono due a più b oppure tre a più b e così di seguito; b) potendo d'altronde anche divenire due b) tre b) ecc. La differenza di reddito, è in altri termini, determinata non dalla sola differenza di resa individuale, ma dalla appropriazione mascherata del lavoro altrui. La minoranza privilegiata degli azionari vive a spese della maggioranza.

Se si ammette che il manovale sovietico riceve più di quello che egli non riceverebbe, restando fisso il livello tecnico e culturale, in regime capitalistico, ossia che egli è nonostante un piccolo azionario, il suo salario deve essere considerato come a più b. I salari delle categorie meglio pagate saranno in questo caso espressi dalla formula 3a+2b 10a+15b ecc. ciò che significherà che il manovale avente un'azione, lo stakanovista ne ha tre e lo specialista dieci; e che inoltre i loro salari, nel vero senso della parola, sono nella proporzione di 1 a 2 e a 15. Gli inni alla proprietà socialista sembrano in queste condizioni molto più convincenti per il direttore d'officina o lo stakanovista che per l'ope-

raio ordinario o il contadino del kolkhoze. Ora i lavoratori di rango formano un'immensa maggioranza e la Società e il Socialismo deve contare con essi e non con una nuova aristocrazia ».

Approviamo perfettamente e, se lo dice Trotzky che una minoranza privilegiata vive alle spalle di una maggioranza beffata, pensiamo che anche Naville se ne convincerà.

Noi non possiamo neanche sperare di essere letti, ma ci pare per inciso che, se nazionalizzazione del plus-valore e della rendita fondiaria finiscono nelle tasche dei burocrati, è lecito pensare che anche la proprietà « nazionalizzata » sia di loro spettanza e non appartenga alla Società che allora sarebbe squisitamente socialista. Da buon discepolo, il luogotenente francese ha tirate le conseguenze sul concetto del maestro relative alla proprietà sovietica ed ha eseguita una derivazione esatta, ma la posizione era sbagliata ed il risultato non poteva essere che errato. Se la prenda con Trotzky, se crede, od impari che al mondo anche i geni sono uomini e perciò fallibili, mentre le mediocrità possono qualche volta rilevare gli errori dei grandi uomini. Molto opportunamente però ci sottopone un passo interessantissimo de "Il Capitale": « La forma economica specifica nella quale il sopra-lavoro non pagato è estorto ai produttori immediati, determina il rapporto di dipendenza tra padroni e non padroni tale come esso discende direttamente dalla produzione stessa, e a sua volta reagisce sopra di essa. È d'altronde, la base sopra la quale riposa tutta la struttura della comunità economica, delle condizioni stesse della produzione, dunque nel medesimo tempo la forma politica specifica ». « È sempre nel rapporto diretto tra i proprietari delle condizioni di produzione ed i produttori immediati — rapporto del quale la forma corrisponde sempre in un modo naturale a uno stadio determinato nello sviluppo delle modalità del lavoro ossia della sua produttività sociale — è sempre in questo rapporto che noi troviamo il segreto intimo, il fondamento nascosto di tutto l'edificio sociale, e per conseguenza anche la forma politica rivestita dal rapporto di sovranità e di dipendenza, in una parola di tutta la forma specifica dello Stato. Ciò non impedisce che la stessa base economica — la stessa intendiamo in quanto alle condizioni principali — possa, sotto l'influenza di diverse condizioni empiriche date storicamente agenti dal di fuori, condizioni naturali, differenza di razza, ecc..., presentare, quanto alla sua manifestazione, delle variazioni e delle gradazioni infinite, la cui comprensione non è possibile che dall'analisi di queste circostanze empiriche date ».

Anche noi pensiamo esattamente che il segreto intimo dell'edificio sociale è rivelato dalla forma economica specifica nella

quale il sopra-lavoro viene estorto ai produttori immediati; ma se questo sopra-lavoro va ad una classe privilegiata e la rendita fondiaria dei kolkhoze, prende la stessa via come dimostra Trotzky e non corre già allo « Stato » come vorrebbe dimostrare Naville col suo ingenuo esempio sul kolkhoze, ciò dimostra che la classe burocratica sovietica non è un fantasma: assume infatti le qualifiche di dirigente e di sfruttatrice.

Ecco l'esempio di Naville sul kolkhoze a mezzo del quale ci fa vedere come soltanto il 37% della produzione resta ai lavoratori ed il rimanente va allo Stato, ed alla burocrazia direttamente solo in parte.

« Un esempio. Ecco come la rendita fondiaria torna allo Stato. La ripartizione dei prodotti e del denaro in un kolkhoze si fa seguendo delle regole dettate dal governo. Dapprima, un prelevamento è effettuato a profitto dello stato, prelevamento la cui importanza varia seguendo la fertilità della regione, e che arriva fino al 41% del raccolto. Poi, viene dedotto il 2 o 3% per le spese amministrative, e dal 13 al 25% per l'ammortamento dei trattori e macchine agricole, infine 10,5% per i fondi di riserva. Il resto è ripartito tra i lavoratori, proporzionalmente alla quantità ed alla qualità del lavoro da essi effettuato ».

Il punto essenziale è di vedere se con le percentuali devolute direttamente per le spese di amministrazione i burocrati vengono pagati in ragione della paga media dell'operaio e ancor più è interessante il vedere che cosa ne fa lo Stato sovietico del 60% della produzione incamerata. Rimette in circolazione totalmente questo plus-valore nell'interesse della massa estranea al governo della cosa « pubblica » o gli fa prendere delle direzioni particolari care alle sue qualità specifiche di Stato di classe? La risposta è quasi oziosa: anche Gesù Cristo lavò prima i suoi santissimi piedi per lasciare poi il turno agli Apostoli. Tutta la letteratura dei cavalieri di Agramante, diciamo tutta, è qui ad accusare: « Le enormi differenze nelle retribuzioni fra i cittadini sovietici, la differenziazione crescente delle classi, la nuova borghesia, l'aristocrazia sovietica, la parte del leone, il 40% della produzione ingollato dalla burocrazia, la crescita degli antagonismi sociali, dell'ineguaglianza e... chi più ne ha più ne metta. Non ci voleva che la candida ingenuità del filisteo Naville per supporre che il plus-valore estorto ai lavoratori sovietici tornasse a loro in gran parte, a mezzo di un sedicente « Stato Operaio ».

In realtà lo Stato Burocratico devolve in varie guise il plus-valore ai suoi funzionari che formano la classe privilegiata, inserita direttamente nello Stato.

Anche noi non avevamo mai vista una classe dominante direttamente alla direzione dello Stato, né una burocrazia che fosse anche classe dominante. Oggi però lo vediamo e siamo anche persuasi di non prendere lucciole per lanterne. Ce ne duole per i cavalieri di Agramante che oggi si battono contro mulini a vento o meglio per dei Don Chisciotte che hanno invaso il campo dannato alla discordia da un arcangelo vendicativo, ma la realtà sociale crediamo sia propria questa. Scherzi della Storia, piccoli contratempi rivoluzionari di grandi marxisti scientifici o filistei. Per essere obiettivi dobbiamo convenire che Naville se ne accorge anche lui che i burocrati sovietici non restano indifferenti davanti alle montagne di plus-valore accumulate dallo « Stato Operaio » ed ecco che cosa dice: « Gli stalinisti ripetono che il plus-valore non esiste più nell'U.R.S.S. poiché "le officine appartengono agli operai" ». Ma a questa assurdità, è inutile di proporne una altrettanto grande: ossia che il plus-valore vi è prodotto e ripartito come nel sistema capitalista, e che per conseguenza i rapporti tra padrone e non-padrone, secondo l'espressione di Marx, vi sono simili. In realtà, la forma specifica dell'appropriazione di una parte di sopra-lavoro non pagato, le conferisce il ruolo e la funzione di una classe semiparassitaria, e preso certi strati, la tendenza diretta ad aprirsi la via di proprietari.

La differenziazione estrema dei salari, fenomeno che colpisce e pieno di significato, non esaurisce ciò nonostante la questione del « segreto intimo, del fondamento nascosto di tutto l'edificio sociale ». Questo segreto dello Stato transitorio dell'U.R.S.S. e delle nuove contraddizioni che tiene in grembo è rilevato, se non si perde di vista il senso reale delle nazionalizzazioni e se non si maschera il loro vero carattere con delle analogie superficiali, con le statizzazioni fasciste di Mussolini o di Hitler ».

Ma come li vede modesti questi burocrati sovietici regolarmente coperti d'ingiurie proprio dal signor Naville. Si approprirebbero solo di una « parte » del sopraventore non pagato! Chissà con quale apparecchio può misurarla. Intravvede poi nella burocrazia una casta « semiparassitaria ». Bello quel « semi » così dovrà essere anche semi-dirigente, semi-sfruttatrice e semi-proprietaria. In verità il « segreto intimo » non è affatto esaurito dalle « differenze estreme dei salari », ma solo indicato; il segreto intimo risiede nel rapporto tra i proprietari delle condizioni di produzione ed i produttori immediati. Ossia in forma algebrica proprietari

= segreto intimo. Il termine del rapporto che sta al produttori denominatore è conosciuto poiché i produttori immediati rappre-

sentano una costante nota nello sviluppo sociale del lavoro. Il nominatore invece è variante poichè variabile è la forma di proprietà nello sviluppo economico. Bisogna appunto individuare questo termine e noi l'abbiamo trovato rappresentato nella burocrazia proprietaria dei mezzi di produzione in blocco, quale classe. Scriveremo quindi il rapporto in questo modo:

burocrati — segreto intimo. Senza la nuova individuazione dei produttori

la proprietà, il segreto intimo resterà quindi sempre un mistero.

Se si vuole poi conoscere il rapporto di dipendenza fra padrone e non padrone, si deve indagare in qual modo il plus-valore viene estorto ai produttori immediati.

Nella società sovietica gli sfruttatori non si appropriano direttamente del plus-valore come fa il capitalista incassando i dividendi della sua azienda, ma in modo indiretto, attraverso lo Stato che incamera tutto il plus-valore nazionale e poi lo ripartisce ai suoi stessi funzionari. Buona parte della burocrazia; tecnici, direttori, specialisti, stakanovisti, ecc. vengono in certo qual modo autorizzati a prelevare direttamente nell'azienda che controllano i loro pezzi emolumenti, ma godono poi anche essi come tutti i burocrati dei « servizi » statali pagati col plus-valore e che nell'U.R.S.S. in onore alle forme di vita « socialista », sono importanti e numerosi.

Nel complesso la burocrazia estorce il plus-valore ai produttori diretti con una colossale maggiorazione delle spese generali nelle aziende « nazionalizzate ». Non si tratta del 2 o del 3% per spese amministrative notate nel celebre kolkhoze di Naville, ma di percentuali che fanno rizzare i capelli al più coraggioso capitalista e sono documentate nelle opere di Trotzki stesso.

Vediamo dunque che lo sfruttamento dalla sua forma individuale si trasforma in una forma collettiva corrispondente alla trasformazione della proprietà. Si tratta di una classe in blocco che ne sfrutta un'altra e che poi per vie interne a mezzo del suo Stato passa alla distribuzione tra i suoi membri — (c'è da aspettarsi un'ereditarietà delle cariche burocratiche). Il plus-valore è inghiottito dai nuovi privilegiati attraverso la macchina statale che non è più un apparecchio di oppressione politica soltanto, ma anche di amministrazione economica della nazione. In un solo organo è stata riunita la macchina per lo sfruttamento e per mantenimento dei privilegi sociali: l'apparecchio sembra perfetto.

La forza-lavoro non è più acquistata dai capitalisti, ma monopolizzata da un solo padrone: lo Stato. Gli operai non vanno

più ad offrire il loro lavoro a diversi impresari per scegliersi quello che fa loro più comodo. La legge della concorrenza non funziona più: i lavoratori si trovano a discrezione dello Stato.

Le spese generali delle aziende che aumentano in modo fortissimo negli Stati Totalitari e non risparmiano le grandi democrazie, ci indicano che ovunque nel mondo il Collettivismo Burocratico è in via di formazione e che la proprietà di classe sta cristallizzandosi.

Nell'U.R.S.S. i salari sono fissati dalla Commissione del « Piano », ossia dall'alta burocrazia. I prezzi di vendita al pubblico seguono la stessa sorte e ciò ci fa intuire che fra il costo di produzione delle merci ed il prezzo di vendita al pubblico la burocrazia fa i suoi affari. A causa delle sue forti spese, aumenta il costo di produzione e per coprire i suoi emolumenti più o meno nascosti passa a delle maggiorazioni enormi sui prezzi di vendita. Il tradeunionista Citrine visitando un calzaturificio sovietico non è riuscito ad ottenere dal direttore i prezzi ai quali il pubblico avrebbe comperato le calzature che gli stavano mostrando, ma gli riuscì di sapere che nella spaccio del calzaturificio il prezzo era di 32 rubli, mentre nei magazzini di vendita trovò poi le stesse calzature esposte a 70 rubli. La vendita degli articoli fabbricati dall'azienda nello spaccio di questa, è limitatissima: la burocrazia tratta gli operai come clienti e li invia « nei suoi negozi statali ».

In un regime a « tendenze socialiste » una maggiorazione del 120% ci sembra una enormità. I commercianti capitalisti si limitano per lo stesso articolo ad una media del 40%. È la burocrazia che fa i bilanci delle aziende e dello Stato e se non intasca i dividendi come i vecchi capitalisti, dispone a piacere dell'impiego delle somme accantonate. Tutto il senso della « vita felice » annunciata da Stalin è nelle maggiorazioni e nei prezzi di vendita imposti dalla burocrazia nonché nel collocamento dei capitali accantonati per opere « pubbliche » che siano soprattutto di utilità alla classe burocratica.

Il signor Naville dirà che si capitalizza anche per lo Stato e per l'avvenire con l'impianto di grandi stabilimenti, di centrali elettriche ecc. ecc., ma quale è la classe sfruttatrice che non fu obbligata a far questo? Anche il borghese sfruttando il proletario ha potuto condurre una vita felice e nello stesso tempo ha capitalizzato per l'umanità: ci ha tramandato la più fomidabile e perfetta organizzazione produttiva che il mondo avesse mai vista. Non per fare un regalo all'umanità, ma perché era spinta al perfezionamento delle sue macchine, alla razionalizzazione scientifica del lavoro ed alla creazione degli stabilimenti modello dal-

le necessità di sviluppo della produzione. Non fu quindi filantropia, e la burocrazia sovietica per le stesse leggi, è obbligata a « capitalizzare » per il futuro anche se la sua essenza resta tipicamente sfruttatrice.

IL PROLETARIATO

E di questa classe cosa ne è nell'U.R.S.S.? Tutti sono unanimi nel ritenerlo defraudato, oppresso, sfruttato, ma non una voce si è alzata per vedere se per caso la personalità giuridica del lavoratore che era stata cambiata in seguito alla Rivoluzione di Ottobre, non avesse subita una nuova metamorfosi. Eppure i produttori diretti cambiarono sovente di veste sociale nel corso della storia: furono schiavi, servi, proletari, paria ecc. Non una voce si è alzata naturalmente perché « sta scritto » nella Bibbia marxista che il proletario sarà l'ultima classe sfruttata avente il disonore di apparire sulla scena della storia, dopo di che le classi scompariranno nell'umanità degli uguali.

Le contestazioni però non sono mancate.

L'operaio non è nel nostro paese uno schiavo salariato, un venditore di lavoro-merce » dice la "Pravda". E Trotzky risponde: « All'ora presente, questa formula eloquente non è che una inammisibile fanfaronata. Il passaggio delle fabbriche allo Stato non ha cambiato che la situazione giuridica dell'operaio; infatti egli vive nel bisogno lavorando un certo numero di ore per un salario stabilito. Le speranze che l'operaio fondava prima sul partito e nei sindacati, egli le ha riportate dopo la rivoluzione sullo Stato che ha creato. Ma il lavoro utile di questo Stato si è trovato limitato dall'insufficienza della tecnica e della cultura. Per migliorare l'uno e l'altro, il nuovo Stato ha dovuto ricorrere ai vecchi metodi, all'usura dei muscoli e dei nervi dei lavoratori. Tutto un corpo di pungolatori si è formato. La gestione dell'industria è divenuta estremamente burocratica. Gli operai hanno perduto ogni influenza sulla direzione delle officine, lavorano a cattivo, vivendo in un malessere profondo, privati della libertà di spostarsi, subenti all'officina stessa un terribile regime poliziesco, l'operaio potrebbe malamente sentirsi "un libero lavoratore". Il funzionario è per lui un capo, lo Stato un padrone. Il lavoro libero è incompatibile con l'esistenza dello Stato burocratico.

Tutto quello che noi abbiamo detto, si applica alle campagne con qualche correttivo necessario ».

Ma se lo Stato è un padrone e il funzionario un capo, dato che lo Stato è un apparecchio e che, marxisticamente parlando,

dietro lo Stato c'è sempre una classe, non è forse vero che il « burocrate-capo » è anche il padrone e lo Stato il suo organo di oppressione? Più in là Trotzky aggiunge: « La nuova Costituzione, quando dichiara che "lo sfruttamento dell'uomo è abolito nell'U.R.S.S." dice il contrario della verità. La nuova differenziazione sociale ha creato le condizioni di una rinascita dello sfruttamento sotto le forme più barbare che sono quelle dell'acquisto dell'uomo per il servizio personale altrui ».

D'accordo! Sì, « l'acquisto dell'uomo per il servizio personale e altrui », ditelo pure con una parola sola; ossia: schiavismo! * Che cosa si intendeva infatti per proletario se non il libero venditore della sua forza-lavoro nel libero mercato capitalistico? Colui insomma che trae il suo sostentamento unicamente nell'impegno dei suoi muscoli in un'impresa privata. La sua paga era regolata dalla domanda e dall'offerta in un mercato che non aveva confini.

Nell'U.R.S.S. questa legge non ha più alcun valore. Il mercato è chiuso, la concorrenza abolita, la paga viene fissata dallo Stato a mezzo di fattori che hanno completamente cancellato le influenze della legge della concorrenza e per scartarla completamente lo Stato ha monopolizzato la forza-lavoro. D'imprenditori non c'è che lui! Ai suoi tempi il proletario offriva i suoi servigi a chi voleva, se ne andava quindi quando gli piaceva e dove meglio gradiva; aveva libertà di pensiero e sindacale, libertà di stampa, di riunione e di culto. Subiva le incertezze del mercato, ma era come un libero uccello librato in cielo e che poteva far nido in ogni angolo della Terra.

Il lavoratore sovietico non ha che un padrone, non può più offrire la sua merce-lavoro, si trova prigioniero senza via di scelta, messo alla "portion congrue", sradicato dal suo paese per essere trapiantato dove meglio agrada allo Stato e messo nella necessità di avere un passaporto per viaggiare all'interno. La sua personalità viene concepita dallo Stato in funzione dell'economia nazionale, la sua individualità scompare, è divenuto un minimo ingranaggio di un immenso organismo ed ha senso sociale solo se propriamente collocato in questo.

I rapporti sociali tra proletari e capitalisti erano ridotti alla semplice espressione di un atto di compra-vendita ed il rito veniva consumato una volta alla settimana con la consegna della busta paga. All'infuori di questo semplice rapido gesto non vi

* In realtà trattavasi di servaggio, servaggio di Stato.

era alcun altro legame sociale, ognuno se ne anlava per la propria strada e secondo i propri gusti.

Ora invece il lavoratore russo è a continuo e diretto contatto con il suo padrone, in fabbrica, nella casa, nella scuola, nel sindacato, a teatro, in campagna, deve intervenire alle riunioni « politiche », dire sempre di sì, sottoscrivere a collette volente o nolente, comperare il giornale od udire il pistolotto della radio che il padrone gli ha amorosamente preparato come piatto spirituale del giorno. Se vuol fare della politica non ha che un partito da scegliere ed entrarvi non già come pensatore, ma come soldato. La burocrazia sovietica è ovunque, onnipresente come una divinità.

Lo Stato, unico imprenditore della mano d'opera, non può prendersi il lusso capitalista di pagare la forza-lavoro e di disinteressarsi poi completamente dell'essere umano che l'esprime. Quale monopolizzatore non può più limitarsi all'acquisto di una certa quantità di mano d'opera per un periodo determinato. Accaparrandosela tutta e senza limiti di tempo, diventa di fatto anche possessore di coloro che producono la forza-lavoro. In ultima analisi lo Stato Sovietico di oggi ha asservito in blocco il proletariato ed i rapporti tra imprenditore e prestatori di mano d'opera sono totalmente cambiati. Il lavoratore della Russia odierna non ha più nulla a che fare col proletario, assume i caratteri peculiari del servo.

Lo sfruttamento avviene pressapoco come nelle società feudali: il suddito di Stato lavora per un solo padrone: lo Stato. Diventa un suo arnese, rappresenta le scorte vive che vanno curate, alloggiare, e della produzione ci si interessa vivamente. Anche il pagamento del cosiddetto salario, effettuato in parte con servizi statali e prodotti, non deve ingannare e lasciar supporre una forma socialista di retribuzione: si tratta effettivamente del mantenimento del servo. Unica differenza fondamentale è che anticamente i servi non erano generalmente ammessi all'onore di portare le armi mentre i servi di Stato moderni vengono sapientemente ammaestrati nell'arte della guerra e devono essere pronti a lasciarsi sforacchiare da una mitragliatrice o distruggere da una cannonata per gli interessi della burocrazia. Il lavoratore sovietico appartiene allo Stato dalla culla alla tomba.

La classe burocratica Russa è la padrona della classe lavoratrice. Dispone della sua forza-lavoro e del suo sangue, le darà la possibilità di vivere con uno « standard » superiore a quello dei servi dell'antichità poichè tutto è relativo, ma la classe lavoratrice Russa non è più proletaria: è serva di Stato. Serva nella sostanza economica e serva nelle sue manifestazioni so-

ciali. Si genuflette al passaggio del « piccolo padre », lo divinizza, assume tutti i caratteri servili, si lascia sballottare da un capo all'altro dell'immenso Impero in "corvées" compatte; costruisce canali navigabili, strade, o ferrovie come un tempo eresse le piramidi o le torri di Babilonia. Quella piccola parte di essa che non si è ancora perduta nell'indifferenza verso tutto e conserva la sua fede, si raccoglie a discutere nelle cantine come i cristiani una volta pregavano nelle catacombe. Ogni tanto arriva un'incursione di pretoriani e si fa man bassa. Processi "monstres" vengono apprestati alla moda di Nerone e gli imputati anziché difendersi recitano il "mea culpa".

Tutte le caratteristiche del lavoratore Russo sono antitetiche di quelle proletarie, è divenuto un suddito di Stato, ha acquisiti quasi tutti i caratteri del servo e col libero lavoratore non ha più di comune se non il sudore della fronte. I marxisti si possono armare della lanterna di Diogene se intendono scovare qualche proletario nelle città sovietiche. Il lavoratore Russo è stato trasportato armi e bagagli col suo sindacato nello Stato. Una volta udiva i "pamphlets" scritti da Lenin e letti alla Duma dal suo deputato, ora invece è comandato a riunioni politiche ove si reca in gregge, ridotto ad elemento incosciente di una massa di manovra unicamente diretta dalla burocrazia.

Un solo padrone di servi si è erto nelle piane di Russia: lo Stato. Marx non l'aveva prevista una simile fine dei proletari, ma questa, almeno per noi, non è ragione sufficiente perchè lo si debba negare. I Santi, noi, non li adoriamo.

Come gli Ebrei escono ogni anno fuori le mura ad attendere il Messia, così i marxisti filistei attendono la riscossa del « proletariato » in Russia.

Quando la burocrazia sovietica cadrà riversa ai piedi del mausoleo di Lenin, sarà la spada di un servo che le avrà trafitto il cuore. E se il Quarto Squadrone Internazionale del campo di Agramante sostiene sempre scientificamente che di rivoluzione sociale nell'U.R.S.S. ormai non ce n'è più bisogno e tutto si ridurrà ad un pronunciamento di palazzo strettamente politico, invochi nelle prossime sedute spiritiche le anime trapassate di Zinoviev, di Kamenev, Tomsky ecc. ecc. assieme a tutto l'alone infinito dei martiri oscuri, e li interroghi. Risponderanno in coro: « Siamo morti nella guerra di classe necessaria alla burocrazia affinchè affermasse il suo dominio sociale; quello che noi volevamo era tutt'altro: insellate i cavalli e brandite le lance ».

Colmo di ironia: le lance non vengono impugnate, ma spezzate per « la Difesa dell'U.R.S.S. »!

SUMMARY

Bruno Rizzi was the first among Italian contemporary writers to study and identify the characteristics of the so-called tecno-bureaucratic class. His works, to-day completely ignored by official marxist culture, still give interesting foreviews about the ruling role performed by this class in the so-called Socialist countries, where tecno-bureaucratic class took over the power from the capitalist bourgeoisie. This gave birth to a new exploitation system which the author calls « Bureaucratic Collectivism ». We present here Rizzi's point of view on three important aspects of this social organisation: « class property », « bureaucratic exploitation » and « proletarite », especially referred to the situation in the Soviet Union. In the S.U., according to Rizzi, private property has been substituted by State property. This means that the bureaucracy class which controls and rules the State owns the means of production. These are owned not by individuals, but by the whole ruling class. This « class property » allows the new exploitation: Soviet bureaucracy rules the State and in this way it is able to take possession of a big share of social product.

In this situation, proletariat, once a free seller of labor-force, becomes a « State servant », being compelled to work for the aims of the new ruling class. The articles are taken from Rizzi's book « Il Collettivismo Burocratico », published for the first time in 1939. They are prefaced by a brief note by B. Bongiovanni, about author's work and ideas. Rizzi died a few months ago.

RESUMEN

Bruno Rizzi fue el primero de los autores contemporáneos italianos a estudiar e identificar las características de la clase dicha tecnoburocrática. Su obra, que hoy está completamente olvidada por la cultura marxista oficial, contiene intuiciones todavía interesantes sobre el rol dirigente que esa clase tiene en los países que se dicen socialistas, donde ha substituido en el poder la vieja burguesía capitalista, con la formación subsecuente de una nueva forma de explotación que Rizzi llama « Collectivismo Burocrático ». Aquí, son examinados tres de los más importantes aspectos de esta sociedad, es decir la « Propiedad de Clase », la « Explotación Burocrática », y los « Proletarios », con referencia específica a la situación de Unión Soviética. Rizzi dice que en Rusia la propiedad privada se ha vuelto en propiedad de Estado, lo que significa que los burocratas, que ejercen el poder en el Estado, son los propietarios. Los burocratas no poseen los medios de producción individualmente, pero como clase en el conjunto. La nueva forma de explotación se funda sobre esta propiedad de clase. Si la burocracia en Unión Soviética puede apropiarse de una larga porción del producto social, es porque tiene la dirección del Estado. Así, el proletariado también se convierte, desde vendedor libre de su fuerza-labor, en un « siervo de Estado », que está obligado a trabajar para las tareas impuestas por la nueva clase dirigente.

Los artículos son traídos del libro de Rizzi « Il collettivismo burocratico », publicado por la 1.ra vez en el 1939. Precede una presentación de la obra y de las ideas del autor (que ha muerto desde pocos meses) hecha por B. Bongiovanni.

RESUME

Parmi les hommes d'études modernes, Bruno Rizzi a été le premier, en Italie, qui ait analysé et défini les caractéristiques des classes technoburocratiques. Son ouvrage est aujourd'hui totalement oublié par la culture marxiste officielle, néanmoins il contient des intéressantes intuitions quant au rôle dirigeant que cette classe développe dans les pays que l'on appelle socialistes, où elle a remplacé au pouvoir la bourgeoisie capitaliste, en donnant origin à un nouveau type d'exploitation que Rizzi définit « Collectivisme Bureaucratique ». De cette type de société, on examine ici les trois aspects fondamentaux, la « propriété de classe », l'« exploitation bureaucratique » et le « prolétariat », avec une spécifique rapport à la situation dans l'Union Soviétique. Ici, dit Rizzi, la propriété privée a été remplacée par la propriété de l'état, c'est à dire des bureaucrates qui le dirigent et le contrôlent. Ceux-là ne possèdent pas les moyens de production individuellement, mais comme classe dans son ensemble. Par le moyen de cette possession de classe on réalise la nouvelle exploitation: en dirigeant l'état, la bureaucratie soviétique est à même de s'approprier d'une portion privilégiée du produit sociale. Dans cette situation, le prolétariat se transforme, de libre vendeur de son propre force-travail, dans un « serf d'état », obligé à prêter son oeuvre pour les fins imposées par la nouvelle classe dirigeante. Les articles sont tirés du livre de Rizzi « Il Collettivismo Burocratico », publié pour la première fois en 1939. Ils sont précédés par une brève note de B. Bongiovanni sur la figure et la pensée de l'auteur, qui a récemment disparu.



The Ulster conflict

part 1

From the English colonization to the
2nd Home Rule bill.

DAVE MANSELL (*)

The latest (1971) census figures for Northern Ireland (1) showed a population of 1,519,640. In response to an optional question about religious denomination 510 people called themselves atheists and 1200 agnostics. 142,511 people did not answer the question compared with 28,418 in the previous census of 1961 (when the question was compulsory) but this was probably due to a campaign against answering the question

(1) « Northern Ireland » is the official title for the six north-eastern counties of Ireland (Antrim, Down, Armagh, Derry, Tyrone and Fermanagh) which were detached from the rest of the country by the British Government's « Government of Ireland Act » in late 1920. All these six counties formed part (along with Monaghan, Cavan and Donegal) of the ancient province of Ulster. When « Ulster » is used with reference to the current political situation, it refers to the six-county area (which was thought by the Protestant ruling and business classes to be the maximum area they could maintain under their control permanently, and which would be economically viable); when « Ulster » is used in historical accounts, it refers to the entire northern province. The rest of the country outside Northern Ireland has been known variously as Southern Ireland (even though it contains the most northerly county — Donegal), the Irish Free State, Eire and the Republic of Ireland. Many southern republicans (particularly militants of the I.R.A.) refer to Northern Ireland as « the six counties » and to the Republic as « the twenty-six counties » since they still do not recognise either of the two states, and are dedicated to the creation of a « thirty-two counties workers' republic ».

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mounted by some anti-Unionist groups, the vast majority of whose followers were probably professing Catholics. The overall pattern revealed in the 1961 and 1971 figures was much the same (2): a Protestant bloc (composed of Presbyterians, members of the Church of Ireland, Methodists and other smaller sects) comprising about 65% of the population, and a Roman Catholic bloc comprising about 35%. In the Republic of Ireland, the position is reversed: out of a population of 3,000,000 95% of the people adhere to the Roman Catholic Church and 5% are Protestants.

Church attendance amongst Ulster Catholics is extremely high (almost 90%) and is only bettered amongst « Western » nations by that of the Southern Irish (the Republic is considered to be « priest-ridden » by the Northern Protestants). Amongst the Protestants the attendance rate is probably four to six times the rate for their coreligionists in England. All this adds up to the fact that religion plays a very important role in the public life of Northern Ireland. But what does this mean? The fighting over the past eight years, which has resulted in over 1800 deaths, has not been over *doctrinal* differences. The Provisional I.R.A. don't shoot British soldiers, the Ulster Workers' Council didn't bring down a British-appointed government in one of the most successful general strikes this century, because of a dispute about *transubstantiation*.

Unlike in England, where membership of one or another Christian sect has become primarily a matter of private conscience which has little effect on economic or political life, to be a Protestant or a Catholic in Northern Ireland in the last fifty-five years has had a great effect on the possibilities of getting decent housing and a job and, increasingly in the last few years which have been marked by an upsurge in sectarian murder, can have meant the difference between life and death. Although the economic development of Ireland as a whole over the last 350 years since the massive intervention of

(2) Main religious denominations in Northern Ireland:

	1961	1971
Roman Catholic	497,547	477,919
Presbyterian	413,113	405,719
Church of Ireland	344,800	334,318
Methodist	71,865	71,235
Others	69,299	87,938
No response	28,418	142,511
Total	1,425,042	1,519,640

England into the politics of the island in the early 17th century, has had a decisive effect on the internal structure of Northern Ireland and on its relationship to the Republic of Ireland, the Northern working class, on whom the sectarian conflict wreaks the most devastating damage, are almost irretrievably split on religious sectarian lines. It is the working class which provides the majority of the combatants and it is in the working class districts that most of the fighting and killing takes place.

Going by Marxist analysis the Ulster working class ought to be one of the most class-conscious in the world. When Ireland was partitioned in the early 1920s almost 50% of the Irish industrial working class was incorporated into the new state of Northern Ireland which comprised only a third of the total population of the island. Ulster's position as the industrial power house of the island was clearly reflected in the statistic that in 1907 industries centred in the Belfast region provided £ 19.1 million of the total of £ 20.9 millions' worth of manufactured goods (excluding food and drink) exported from Ireland (3). This economic predominance was the reason why the Ulster industrial capitalists were willing to go to war to prevent themselves from being incorporated into an independent, nationalist Ireland: they feared that a nationalist administration, dominated by Southern, mainly agricultural, interests would erect tariff barriers that would exclude them from lucrative British imperial and American markets. But by themselves the industrial capitalist class would have been impotent against the forces opposing them. If they were to defeat the Home Rule movement they had to have the Protestant working class with them. And that working class were with them, massively, enrolled in the Ulster Volunteer Force. The theoretically warring factions of Protestant working class, Protestant industrial employers and aristocratic Protestant administrative elite were united in the Ulster Unionist Council dedicated to maintaining the Union of Ireland with the rest of the United Kingdom of England, Wales and Scotland (4). Obviously the economic perception of the Ulster Protestant working class was that their interests would be better served by maintaining the link with Britain than by throwing in their lot with the rest of Ireland, but if that had been the only

(3) L.M. Cullen: *An economic history of Ireland since 1660* (Batsford, London, 1972) p. 161.

(4) Ireland was united with England, Wales and Scotland in 1800 after the abortive United Irishmen uprising of 1798.

component in their decision the Unionist alliance ought to have broken down decisively when the Ulster economic « miracle » turned into a slump, along with the rest of the world economy in the early 1930s. That this did not happen (in fact the Unionist alliance did not fragment until the middle 1970s, after the downfall of the Stormont administration) is due to two factors: the development of a separate Protestant « identity » over the 350 years since Protestant communities were deliberately introduced into Ireland by an English government to « stabilise » the island (mirrored by the development of a Catholic « identity » in the nineteenth century, in a sort of mutual racism); and the particular nature of the state set up by the Protestant ruling class in Northern Ireland after Partition in 1922.

It is, unfortunately, necessary to chart the historical development of Ulster in its relation with the rest of Ireland before we can understand Protestant and Catholic « separateness »; and the reasons why, although neither the Home Rulers nor the Unionists wanted it, the island was divided into two hostile communities in 1922. Mythologized versions of « history » still play an unwarranted role in contemporary Irish politics, North and South, and are used by politicians on all sides to maintain their power bases.

THE ROOTS OF THE ULSTER PROBLEM

Ireland is a large island close to the west coast of Britain and fairly easily accessible from the continent of Europe by sea. It has been constantly subject to foreign contact and invasion. There are traces of trading and settlement by Phoenicians from the heart of the Mediterranean basin, but the first invasion significant to the current situation was that of a Celtic race, the Gaels, from Roman-occupied Western Europe in the 1st century B.C.. The Gaelic ruling families achieved economic and political hegemony over the native inhabitants, imposed their own language and legal structure, and so assimilate the previous cultures of the island that over a period of five or six hundred years (and particularly slowly in the north of the island which eventually became Ulster) these cultures virtually disappeared. The Gaelic civilization achieved in this manner is the point of reference for those who wish to emphasize the unity of Ireland and its differentiation from the rest of the surface of the globe.

But this unity was never a political one. There was no centralized state: the people were organized into tribes or

« clans » governed by a chieftain chosen from a ruling family by the clansmen on the basis of suitability for the task. There was no succession by male primogeniture — a chieftain was as likely to be succeeded by a nephew or cousin as by his eldest son. And the clan system did not recognize private property in land: the tribal area was considered to be the common property of the entire clan, and the whole clan (including the chieftain) only enjoyed temporary private use of whatever had been allocated to them. Some chieftains exercised nominal overlordship as provincial « kings », but they had little influence over local administration, and there was constant struggle for power between the clans. The only real unifying factors were the common language and culture, and the influence of Christianity throughout the whole island (converted by St. Patrick) at a time when that religion was in a state of breakdown in the rest of Europe following the collapse of the Roman system.

From the 5th to the 8th century A.D. Ireland was a sanctuary for Christianity and a jumping off point for Christian missionaries and wisemen determined to maintain the Christian cause in Britain and Europe. In the 9th and 10th centuries the Norsemen from Scandinavia invaded Ireland as part of their great outward expansion of that era. But they did not achieve any lasting supremacy. Their greatest contribution to Ireland was the establishment of seaport towns and the quickening of commerce carried by sea. They weakened Christian monasteries and schools in the island, and were used as allies in the continuing local warfare between contending chiefs.

This use of the Norsemen as allies by one provincial « king » led another, Dermot MacMurragh, « King » of Leinster to get permission, in 1166, from the English king, Henry 2, to recruit help from the Norman lords in South Wales for his struggles. When MacMurragh died one of the Norman barons seized and held Leinster. At this time centralized power was only slightly more secure in England than in Ireland, and this seizure of territory in Ireland opened up a prospect of English Norman barons increasing their independence with regard to the English king. Henry 2 had no choice but to intervene. He did so with the approval of the Pope who considered that the introduction of a strong secular power into Ireland would bring the Irish Church, which had strayed from the tradition of Western Christendom, back into line.

In 1171 Henry invaded Ireland with a large army which

persuaded the Norman barons and many of the native Irish rulers to recognize his authority; but apart from taking personal control of the Norse seaport towns, he went no further than this. The Norman barons, who brought with them the feudal system of hereditary land ownership, fought among themselves and this allowed the Irish rulers to retain their chance of power and the opportunity to maintain Irish laws and customs in place of the feudal laws of England. Although the Irish Church and some of the chieftains did go over to feudalism, many of the barons and even some of the settlers living in the Pale, the English enclave around Dublin, adopted clan customs and even started speaking Gaelic. This integration of the two communities threatened English ascendancy over the island, and by the mid-fourteenth century the English king had little control over the provinces of Ulster and Connaught. The attempted solution to this loss of power was a policy of what we can, anachronistically, call *apartheid*. By the Statutes of Kilkenny (1366) the English ruling class tried to stop intermarriage of the races but the policy could not be carried out thoroughly. Its one effect was to maintain the segregation of English and Irish clergy in the Church and the distinction between Irish and English Church traditions and ways of organization.

During the following two centuries the racial intermixing continued and the great Anglo-Irish families in alliance with native Irish rulers often took an independent attitude to the English which could have been the basis of a new Irish political system. The earls of Kildare came to dominate most of the eastern part of the country for half a century after 1470 and posed a particular threat to the English political system during the civil wars of that period (the « Wars of the Roses ») and to the claims to power of Henry 7 when an earl of Kildare crowned a pretender to the English throne in Dublin. Various attempts were made by the English Crown to exert its authority, the decisive step being taken by Henry 8 in 1534 to break the power of the Kildares. In 1541 he had himself proclaimed King of Ireland and tried to get the Irish chieftains and the Anglo-Irish ruling families to submit to his rule by conciliation. This settlement of the « Irish problem » made Ireland and all its inhabitants (including the clans and their chiefs) subjects of the English king and his laws; but it soon broke down in Ulster where the inter-clan warfare continued under the impulsion of the O'Neills.

Another factor influenced English policy towards Ireland

at this time: trading and political rivalry with Spain. Ireland was very strategically placed as the base for an attack on England, so the English ruling class tried to make Ireland secure for itself by dispossessing native Catholic landlords and replacing them with English Protestants defended against reprisal by severe repression of even the most legitimate expression of discontent. The political divisions in the island were now being reinforced by associated religious divisions.

English suspicion that the native population were now a source of danger because of their loyalty to the Roman Church and susceptibility to the intrigues of foreign powers found the confirmation it sought in a rebellion in the south western province of Munster which lasted from 1579-83 and received Spanish assistance. So, when twelve years later most of the northern clans rose in revolt, and in 1598 Hugh O'Neill the earl of Tyrone (who had come near to achieving a united Gaelic front) defeated in battle English forces under the command of Sir Henry Bagenal, the government of Elizabeth 1 took vigorous action out of dread of renewed Spanish intervention. The Spanish intervention came in 1601 but it was too late because English forces under Mountjoy had established too strong a hold and had steadily eroded the strength of the O'Neills, who submitted to the new English king, James 1, in 1603. The eight years of struggle had left Ulster devastated, starving and depopulated. This was the last major attempt to restore a Gaelic social order.

Up to this point Ulster had been the most Gaelic part of Ireland except for a few precariously English-held coastal fortresses, and had resisted English colonization (though there had been a tradition for many centuries of exchange of population between eastern Ulster — the counties of Antrim and Down — and western Scotland). It was this very intransigence however, which led the English government to plan a very intensive colonization (or « plantation ») of Ulster.

One of the terms of settlement between James 1 and the earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnell was that the clan chieftains should become English-style hereditary landowners, but although they accepted this for a while, they were unable to settle down under the new regime which saw a diminution of their lands, and in 1607 the earls fled to the Continent together with their entourages and dependents. This « flight of the Earls » was treated as treason by the English government, and their estates (in western Ulster) were confiscated by the Crown. The mass of the native population who remained in the area

were assured by the English government that their property rights would be respected if they kept the peace. This they did and no rising followed the « flight », but the English government almost immediately reneged on its pledges and started the « plantation » of Ulster. Most of the Irish landlords were dispossessed, attempts were made to clear out the native Irish completely from certain areas and to replace them with communities of English and Scottish colonists who were intended to include all classes. This central feature of the English government's intention for the Ulster plantation was never fully realized: the Irish were too hard to displace and they were useful as tenants and servants. Legally the « planters » were not allowed to employ the native Irish as servants in the new towns which they built, but there were simply not enough settlers to achieve comprehensive control, and Irish servants were quietly admitted to the towns. Outside the towns the Irish were banished from the land they had worked and owned and were confined to boggy and mountainous regions.

This method of colonization was more typical in Ulster west of the River Bann than in the counties of Antrim, Down to the east of it, and Monaghan. Here the land was handed over to private adventurer called « undertakers » who « undertook » to bring in Protestant English and Scottish settlers; numerically they were more successful than the government was in Londonderry, Armagh, Tyrone, Fermanagh, Donegal and Cavan. The colonization was least successful in the south and west of the province. The most striking feature of the « plantation » was the fact that the colonists were Protestant and represented a culture alien to Ulster, a foreign community which spoke differently, worshipped apart and represented a totally different way of life.

The two communities interacted powerfully. Wherever the colonists became entrenched an English deeply influenced by the native tongue superseded the Irish language. The fact that the colonists were real communities and not mere land-owners favoured the eventual development of a healthier relationship between landlord and tenant than was to be the case in the rest of Ireland. But the fact remained that the colony had been established by dispossession and repression, and that the Ulster Irish could regard the colonisation as nothing more than a massive act of injustice tarted up with the appearance of legality. The plantation had been a social revolution in a sense, a clean sweep of all the traditional property rights of the occupying Irish (a century later Catholics

owned only 5% of the land in Ulster). Some of the dispossessed became outlaws and sought revenge by violence on their dispossessors who in turn reacted with no less ferocious counter-violence. The distance between the two communities was also increased by the new, more efficient farming methods of the colonists, and their access to British capital which enabled them to start up cottage industries. Economic gaps opened up between the Catholics and Protestants in Ulster, and between Ulster and the rest of Ireland. The native Irish resented the colonists, and the colonists felt that they were under siege from the Irish, whom they greatly distrusted. The seeds of the Ulster problem had been sown.

DEEPENING THE DIVIDE

The religious difference between the colonists and the native Irish in Ulster, however, was not a simple one between Protestants and Catholics. Before 1603 the main influx of settlers into Ulster had been Scots who were just as Gaelic as the Ulstermen who had migrated to Argyll (in Scotland) centuries before, and they had not disturbed the cultural balance in Ulster. But the Scots who came in after 1603 spoke a dialect of English and adhered to a dissenting form of Protestantism, Presbyterianism, whose organization was, in principle republican, its theology Calvinist, and its social code puritan. The conditions of life in south-west Scotland from where they came were harsher than the conditions experienced by the English colonists who came in with them at the same time. Quite a lot of the English colonists became quickly disenchanted with the rigours of pioneering in Ulster, sold up and went home, whereas any Scots who did so were speedily replaced by fresh recruits from nearby south-west Scotland.

The Scots' dourness, self-discipline, indifference to hostile opinion, determination to maintain what they had gained and social cohesion were intimately linked with their Presbyterianism, which was theoretically illegal in Ireland where the only church established by law was the protestant episcopal or Anglican church, the Irish equivalent of the Church of England. It was generally the English colonists and the new ruling class in Ulster who adhered to this Church of Ireland, whilst the Presbyterians were mainly small freeholders, tenant farmers, merchants and manufacturers. Nevertheless, this dual community was united in defending what it saw as its superior culture against rebellious, priest-ridden and barbarous natives.

But the strain between the two Protestant communities

was increased during the reign of Charles 1. Presbyterian ministers were harshly dealt with by the government of Ireland after Wentworth became viceroy in 1633. When Charles tried to impose an Anglican liturgy on the Presbyterians in Scotland in 1638, an organized national resistance faced him and there were sympathetic movements in Ulster which Wentworth considered constituted a serious threat to English ascendancy. This conflict was soon overshadowed, however, by the struggle fomented by the clash between Charles's proclivity to political absolutism and the rising power of the English bourgeoisie, which led to the civil war between crown and parliament. Although nominally a Protestant monarch, Charles, like his Stuart predecessors (with the exception of James 1) also had a proclivity to Catholicism. The Pope had emissaries close to the throne during the civil war.

Taking advantage of the political confusion in England, the dispossessed Irish Ulster peasants rose against the colonists throughout the province and, for a time, swept the Plantation away except for some of the towns such as Londonderry. These « massacres of 1641 » are one of the key symbolic memories for the Protestants of Ulster. The rising spread southwards and was joined by many of the Catholic gentry of Anglo-Irish stock eager to regain their positions as exploiters of the Irish peasantry. Whilst the English civil war raged the rebellion made political headway, but by 1649 Cromwell was able to land in Ireland to prevent it becoming a stronghold of Royalist resistance. Cromwell was ferociously anti-Catholic in politics and religion, which was scarcely a rare condition for bourgeois leaders in Europe at a time when the Catholic Church was a general ideological and organizing centre of the feudal counter-revolution. On landing in Ireland he said that he would defend freedom of religion and would make it impossible for a Catholic mass to be held. To the leaders of the Puritan revolution this was not a contradictory statement: freedom of religion meant the freedom of Protestant tendencies and the strict exclusion of Catholicism. Anti-Catholicism remained a main tenet of the British popular movement throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, continually fed by Republican, Whig or nationalist agitation, and Catholic emancipation only became possible in England after Catholicism had been reduced to a matter of private conscience. After the triumph of the Protestant ascendancy in all areas of social life and the decline of the Catholic Church as a European power.

Cromwell applied a cruel and ruthless policy of extermination and extirpation in Ireland, partly to avenge the « massacres of 1641 », partly in an attempt to crush Catholic power in Ireland. This involved not only the expropriation of Royalist, mainly Catholic, landowners and the handing over of their land to Protestant adventurers (many of them Cromwell's soldiers), but also a vicious attack on the Catholic peasantry, thousands of whom were either slaughtered, sold into slavery in the West Indies, or driven into the barren west of Ireland under the slogan, « Hell or Connaught ». The new order, in which social and political power was decisively in the hands of a class of English Protestant, and often absentee, landlords, remains linked by many people with the hated memory of Cromwell's revenge.

The events of these years increased the sense of embattlement in both the Protestant settlers and the Catholic Irish, and the lines of division between the two communities became more definite. In Ulster the Anglican landowners had been and remained opposed to the dissenting Protestantism of the Presbyterian lower classes whom they regarded as a threat to their position. The two sides, however, would always come together against any manifestation of what they considered the Catholic menace. The Presbyterians also remained constitutional monarchists, despite their experience under Charles 1 and much to the disgust of Cromwell, so they gave a cautious welcome to the restoration of the monarchy in England in 1660 in the person of Charles 2. They were cautious because they knew that the Stuarts had been carefully cultivated by the Vatican in their exile in the 1650s. Charles 2 proceeded very circumspectly in the early years of his reign, but he renewed the fears of the Ulster Protestant community towards the end of his reign by evidence of favour towards Catholics. He made a formal conversion to Catholicism on his death bed and his successor, James 2, came to the throne as a Catholic. His pursuance of Catholic policies in England led to his expulsion by the English parliament in 1688. He had undertaken a similar policy of restoring Catholic influence in Ireland by means of his Lord Lieutenant, Richard Talbot, whom he created Earl of Tyrconnel, and this enraged the Protestant community against him.

James had fled to France where he sought the help of Louis 15, whose puppet he was, to restore his power. In the meantime the English parliament had appointed William of Orange (then ruler of the Netherlands) as his Protestant suc-

essor. James's plan for reconquest of Britain once again stressed the important strategic position occupied by Ireland in the struggle for European hegemony in the 17th century. In March 1689 he landed in Ireland with French support, and rallied the Catholic ex-landowners to his side. He set up a parliament in Dublin in May 1689 which passed an act confiscating the estates of over 2000 Protestant landowners; while this legislation was being rushed through James had gone north to try and restore his power in Ulster, which had come out in favour of William. He spent fifteen weeks futilely besieging the fortress-town of Londonderry. This « closing of the gates of Derry on James by the Apprentice Boys » has been etched into the consciousness of succeeding generations of Protestant Ulstermen, and is reinforced by the physical separation of the Protestant minority of the Derry population inside the fortress walls from the Catholic majority who live outside them in the Bogside and the Creggan.

The Derry Protestants survived all the deprivations of a four-month siege before they were relieved by an English naval force, and in August 1689 William landed in Ulster with an army composed of English regular troops and European mercenaries. After months of indecisive struggle William defeated James at the battle of the River Boyne in July 1690 and ended all his hopes of reconquest. This battle is commemorated by Ulster Protestants every July 12th in the form of « Orange marches » which celebrate the supremacy of Protestants over Catholics in the north east of Ireland. (Ironically William's victory over James was celebrated by a pontifical high mass in the Vatican because, due to a convolution in the European politics of the time, William along with other European rulers had made a defensive alliance with the Vatican against Louis 14).

Following William's final victory in 1691 an exclusively Protestant legislature was established in Dublin in 1692 which set about enacting penal laws against the Catholics which led to their almost complete prostration during most of the 18th century. This legislation decisively widened the gap between the Irish establishment and its opponents. Catholics were excluded from the armed forces, the judiciary and the legal profession as well as from parliament; their bishops and regular clergy were banished in 1697; they were forbidden from holding long leases on land, from buying land from a Protestant, and were compelled to divide their property equally among their children in their wills unless the eldest son adher-

ed to the (Anglican) Church of Ireland; they were banned from running schools or from sending their children abroad to be educated. Some of the laws could not be enforced, but others, notably those affecting property, were stringently applied. The net effect of these provisions was to drive Gaelic Catholic culture underground, to strengthen the political component of Catholicism, and to deepen the divide between Protestants and Catholics.

ENGLISH LEGISLATION AND IRISH ECONOMY

Outside Ulster the position of the Catholic peasantry dived to a new miserable low. Although nominally « tenants-at-law », they were scarcely more than feudal serfs, completely at the (non-existent) mercy of absentee landlords and their middlemen. The landlords' agents were leased the land at a fixed rent, and they, in turn, sub-let the land, in very small holdings to the peasants, retaining an estate for themselves. The peasants had to work the middlemen's land for them in order to pay the rent and the tithes due to the Anglican Church of Ireland. Virtually all they had in return for this labour was a small patch of land on which to raise subsistence crops (basically potatoes). If they showed any sign of producing a surplus, the middlemen raised the rent so as to expropriate it. The peasants had no security of tenure and evictions were common when more profits were to be made from labour non-intensive cattle-raising or sheep-grazing.

The peasants' only resource against rent-raising or eviction was the formation of secret societies which retaliated against rapacious landlords by mutilating their cattle, burning their buildings, or killing them. The parasite class of landlords, agents, Church of Ireland clergy and the corrupt State administration based in the Castle at Dublin, responded with lynchings and transportation of any peasant suspected of membership of a secret society.

In Ulster the Presbyterian tenents achieved a more equitable position for themselves. They were much more resistant to landlords than the down-trdden Catholics and they eventually obtained a security of tenure, rents fixed for a reasonable length of time, and the right to sell their tenancies at an improved price. They earned the money to pay the landlord's rent by weaving linen on hand looms in their cottages, not by working the landlord's land. But the Presbyterian tenants also developed secret societies to struggle against tithes and any taxes they considered unfair. These societies had another

function, however: to ensure that tenancies were prevented from passing into the hands of the other religion, and to this end they fought the Catholic societies. Even at this level of oppression the religious division could assert itself by the operation of scarcity. It was one of these skirmishes in the late 18th century in Armagh (which was almost equally divided among Protestant and Catholic tenants) which produced the Orange Order, an organization which stressed the common interests of all Protestants, and was used to challenge the alliance between the Presbyterian and Catholic middle classes coming about in the Society of United Irishmen which flourished briefly in the 1790s.

For after William's victory in 1690 the temporary alliance between the Anglican ascendancy and the dissenters — notably the Presbyterians of Ulster — soon fell apart. The Presbyterian middle class were important in trade and increasingly in industry, and they eventually came to resent the restrictions which had been imposed on important sectors of Irish trade by the English government at the behest of their English rivals; and also their treatment as second-class citizens by the landowning Anglican minority. All « dissenters » (of whom the Presbyterians formed the large majority) were excluded from all civil and military office, from local government, and in effect from any share in political power.

By 1641 the Irish economy had emerged from medieval underdevelopment characterized by exports of fish and hides, the unsophisticated harvest of its rivers, coastal fishing grounds, forests and domesticated herds of cattle and sheep. The first half of the 17th century had witnessed a rapid transition in Irish agricultural life. Exports of cattle grew rapidly, and wool exports increased too, overshadowing the previously important categories of fish and hides. By 1641 exports of butter, unimportant in the 16th century, were the third most important export. From a woodland society Ireland was emerging as an agricultural area with a large agricultural surplus; but this development was seriously interrupted by the war from 1641 to 1652. Plague, too, in 1650 had its effect: thousands died. War destroyed crops and cattle. Famine followed in 1652 which probably reduced the Irish population to 1,000,000. But after this the economy gradually recovered under the impetus of the new proprietors of the land introduced by the Cromwellian plantation. Exports of beef, cattle and sheep were of record proportions in the early 1660s. Ireland's insular position was relevant here, for it was in proximity to two expand-

ing markets for livestock or livestock products — the English market and transatlantic trade. The English market started becoming difficult in 1663 when there was an outcry in England against imports of cattle and sheep from Ireland at a time of low prices in England. A seasonal restriction was placed on Irish cattle imports, and in January 1667 a bill was passed into law which excluded Irish cattle, beef, sheep and pork from the English market. 1663 had also seen the introduction by the English parliament of a Navigation Act which required all goods for the English colonies to be shipped from England and Wales. An exception was made, however, for salted provisions (as well as for servants and horses). This was a tacit acknowledgement of the growing importance of Irish salted beef in the feeding of the crews of the rising number of merchant and naval vessels in the Atlantic. A new Navigation Act in 1671 (which lapsed in 1680 but was renewed in 1685) introduced the principle that certain enumerated articles such as sugar, tobacco and indigo must be shipped from the colonies exclusively to England. Although this act still permitted Ireland to import non-enumerated articles from the colonies, that trade too was prohibited in 1696. The most damaging of all English restrictions came with the Woolens Act of 1699 which forbade the exportation of Irish wool or woolens to the colonies or to any foreign country and limited Irish wool exports to England alone.

Much has been made, especially by Nationalist economic historians at the turn of this century, of the deleterious effects of this English legislation on the development of the Irish economy, but whilst they did undoubtedly curtail trade to some extent they also served to divert it into different channels, particularly into trade with the French, Dutch and Spanish empires. The Irish mercantile class was as much affected by English wars with these empires, which restricted trade badly, by poor harvests and gluts, and the size of the internal market. Certainly Dublin and Cork expanded rapidly as major ports during the late 17th and early 18th centuries and trade began to be centralised in them because of their extensive hinterlands. Between 1700 and 1765 Irish imports tripled and exports quadrupled with much of the increase being accounted for by the expansion in Irish-British commerce (the Irish growth rate was higher than the British one for the same period).

The 1680s saw a significant growth in the linen industry in Ulster. It was relatively small in 1665 when export of yarn was

smaller than it had been in 1641, and no real advance showed until the middle 1680s when there was an influx of Scots and north English into the thinly populated province. Previously Ulster had been the most backward of the four provinces, and rents were lower than elsewhere. This combined with poor conditions in Scotland attracted an influx of emigrants and capital. Low manufacturing costs gave an edge to linen exports. This quickening of economic activity in the province was reflected in the significant role acquired by Belfast in the 1680s. Previously no port in Ulster had been among the first seven Irish. By 1700 Belfast had become the fourth port in Ireland. Although the war between James 2 and William hindered trade and caused some destruction in Ulster, the province ceased to be a theatre of war operations after July 1689 and economic recovery was fairly rapid. Its merchants had made profits out of provisioning the Williamite armies which were used to finance the export trade. The war years enhanced the importance that Belfast had acquired in the preceding decade. Cheap land and a famine in Scotland in 1698-9 attracted great numbers of Scots dissenters, which greatly alarmed the Anglican bishop of the province.

The linen industry received a boost in 1705 when pressure from the Irish parliament finally prevailed on the English parliament to make a change in the Navigation Acts allowing the export of Irish linen to the English colonies. This opened up a large market. A previous enactment of 1696 had allowed, Irish linen to enter the English market duty-free and this had undoubtedly aided in the establishment of the industry in the north-east of the country, but the real expansion of linen took place in the 18th century. Exports of linen were less than 500,000 yards in 1698; in the 1790s they were above 40,000,000 yards. There was even a certain amount of government intervention to aid the linen industry. In 1711 a Linen Board was established to regulate the industry, to subsidise various projects and to spread the knowledge of methods and techniques throughout the country; but a more decisive factor in the expansion of the industry was the provision of working capital from Dublin.

Although the Irish parliament was only elected by Protestant landowners with the corollary that most of the M.P.s were « placemen » who only retained their profitable office by the favour of the landowners, it can be seen from the preceding that where the development of the Irish economy was involved they did show an amount of independence from and resistance

to the vested interests in England which were principally responsible for the legislation restricting Irish economic development. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the parliament was fairly corrupt, particularly in the way that it allowed Ireland to be used as a source of revenue for political bribery in England.

In 1720 the English parliament passed legislation which reaffirmed its ultimate authority over the Irish legislature and this aroused a storm of opposition among the Irish middle classes. Anti-English feeling took root and during economic crises in the 1720s the theory took firm hold that England was responsible (particularly by the Woolen Act of 1699) for Ireland's economic trouble. Failures of the grain harvest led to the belief that insufficient land was being tilled as compared with being used to pasture cattle, and that this too was the fault of English economic oppression. Whether this retrospective analysis was correct is open to doubt, but the fact remains that a general opinion grew up among the Protestant and Presbyterian middle class that the Irish parliament was a corrupt tool of English policy holding up Irish development.

The Presbyterians had two reactions to this parliament. On the one hand they began to emigrate to America in large numbers: the effect of this was to proportionately strengthen the Anglican ascendancy in Ireland, but also to increase radical agitation in England's American colonies which laboured under the same penal trade laws. The other reaction was to stay in Ireland and agitate for the independence and political reform of the Parliament to make it a genuine representative assembly, and for the removal of civil and religious disabilities from Protestant dissenters, and later in the century from Catholics. (The fear of Catholicism waned in conjunction with the waning of the Catholic Church's power on the Continent during the 18th century « enlightenment »).

The connection between the Irish Presbyterian radicals in America and the Presbyterian middle class remaining in Ulster led, in the last third of the 18th century, to a liberal movement of Protestant nationalism. This movement, largely middle class in origin but supported by a liberal element in the Anglican nobility and gentry spread throughout Ireland. When the American colonists decided to fight England for their independence in 1776 and enrolled French support, the Presbyterian radicals saw their opportunity. They took control of the Irish Volunteers, a citizen army raised to resist possible

French invasion of Ireland during the American war, and used it as a political threat to the seriously over-stretched English government to force it to remove discrimination against Irish trade in 1779. Three years later the Irish Volunteers were instrumental in forcing the English government to grant the Dublin parliament the right to make its own laws for Ireland. This inaugurated a twenty-year period of Home Rule which, linked with the increasing prosperity unleashed by the combination of the increasing trading and industrial capacity of the Presbyterian community and the removal of the penal trade laws, was to be turned by the nineteenth century Home Rule movement into a symbolic « golden age ».

The Home Rulers (who have their descendants today in the proponents of a 32-county Irish Socialist Republic) insisted, however, that the prosperity was due to the establishment of the independent Irish parliament, whereas the inverse of this was probably the case. The Presbyterian middle class centered mainly in and around Belfast, who had supplied the backbone of the Volunteers would not have agreed with the Home Rulers' analysis: they could plainly see that the Parliament was still unreformed and was the stronghold of the Anglican landowners whose power they needed to break to further their own development. To do this they were, under the influence of ideas emanating from the French Revolution at the beginning of the 1790s, prepared to fight for an independent bourgeois republic, and to enlist the aid of the small Catholic middle class which had emerged during the 18th century to achieve this end.

SECRET SOCIETIES AND TERRORISM

The Society of United Irishmen was formed at Belfast in October 1791 by the mainly Presbyterian middle-class radicals, under the impulsion of a young Dublin Protestant (a descendant of one of Cromwell's soldiers) Theobald Wolfe Tone. Tone's programme was « to unite the whole people of Ireland. To abolish the memory of all past dissensions, and to substitute the common name of Irishman in place of the denominations of protestant, catholic and dissenter ». Despite these high-flown sentiments Tone retained the ambivalent Protestant attitude to the Catholics. In his *Journal* for September 29, 1792 he wrote: « I believe if the Catholics were emancipated... in a little while they would become like other people ». The Belfast radicals as a whole were prepared to work with the nascent Catholic middle class because they could see signs

of a break between that class and the Catholic Church which opened up the possibility of the Catholic population as a whole coming back into political life under liberal democratic influence.

At first the Society of United Irishmen won wide support among the two middle classes and it constituted one of the levers which brought about the Catholic Relief Act of 1793. This legislation gave Catholics a parliamentary vote on the same terms as the Protestants (the « Forty-shilling freeholder franchise ») but still did not allow them to sit in parliament. This, however, was the limit of success of the United Irishmen's legal assault on the power of the Anglican (increasingly Anglo-Irish) landlord class. From now on the movement diverged on how to rid itself of the yoke of that class: one section decided that the way forward lay in armed rebellion (with aid from the French); another section based in Belfast, decided that this strategy was increasingly unrealistic and that the best prospect lay in union with Britain which would automatically eliminate the Irish parliament and bring Ireland under the influence of more liberal British legislation.

This ferment of radical ideas had not permeated the lower classes who had not been sharing, to any thing like the same extent, in the gradual improvement in Ireland's economy and were always the first to suffer in times of dearth. In the border counties of Ulster there was a history of strife between Protestant and Catholic peasants over the allocation of tenancies. In the 1760s and 1770s the Ulster peasantry organized secret societies known as Oakboys and Steelboys which protested against the leasing of land to Catholics, but directed their energies primarily against the landlords, as did the contemporary catholic secret society in Munster known as the Whiteboys. In both provinces the landlord-magistrate system of justice was paralysed by secret society terrorism. A generation later new disturbances broke out in Ulster when the Protestant peasantry began daybreak raids to disarm Catholic peasants who had acquired arms from the disbanded Irish Volunteers. This acquisition of arms by the lower classes gave a serious character to the ritual clash of mobs at fairs and cock fights, but these clashes were not necessarily along religious lines. The Presbyterian clergy and middle class radicals, in fact, tried to prevent the growth of distinct Protestant or Catholic bands, but the Protestant peasantry, who had acquired a consciousness of superiority over the Catholic over the many years that the Catholics had laboured under the penal laws

and when the Protestant peasants had, in fact, enjoyed some slight privileges over the Catholics, were deeply disturbed by the presence of armed Catholics in bands of any kind. Denominational groups were soon formed — with the Catholic gangs taking the name « Defenders ».

Pitted against a much stronger opposition, the Defenders grew into a federated society which had branches in the south where attacks were directed against landlords. The Catholics' position was enhanced by the Catholic Relief Act of 1793 which was followed by the organization of a predominantly Catholic militia. (The Catholic Relief Act had been conceived of by the English government as a way of quietening Catholic agitation and securing their loyalty in the troubled Napoleonic period). As the Defenders were setting up cells in the militia, disarming Protestant peasants, and preventing rent collection in the south without any effective measures being taken against them by the Dublin administration, a section of the gentry started to think in terms of independent action, whilst scattered bands of Ulster peasants called Peep O'Day boys continued their early morning raids and contemplated organizing a protestant federation along the same lines as the Defenders. But before any of these organizations could get off the ground there was a very serious clash between the Defenders and the Protestants in September 1795. After this incident the Protestants, made very uneasy by the Defenders' mobilization of thousands of peasants (even though only a few hundred took part in the clash which the Protestants won), decided on the formal organization of a Protestant society modelled after the Defenders. This is the origin of the Orange Order, which has survived many attempts at suppression by a succession of English governments and still plays a major role in the politics of Ulster today. The founding of the Order marked the revival of a tradition that had almost died in the « enlightened » 18th century. Orange had been adopted as a symbol of Irish Protestant patriotism after William of Orange had defeated James 2 in 1690. The anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne was celebrated each year, and a number of clubs were founded to keep the spirit of militant Protestantism alive. The early Orange clubs usually bore a name suggesting an incident in the 1690 campaign — the Apprentice Boys, The Boyne Men, etc. The Orange tradition was closely associated with the maintenance of the « Protestant Ascendancy ». Gradually the upper and middle classes lost their fervour for these traditions, but latent fears of Catholic domination were kept alive among the

Protestant peasants in the border districts of Ulster by a series of petty incidents, motivated by the peasants' hunger for land.

The organization of the Orange Order during 1795-6 was carried out with virtually no aid from the gentry, and a series of attacks were mounted on Catholic dwellings in Armagh in this period. The effect of this was to convince the Catholics that they had nothing to hope for from the government or gentry, and drove them into the republican camp of the United Irishmen whose approaches they had previously ignored. This merger of the republican and the Catholic forces provided the middle-class radicals with an underground army, and changed the Defenders from being an agrarian secret society into a revolutionary movement. The rapid spread of the United Irishmen throughout the country put great pressure on the British administration to allow the Irish gentry to recruit a force of yeomen to combat the threat of revolution. The Orange Order which included among its goals, in its first public pronouncement, the maintenance of the Constitution, the Protestant religion and the Established Church, was the obvious recruiting ground, and the gentry found themselves in late 1796 in command of corps of armed Orangemen. Efforts were made to give the Order a *post-facto* respectability by the gentry being placed at the head of the lodges, and by a gentlemen's lodge being formed in Dublin. By the end of 1797 the movement included a wide cross section of all the strata of society benefiting from the « ascendancy », and the Order had spread from Ulster into the Dublin area and the midlands. The Orange yeomanry now joined with the British army in a two year campaign of repression designed to disarm and terrorise all the potential revolutionaries, which was taken to mean the Catholic population as a whole. The repression was most successful in Ulster, for when the United Irishmen finally sprang their rebellion in May 1798, the major revolt was in Wexford in the south-east where the rising soon turned into a *jacquerie* involving the massacre of some Protestants, which did not help the cause in the North where memories of the « massacres of 1641 » were still alive. The only rising in Ulster was in Antrim and it was quickly put down — Belfast remained quiet because it was occupied by a large garrison.

The greatest contribution that the Orange lodges made to the British government's containment of the revolutionary potential of the United Irishmen was its arousing among all classes of Protestants, by an appeal to the tradition of 1690, of an Orange spirit which matched, and indeed often exceeded

in zeal and ferocity the revolutionary spirit to which it was counterpoised. What the British government could not neglect either, however, was that it had been the summoning of the Orange spirit which had precipitated the rebellion among the Catholic peasantry by driving them into the republican camp. Once the rebellion was over the British government hastened to defuse the situation and secure the island against any possible use by the French. (The French had landed in support of the rebellion but far too late).

The Orange was now an embarrassment to the government, and the British viceroy had to sacrifice his popularity in checking the excesses the Orange men were trying to indulge in. Even though he managed this, the Orange Order had become so involved in the government service that they could not have been removed without dismissing the greater part of the placemen and disbanding the yeomanry and militia.

The government's main scheme for stabilising the island contained two proposals: union of Ireland with England, and a promise (by Pitt) of emancipation for the Catholics. By this time most of the Ulster peasantry were apathetic about Union since it affected their plight neither one way nor the other; many of the previously radical Presbyterian and Protestant middle classes were so horrified by the prospect of Catholic domination presented to them by the Wexford *jacquerie* that they did not oppose Union; and the opposition turned out to be the « placemen » in the Dublin parliament who did not look forward to their profitable offices being abolished, and, ironically, in the perspective of later history, an influential section of Orangemen under pressure from the Dublin corporation and the gentry, who also feared the loss of their privilege. Most of the Catholics favoured Union because of the promise of emancipation. The main obstacle to the Union, the « placemen » who lived off the corruption of office were soon persuaded to change their minds about Union by means of substantial bribes. Despite the Orangemen's opposition, the Union went through, but the provisions of the act did not include emancipation for the Catholics since George I refused to countenance any soon measure.

Thus, Ireland entered the 19th century in a new political posture: for the first time in its history it was totally integrated with the rest of the British Isles; in the North-East the spirit of Protestant suprematism had found an organizational form, the Orange Order which would outlive all subsequently formed

political parties; and the Catholics had found a new source of bitterness against the Protestant Ascendancy in its breaking of the promise of emancipation.

ULSTER ECONOMIC BOOM

During this period of radical ferment Irish manufacture and agriculture had, on the whole, been going through a phase of relative boom. Due to a series of embargos enforced by the British parliament during the 18th century on trading with hostile nations in times of war, the meat trade had swung over to supplying to British mercantile and naval fleets, which proved to be very profitable for the mercantile interests involved; and throughout the period of the Napoleonic wars grain and meat prices were kept at an artificial high by a huge increase in demand from the British market which had virtually no other source of supply. The position in the grain trade was maintained after the Napoleonic period by the British Corn Laws, which placed high tariffs against foreign grain (by this time, of course, Ireland had been integrated into the British empire). Irish industrialists did not lag far behind their English counterparts in introducing power machinery. The most noticeable effect of this was seen in Belfast. Foundries, rope works, sugar refining and vitriol factories had all been established by the 1790s, but the main factor in the conversion of the town from a commercial to an industrial centre was the introduction of the cotton industry. This had started in the 1780s when the American War of Independence was interrupting the importation of cheap cotton goods from the American colonies. Its introduction was due to the visit by the owner of a paper mill to Scotland where he became acquainted with the new cotton-spinning techniques of Hargreaves and Arkwright. The new industry started in a small way because trained labour and risk capital were in short supply, but it developed very rapidly, especially in Antrim and Down where for a century the linen industry had already been established on a cottage basis. The fact that cotton weaving is much easier than linen weaving and that muslin weavers could earn three times as much as linen weavers resulted in the almost complete extinction of linen weaving in Belfast. Cotton mills were established within a ten-mile radius of Belfast, close to streams and rivers, since the machinery was more often operated by water-power than by steam.

The upsurge in cotton and the decline in linen is shown in the following table:

Number of Linen and cotton looms in Belfast 1760-1810

	1760	1791	1806	1810
Linen looms	400	129	4	—
Cotton looms	—	522	629	860

By 1811 Belfast was importing over three quarters of the total Irish imports of raw cotton. Cotton rapidly took over the Irish domestic market from linen (which was three times as expensive in 1810) but met with little success in exporting to England, which maintained high protective duty barriers before the Union, which were scaled down to 10% by 1808 and abolished in 1824 under Huskisson's free trade policies. The cotton boom which was sustained by the buoyant wartime economy lasted until the end of protection in 1825, although there were dips which created pockets of acute unemployment among weavers especially during phases of overproduction. The weavers, who still used hand looms, were much worse paid than the spinners whose side of the industry had been mechanised, and after 1815 their wages were forced down by a third, a result of the general British depression of the period. The weavers resisted efforts to lower their wages: there was a weavers' riot in 1815 and an attempt to form a weavers' association in 1824, but their efforts were to no avail. After the depression of 1825 the cotton industry declined. Wages in all levels of the industry declined by about a third. The abolition of protection led to a flooding of the Irish market by cheaper and finer English muslins and cottons. This menaced the weavers with almost immediate starvation, and attempts were made to assist them, at first by providing them with food at half-price, and later by helping them to emigrate principally to America (although as late as 1838 there were still 12,000 to 15,000 weavers within ten miles of Belfast, but few if any, elsewhere. By 1861 the few weavers and their families left were surviving on starvation diets, and they were wiped out by the cotton famine of 1861-2, brought on by the American Civil War).

An accidental introduction of new textile technology « saved » most of the cotton spinners so that they could undergo the full rigours of capitalist exploitation. At the crucial moment a cotton manufacturer, Thomas Mulholland, when rebuilding his burnt-out cotton mill decided, because of the keen

competition from English and Scottish cotton, to introduce a new wet-spinning process into his mill and to adapt it for flax-spinning (which previously could only be done by hand). The experiment was a great success and within five years there were 12 flax mills in Belfast. Farmers found it more profitable to grow flax than other crops and there was a ready supply of labour (including the ex-cotton spinners) available for training. The manufacturers continued to rely on handloom weavers for the production of linen because there was a lack of power looms capable of weaving fine linen cloth and because the hand weaving system was very cheap. It was not until the early 1860s that steam weaving was introduced on a large scale. The linen magnates relied on women and children for spinnings, and this meant the early establishment of a low level of wages in the industry.

Wage rates did not rise until power looms were introduced, and the factory weavers were always better paid than the spinners and had better conditions (in fact the position of weavers in relation to spinners was the reverse of that prevailing in the cotton industry). The linen masters made no effort to improve conditions for the spinners; they introduced no safety devices into the spinning mills, and the atmosphere was permeated with flax dust which reduced life expectancy to about 45 years. Due to this exercise of « extreme » laissez-faire capitalism, the transformation of the Belfast textile industry was rapid: in 1832 there had been 19 cotton mills in and around Belfast and 1 flax mill. Within five years there were 15 flax mills and 6 cotton mills. The number of flax mills increased to 18 in 1840, 24 in 1852 and 32 in 1861 when there were only 2 cotton mills; in 1836 there were 2,000 employees in the linen industry, in 1862, 15,000; by 1835 over half the total exports from Belfast were linen, and Belfast was the first port in Ireland in the value of its trade, though second to Dublin in tonnage. Thirty years earlier Belfast's share of Ireland's total exports, in value, had been 17%.

Outside Ulster the economic effects of the Union fell most heavily on the lowest class: the landless labourers and those with only a small holding of land (« cottiers »). This class had grown rapidly during the latter part of the 18th century due to the introduction of a certain amount of subsistence farming, encouraged by the Irish parliament to stop what it thought was a deleterious drift away from tillage to pasturage, and to the spread of linen manufacture out of Ulster into the rest of the country where these activities helped to supplement

the income of this class. Potato cultivation was rapidly expanding and all these factors seem to have encouraged earlier marriages and large families. Population increase outdistanced the food supply and a classical Malthusian situation was set up which was to contribute greatly to the catastrophe of the 1840s.

This lowest class did not share in the agricultural prosperity of the Napoleonic war period, and the newly mechanised factories, such as large flour mills, employed little labour. It was the textile industries alone that held out the prospect of widespread supplementary employment. One of the allurements of Pitt's programme for the Union had been an influx of British capital to the island as a whole, but this did not happen in a way that produced much employment. The rapidly enlarging class of labourers and cottiers (probably due as much to a falling death rate as to a rising birth rate) came to depend on a diet centred on the potato, supplemented with what they could earn from domestic textile production, and they were severely affected by a series of poor harvests in grain and potatoes in 1799-1800, 1816, 1817, 1822 and 1836 which led to partial famines among them, but which led to increased prices for the larger farmers. Their poverty was greatly added to by the severe depression in the linen industry after the British slump of 1819/20. As we have seen above, textile manufacture as a whole began to be centralised more and more in the North-East at the expense of the rest of the country which became relatively more ruralised.

The visible effect of this ruralisation on the labourers and cottiers made the smallholders that much more tenacious in clinging on to the little land that they had, which at least guaranteed them a more varied diet and protected them from total famine. In the poorest regions, subdivision of land provided access to a minute holding for every man. In other regions there was a pronounced sense of property rights. Conflict was apt to arise between tenants and landlord if a tenant's jealously guarded right to his holding appeared to be in question. By now the right of a tenant to the renewal of his lease so long as he paid the rent demanded, or to the continuation of whatever agreement he held the land by, was all but universal. Trouble was only likely to occur if the lease came up for renewal in a time of falling prices when landlord and tenant might not agree on terms for renewal and, failing agreement, the farm might be offered to someone else willing to pay a higher rent. At this point the occupying tenant might come

into conflict with the landlord or the incoming farmer over what he considered his traditional right of occupancy. This form of agrarian unrest was, therefore, a feature of the more prosperous parts of the countryside and usually at times of falling prices.

In fact a more universal spring of agrarian unrest was the tithe system whereby the Anglican Church of Ireland levied a tax on farm produce, and resentment of tithes at times constituted a bond uniting landlords and tenants. The acrimony against tithes was strongest when prices were low, and the agrarian unrest of the early 1830s revolved around the tithes issue. In this Tithe War, as it was called, the more prosperous sections of the Catholic population were led by Daniel O'Connell, who had previously channelled peasant discontent into a struggle for Catholic Emancipation in Ireland which had succeeded, through Parliamentary action in 1829. O'Connell had created the first mass Catholic movement by his undoubted powers of oratory, but also by skilful organizational methods. When he first founded his Catholic Association in 1823 membership cost a guinea a year, an immense sum that a peasant would rarely see in one lump sum, and which he was far more likely to spend on his own personal and family needs than on membership of an association devoted to the furthering of the political advancement of the small Catholic middle class to which they did not belong. Several months after he had founded the Association he had a stroke of genius: he changed the membership rules by making the subscription payable at one penny per week and he arranged that the Catholic clergy should collect after Sunday mass. By the end of the year £1,000 a week was being collected in this way, which meant that the membership was well over 240,000.

The success of the Association so alarmed the administration based in Dublin Castle that they ordered its dissolution. O'Connell was no revolutionary but a constitutionalist conservative and he immediately obeyed the letter of the law, but reformed the association under the name of Liberal Clubs. This organization started to contest seats in the 1826 general election using Protestant candidates pledged to emancipation and backed by the Catholic clergy. They were successful in some of the southern counties and in one of the Ulster border counties, Monaghan. In 1828 O'Connell himself contested and won a by-election in Clare, but as a Catholic he could not take his seat. This disenfranchisement (in effect) of a large

constituency put the English parliament in a quandary for there was, at this time, a strong movement for extension of the franchise rather than its diminution. The parliament was also faced with massive, organized Irish Catholic disenchantment with the Union after the slump of 1825. The population of Ireland as a whole had increased from five million in 1800 to nearly seven million in 1821, and the Irish Catholics constituted almost 25% of the entire British population. Faced with these twin problems, the parliament swiftly came to a compromise with O'Connell: in return for a Catholic Emancipation Bill which became law in the spring of 1829, he agreed to a raising of the financial qualifications for voters in the counties. Previously freeholders whose property was rated at £2 or above could vote, but now the figure was raised to £10 depriving many of the small farmers of the vote given to them in 1793.

The aim of this policy was to prevent more than a few Catholics being elected to the English Parliament so that an effective Catholic party could not arise there. Although these measures were modified by the 1832 Reform Bill, the majority of Catholics were deprived of a vote until the second Reform Bill of 1867. Nevertheless, despite its limited success, this new Catholic agitation, with its democratic undertones, had frightened the Anglican Ascendancy landlords in Ulster, who had opposed the Union bitterly, into extreme conservatism in favour of the link with England. At this point, although the Orange Order was still in existence it had been made illegal and survived at grassroots level amongst the working class. Although the Emmet rebellion (a farcical failure to revive the United Irishmen movement) and the resumption of the Napoleonic wars in 1803 had saved the Orange dominated yeomanry and militia from being disarmed and disbanded, they had been displaced as a rural police force in 1814 by the introduction of a constabulary organized by Robert Peel, who, as Irish Secretary had rejected all collaboration between the state apparatus and the Orange Order. By the time of O'Connell's electoral campaign of 1826 the Ulster Orangemen were so weak and divided that they had nothing to oppose to it. In fact since O'Connell's movement directed no threat of physical force against Ulster, it would have been extremely difficult for the Ulster aristocracy to stir up the feelings of the Orange Order which had been, since its inception, an organization based on the defence of gains made in 1690 and deeply marked by a siege mentality. Nevertheless O'Connell's

successes had excited an undercurrent of fear amongst the Orange lower classes at Catholic militancy.

This upsurge of feeling was increased after O'Connell's victory in the Clare by-election. Whilst Peel and the Irish viceroy were pondering whether they would have to grant Catholic emancipation, the Protestant Orange aristocracy decided that the only way they could prevent emancipation was by an impressive display of force while the decision was still in the balance. The Orange Order had been illegal for several years, but the proletarian membership kept it going in the absence of middle class or aristocratic leadership, and maintained the tradition of marches of triumph through predominantly Catholic districts on ceremonial dates.

The Dublin administration feared that the July 12th march in 1828 would be a violent expression of the lower class Ulster Protestant reaction to the Clare by-election but, whilst there were some clashes, there was no general tumult. O'Connell still did not as yet pose a direct threat to the Protestant peasants in the border counties and they were prepared to wait on the initiative of the gentry and the politicians whose interests were more immediately menaced.

The Protestant ruling class's response came in August 1828 when they started to organise what they called Brunswick clubs. These were designed to encapsulate the widest possible range of Orange opinion and militancy whilst being sufficiently respectable to avoid suppression as a secret society. The clubs drew mainly on the lower classes but they were dominated by members of parliament, lawyers and Protestant clergy. By no means all members of the clandestine Orange Order joined the Brunswick clubs and they held little attraction for the Presbyterian peasantry. Nevertheless the movement spread rapidly through Ulster in the autumn of 1828, its main activity being the preparation of petitions and the holding of meetings against Catholic emancipation.

In spite of its rapid growth (108 clubs were formed in the space of 12 weeks), however, the Brunswick clubs movement was only really effective in the north of Ireland where the Protestants were in a majority. O'Connell, who was worried (unnecessarily as it turned out) that the Brunswickers might be exerting an undue influence on the English government, decided to demonstrate the weakness of the Brunswick movement by getting a Belfast journalist, John Lawless who was a long-time enemy of Orangeism, to lead a march of the Catholic Association into the northern counties to hold polit-

ical meetings to be attended by the Catholic minority there. Although the march was represented as being non-violent, the main participants were a semi-military order, the Liberators, which O'Connell had organized to protect Catholic tenants from landlord reprisals, and they were, potentially, a means of converting the Catholic Association into a physical force movement.

O'Connell had sadly underestimated the latent strength of grassroots Orangeism. As his disciplined bands of marchers approached Ulster Orangemen collected together in armed troops, and there were fierce clashes when Lawless crossed into Orange territory. The impetus for resistance to Lawless came from the lower classes who had sustained the Orange Order through its periods of official disfavour, and there was nothing that the Ulster gentry could do to prevent them.

O'Connell, the constitutionalist, had no desire to get entangled in a struggle with Orange mobs who were more or less a militia without a uniform, since his own rather inadequately armed force would have suffered the fate of the United Irishmen in 1798. As it was, Lawless's expedition was arousing indignation against O'Connell in England and threatening to create a real opposition to Catholic Emancipation in the English parliament. O'Connell saw his mistake and withdrew Lawless. The Orange lobby in England failed to capitalise on O'Connell's error of judgement and Catholic Emancipation went onto the Statute book in the spring of 1829.

The Emancipation crisis was another watershed in Irish historical development. The political and economic division between Ulster and the rest of the country became more pronounced. During the Tithe war, the English government (now controlled by the Whig party) brought members of the Orange Order into the armed yeomanry and used them to collect tithes from the Catholic peasants. This gave extra prestige to the Orange Order which was by now gaining adherents among the English aristocracy (many of whom were Irish landowners in a big way) and in the British army. (In fact, fear of the growing power of the Order led the English parliament to ban it once again in the late 1830s). For the time being the Catholic peasants concentrated on gaining their own economic demands (which they eventually won in the Tithe Commutation Act of 1838) and O'Connell's new project, which was for Repeal of the union with England, had to take a back seat for a while. After 1838 the Catholic church

resumed its role as a major organizing force in uniting the peasantry and the middle classes into what was a nascent nationalist movement. By 1840 many members of the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy in the south saw that their economic base was being eroded and they began to seek out alternatives. One group under the leadership of Thomas Davis saw the best chance for them was join the Repeal movement and influence its development so that it would produce a secular democratic nation in which they could take a leading role. Davis founded the radical Young Ireland section of the movement and he was tolerated by O'Connell for several years until they clashed over the education issue. Davis imagined that the nationalist movement would opt for co-denominational education so that religious differences could be overcome in the new nation, but O'Connell opted uncompromisingly for religious control of education. Davis tried to oppose this line within the Repeal organisation but he was decisively defeated. O'Connell's main contribution to the debate was to remark that Davis was a Protestant.

THE FAMINE OF THE 1840S.

By now another catastrophic fact of Irish history was altering the equation of forces within the southern nationalist movement: the famine of the 1840s. The main effect of the famine was to alter the structure of the social classes in the south for the rest of the century. The main cause of the famine was repeated failures in the potato crop which was the main staple in the diet of the landless labourers and the «cottier» class. Between 1845 and 1851 the number of labourers and cottiers fell by 40%, the number of farmers by 20%; at least 800,000 people, about 10% of the population, died from hunger and disease consequent on reduced resistance to fever. Combined with a related upsurge in emigration (mainly to America and English colonies such as Australia and Canada) this reduced the total population of Ireland from an all-time high of 8 million before the famine to 6.6 million in 1851. Judged against the standard of pre-industrial subsistence orises, there was nothing unique about these figures; indeed the death rate had often been equalled in European famines of the previous century including the Irish famine of 1740/41, but previously population had usually recovered rapidly. In Ireland however it continued to decline, from 6.6 million in 1851 to 4.4 million in 1911, and the population has

rarely been higher than that since. The spread of population loss was also uneven. In Ulster the drop from 1841 to 1911 was 33.8%; the average in the other three provinces was 51.6%. The main effect on the rural community was to swing the class balance sharply in favour of the farmers: in the 60 years after 1851 the number of labourers and cottiers fell by about 40%, the number of farmers by only 5%. The main effects can be tabulated as follows:

	Labourers	Cottiers	Farmers	
		(under 5 acres)	(5-15 acres)	(over 15 acres)
1845	700,000	300,000	154,000	304,000
1851	500,000	88,000	310,000	277,000
1910	300,000	62,000	192,000	290,000

The exodus of the labouring and cottier classes was aided by the English government's *laissez-faire* attitude to the famine crisis. There was food available in Ireland but since it was a valuable export and since the lower classes had no money to buy it they had to starve or get out of the starving areas. Many were so poor that they did not even have this choice. In fact the main emigration in the famine period was from the more prosperous eastern half of the south in the form of young single people leaving for the better prospect of America. Later in the century at times of further rural crisis whole families began to depart for America from the much more devastated western regions when the severity of their situation (and money remitted from relatives in America) persuaded them to desert a way of life which, however materially poor, they were in fact loath to leave.

The trend towards larger farming units was expedited by the Irish Poor Relief Act of 1847 which stated that no relief was to be given to anybody with more than a quarter of an acre of land. Another significant factor was the slump in grain prices after the effective repeal of the English Corn laws in 1849, and a rise in meat and livestock prices which encouraged a rapid switch-over to land-intensive cattle-rearing.

Mass evictions, emigration, and the compulsory sale of bankrupt estates (provided for by an Act of the English parliament) facilitated the development of a new class of large-scale ranching farmers (and this is still the main trend in Ireland today). The reduced number of labourers left in Ireland found their position stabilised since by their very scarcity

they could force their wages up slightly, but the nature of the new farming meant that less of them were needed. The main lesson that the small farmers still left learned was that they needed security of tenure and a fair way of fixing rents if they were to survive future bad harvests. During the 1850s there was agrarian agitation organised through a Tenants' Rights league which, for a time, united peasants in the north and the south but their activities were sporadic and easily defused by good harvests.

But prior to this there had been some insurrections in 1848 led by the Young Ireland wing of the Repeal Movement. (O'Connell had been unable to get the movement for Repeal really moving, and he had died in 1847 on his way to Rome to meet the Pope). Although they were another farcical failure they were to have important consequences since some of the exiled survivors of the uprising were to play a role in the founding of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (or Fenians) ten years later. In 1849, another rising in Wexford failed badly, but its leader, James Lalor had made a movement to abolish landlordism the main plank of his programme for an independent Ireland. Lalor called for the nationalization of the land and its letting out for crop-growing to peasant families. This was to be the programme of the powerful Land League in the 1880s. An analogous vision of Ireland as a nation of small peasant proprietors (borrowed from Bismarck's contemporary policies) was to form the basis, along with demands for social welfare programmes and political independence, of the « New Departure » in Fenian policies after their abortive attempts at uprising in 1867. The rise of the Fenians (or Irish Republican Brotherhood) out of the ashes of the Young Ireland insurrection was another result of the Famine emigrations to America. A sizeable Irish Catholic community had grown in the eastern seaboard of America where they clustered together in the face of as ferocious an anti-Catholicism as some of them had encountered in Ulster. The result of this experience was to build a fierce Irish nationalism amongst them but to displace their hatred of the puritan Americans onto the English. The Irish proved themselves to be very adept at American local politics (which they entered mainly for the secure and well-paid jobs it offered) and particularly good at setting up well-oiled party machines (a superb example of this is the late and unlamented Governor Daly of Chicago who was very proud of his Irish descent). In addition to remittance money and emigration tickets, one of the main exports of American Irish

to Ireland in the 19th century was ferocious anti-English nationalism and the know-how of slick party-political organization.

Ironically the main inheritor of this skill turned out to be a member of the Southern Irish Protestant Ascendancy middle classes — Charles Stuart Parnell who, during the 1880s took over both the Land League and the Fenians in the interests of the southern middle classes, and co-opted them into his Home Rule (later Nationalist) party, one of the best-oiled parliamentary parties ever known.

The home-rule movement had been founded by another member of the southern Protestant middle class, Isaac Butt, in 1870. A former Orangeman and Tory, Butt was disturbed by the undertow of potential insurrectionism left by the apparently moribund Fenians, but he was also worried by the threat posed to the Irish landlord class by the increasingly democratic English parliament (the Church of Ireland had been disestablished in 1869). The way out that he saw was to remove Ireland from English legislation by the setting up of an Irish parliament controlled by the landlord class. He gained the support of some of the Protestant landlords, but mainly of the Catholic middle class, who could foresee that an independent Ireland would provide them with a good living.

On the whole this was a professional middle class — doctors, lawyers, money-lenders and priests who made a good profit out of selling their « services » to the Irish lower classes. Industry had declined badly in southern Ireland. Despite the fact that money was accumulating in the growing number of banks there was an almost total lack of industrial *entrepreneurs* prepared to use it for the development of industry. The only highly developed industry was large-scale agriculture, and Home Rule probably found its lowest support among the large-scale cattle farmers who relied on the English market.

This lack of an effective middle class had left a vacuum quickly occupied by the Catholic church which took on its social role, providing charity, education, etc. At the beginning of the century the church had been liberal and somewhat anti-Rome, but in the 1840s, in step with the revival of the power of the Vatican it had become ultramontane, dedicated to the notion of a Catholic nation-state and to the furtherance of social Catholicism. This was mainly due to the return from Rome in 1849 of Paul Cullen, who became archbishop of Dublin in 1852 and remained in that position until 1878 (he became Ireland's first Cardinal in 1866). Cullen transformed the Cath-

olic church in Ireland from a South American type institution into one of the most efficiently organised Churches in Europe, and turned its orientation from the creation and protection of privilege and nepotism, to that of meritocratic education and modernisation, principally by centralising administration and creating a machine which might have been the envy of a Tammany Hall boss. Cullen was hated by Unionists and Fenians alike, and the Catholic church was careful throughout the 19th century in Ireland, to steer a middle course in the struggle for independence, always condemning (at least outwardly) insurrectionary activity. Nevertheless the Church always knew what they required of an independent Irish government, and because of their control of the preponderance of the population they were to make sure they got it, in the century to come.

When Parnell took over the Land League and the remnants of the Fenians in 1880, after Butt's death, he also inherited the influence of the Catholic church. None of this bothered Parnell. What he wanted was Irish Home Rule at almost any cost (but not agrarian revolution) and he was prepared to use anybody or any thing to get it. His main support came from the Land League and its land war. Funds from the organisation enabled him to pay retainers to members of the Irish parliamentary party (the first time this had been done in the English parliament) and thus to keep them together as a bloc vote. In parallel with his display as a « great parliamentarian » (organizing disruption of parliamentary business when the need arose) Parnell also came to have decisive though indefinable and ambiguous connections with the Fenian rank and file, especially in the great land-agitation of 1879-72. In one sense the revolutionary movement was captured by the constitutional movement working through a militant and independent Irish party in parliament; and for a long time it looked as though the home rulers had the future in their hands. American support for Fenianism was transferred to Parnell and his party. As the franchise was further expanded in the United Kingdom during the latter half of the century, the number of Catholic M.P.s representing Irish constituencies grew and began to favour the Home Rulers. Before the general election of 1885, Parnell had flirted with the idea of an alliance with the Conservatives since they seemed more likely than the Liberals to allow a Home Rule parliament to erect tariffs to protect small-scale southern Irish industries. Parnell raised the demand for protection of Irish industry in his election

campaign, and it was this more than anything which gained the Home Rule the undying opposition of the Ulster middle classes, to whom tariffs meant being cut-off from their lucrative British and British imperial markets and being forced to bear the major portion of the burden of Irish taxation.

Traditionally the Ulster merchants and industrialists had been Liberals because the Liberals were the party of free trade, and before the election of 1885 Liberals had held 9 of the seats in Ulster. The Home Rule campaign of the 1880s, however, was to polarise politics in Ulster and to set them into a pattern which has persisted basically unchanged until today. The 33 Ulster seats (expanded to cope for the increased electorate) divided 17/16 in favour of Home Rulers against those who favoured the retention of the Union with England (« Unionists »), and the Liberal representation was annihilated: the middle ground had been removed from Ulster politics, and so far it has not returned.

CONCENTRATION OF POPULATION IN THE TOWNS

The 1840s famine had had different effects in Ulster than in the rest of the country. The starving rural agricultural workers, mainly Catholic, had moved towards the towns of the industrialised eastern counties, Antrim and Down, in search of poor relief and work. The Ulster peasantry generally was not totally dependent on the potato for its sustenance, and it was in a position to grow cash crops such as flax and oats, with the money from which it could supplement its diet. The main effect of the famine, therefore was to increase the percentage of Catholics in the towns such as Belfast, Derry, etc.

The towns of the Lagan valley especially began to experience heavy industrialization in the 1850s. The linen industry was already concentrating in Eastern Ulster, and the Harland-Wolff shipyard was founded in 1858. The development of a major ship-building industry in Belfast is often attributed to the inherent efficacy of the Protestant ethic at accumulating capital and utilising it to promote industry. In fact the native Protestant middle class in Ulster were almost as lackadaisical about using capital as their Catholic counterpart in the south. Edward Harland had come to Belfast in 1854 to take up a managerial position in the shipbuilding firm recently founded by Robert Hickson. In 1858 he was on the point of leaving to set up his own business in Liverpool when his harassed employer, who had had little success, sold out to him. Harland

transformed Hickson's unsuccessful shipbuilding yard into one of the most successful in the world by a combination of skill and brilliant salesmanship. His success paved the way for other firms, and the success of shipbuilding gave rise to new ancillary industries such as rope-making. East Ulster's predominance in the linen trade also gave rise to industries such as the manufacture of textile machinery. The general industrial success of Ulster attracted more and more of the rural population into the towns. The population of Belfast grew from 87,062 in 1851 to 208,122 in 1881 to 386,947 in 1911, far outstripping the percentage increase of Dublin.

One extremely salient feature of this transfer of rural population was the introduction of Orangeism into Belfast and the other towns, whereas previously it had been mainly a rural phenomenon, an expression of land rivalry between poor peasants. The Catholic and Protestant workers tended to live in separate areas, a result of the Catholics who were the vast majority of the newcomers clustering together with their coreligionists. In Belfast the boom associated with the cotton industry in the first third of the century had attracted a large Catholic immigration so that Catholics already constituted a third of the population in 1834, a proportion that was to remain fairly constant throughout the 19th and 20th centuries except at times of great sectarian conflict. Belfast experienced inter-religious rioting during the 1830s and 1840s at times of elections (where voting was still performed in public) and at the time of Orange parades in July. (Although the Orange Order had been formally dissolved in 1836, the lower class Orangemen continued to parade under slightly different names such a « Loyalist » or simply « Protestants »).

Along with the absolute growth in, and increasing concentration of, population in the towns (after Belfast, Derry soon became the second largest town, and due to its situation in the rural, predominantly Catholic west of Ulster, the Catholic component of its population rapidly outstripped the Protestant) Ulster also developed a tradition of fiercely anti-Catholic clergymen of both the Presbyterian and Anglican sects who adhered to the conservative cause in politics.

In their sermons these priests tended to associate schemes for Irish political autonomy, such as the Repeal movement, with the power machinations of the Vatican, and to lace these arguments with evangelical fervour. One of the most famous of them, Thomas Drew, also combined this mixture with a social conscience that was advanced for his time, and he

quickly built up one of the largest congregations in Ireland. During the Famine he was very active in relief work, but during the 1850s he became increasingly involved with the Orange Order (he is listed as one of its Grand Chaplains in 1852). He established the Christ Church Protestant Association in 1854. Its main aims were to abolish government grants to the Catholic Church and to repeal the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829. Davis's combination of anti-Catholicism, fundamentalist evangelism and populism forms a pattern that has been repeated in Ulster ever since; its latest incarnation is the Reverend Ian Paisley.

It was Drew's street « preaching » (along with that of his colleagues, the Rev. Thomas McIlwaine — Anglican — and the Rev. Hugh Hanna — Presbyterian) against the wickedness of Romanism throughout the summer that sparked off the most serious sectarian disturbance so far in Belfast in July 1857. The immediate precipitating cause was a triumphalist Orange march through working-class Catholic districts, and the rioting was almost entirely confined to the working-class districts of Sandy Row (Protestant) and The Pound (Catholic). It continued on and off for 56 days with an unknown number of injuries and extensive damage to property.

In 1864 a monument to O'Connell was unveiled in Dublin on 5th August. Three days later in the Sandy Row district of Belfast a 4000-strong crowd burnt an effigy of O'Connell, and in the days that followed Protestant mobs attacked Catholic districts, Catholics retaliated and Catholic navvies and Protestant ship's carpenters, armed with the tools of their trade, engaged in sporadic pitched battles for a week until troops and 500 extra police arrived from Dublin. By the end of it all (it had lasted 18 days), there were 12 dead and over 100 injured.

Various theories have been advanced to account for the bitterness of the conflict between these two sections of the working class. The simplest economic theory is that the riots were the expression of competition between Catholic and Protestant workers for scarce jobs, but most of the evidence points to the fact that manufacturers were already instituting an « Orange » employment system whereby skilled jobs were given to Protestants and the Catholics were left with the unskilled work, so that the two sects were in different employment markets. But the cause and effect relationship is not so simple since it could be argued that the employers were only succumbing to a practice instituted by the Protestant

skilled workers of expelling Catholic workers from factories and shipyards at times of high sectarian tension.

The sectarian riots also concretized the development of religious ghettos in Belfast with both Protestants and Catholics driving members of the other sect out of « their » areas. We have to look to factors such as the Orange Order's deliberate policy of *apartheid* (marrying a « Papist » was the most frequent cause of expulsion from the Order), and the determination of both Protestants and Catholics that education should remain under denominational control. The intense activity of priests on both sides of the religious divide was also a far from negligible factor. Between 1851 and 1911 the number of Catholic priests in Ireland outside Ulster increased from 2,500 to 4,000, the number of monks from 200 to 1,200, of nuns from 1,000 to 9,000, and the annual cost of religion was from £ 3.4 million. Catholic priestly productivity fell by half — there being one priest to about 1,000 laity in 1911 compared with one to 2,000 in 1851. Protestant soul-saving techniques, however, were approximately twice as labour-intensive and probably absorbed capital at three times the Catholic rate. In addition there was an extensive export trade in both Catholic and Anglican missionaries.

Yet another factor was the rapid growth in communications media which brought events in the rest of Ireland under the more immediate scrutiny of the Ulster Protestants, exemplified by the 1864 riot which was parked off by a symbolic event in Dublin. Reports of the growing strength of Fenianism in the 1860s and the home rule movement in the 1870s and 1880s, both associated with a Catholic nationalism, only served to reinforce the siege mentality of the Orangemen and to strengthen their defensive character armouring of Protestant suprematism. « Fenian » came to be used as a common substitute word for « Catholic », signifying that all Catholics were regarded as potential rebels against the prevailing order. By the time of the next serious sectarian rioting in Belfast during the home rule crisis of 1886 the two sections of the working class had become so polarised both spatially (in where they lived) and psychologically (in their perceptions of each other as human beings) that the rioting could go on sporadically for four months, involving the deaths of 32 people, the injury of 371 more and £ 90,000 worth of damage.

THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT

Basically both the Belfast industrialists and the Belfast industrial workers (who comprised a « labour aristocracy » amongst the working class as a whole, performing most of the skilled work and belonging to English craft trade unions) felt, by the time of the home rule crisis, in many cases for sound objective reasons, that Belfast had done well out of the Union with England: wage-rates were higher than anywhere in Ireland (in some cases up to English levels); Belfast was the third port in the United Kingdom on the basis of customs revenue, after London and Liverpool; the largest weaving factory, the largest shipping output, the largest tobacco factory and the largest ropeworks in the world were situated in Belfast. As far as the Belfast industrial sector were concerned they were more part of an economic triangle formed by the industrialised valleys of the river Clyde in west Scotland, the river Mersey in north-west England and the river Lagan in east Ulster, i.e. the basis of Ulster's prosperity was the economic tie with Britain and they were not prepared to come under the rule of a Dublin parliament dominated by impoverished small farmers from the provinces of Munster and Connaught.

Although the amount of « home rule » envisaged in Gladstone's Home Rule bill amounted to little more than is being proposed today by the Labour government as « devolution » for Scotland and Wales, the threat of any transfer of power to the Catholic majority, plus Parnell's advocacy of protection for small industry in the south welded the Ulster capitalists and workers into a bloc which overrode class divisions and which was cemented by their common religious consciousness of the Catholic as a traitorous agent of Rome.

Ironically Parnell's tactical take-over of the Land League (without whose physical and financial support he could not have built his political machine) was destined to remove the last cause of friction within the Ulster Protestant bloc: the opposition between landlords and small tenant farmers. Gladstone had decided to liquidate the « Irish question » by a hard-soft policy of legal repression of « agitators » and the introduction of a Land Act which conceded the Land League's major demands for fair rent, fixity of tenure and free sale. The Act (passed into law in 1881) set up land courts to arbitrate fair rents, but excluded from its arbitrations all tenants who were in arrears (approximately a third of all tenants and a

majority of those in the impoverished west) and all leaseholders. The revolutionary wing of the Land League quickly grasped that this Act would soon recuperate a large percentage of their militants and were opposed to any co-operation with the courts. Parnell, although personally convinced that the Act would make landlordism impossible for the landlords, pretended to be dissatisfied with the Act and persuaded the Land League convention to « test » the Act with trial cases to prove its « hollowness ». He deliberately used very provocative language to denounce the Act so that he would be arrested as an « agitator ».

Whilst he was in prison those tenants eligible to « test » the Act discovered that the land courts would reduce rents by up to 20%, and the courts were soon flooded with eligible tenants, including many from Ulster. But the tenants most in need of relief, those still in arrears of rent, were ineligible to go before the courts. This, coupled with the imprisonment of Parnell led to such an increase in agitation and outrages that Gladstone was virtually compelled to concede all Parnell's demands (specific assurances that the repressive legislation would be dropped and that arrears of rent would be wiped clean by the English government so that previously ineligible tenants could take advantage of the land courts) for a set of vague, almost meaningless counter-concessions by Parnell.

The Arrears Act was a small farmers' charter. The state paid £ 800,000 for 130,000 tenants who immediately scurried to get into the land courts. Although the 1881 Act made provision for purchase by the tenants, the terms (25% down payment with the balance to be repaid at 5% over 35 years) were less favourable than a cancellation of arrears and a 20% reduction in rent. The peasants made economic choices by the cold light of realism rather than by the hazy illumination of bourgeois nationalism. The Arrears Act defused a potentially explosive situation and swung the balance of power inside the Land League away from the social revolutionary wing towards Parnell's much more modest constitutionalist demands.

Henceforth the Land League became the National League dedicated to the achievement of Home Rule by parliamentary means. Parnell demonstrated his organizational strength by helping to turn Gladstone out of office in June 1885 and by winning 85 out of the 103 Irish seats in the subsequent November 1885 general election. In the election campaign Parnell displayed his astute judgement of the political game by directing the Irish in England to vote for the conservative party.

Before the election neither the Liberals nor the conservatives were committed to Home Rule. After the election Parnell's Home Rule bloc held the balance of power in the English House of Commons, and in December Gladstone's son announced his father's conversion to the principle of Home Rule for Ireland. This sensational announcement polarised politics in England and Ireland for the next thirty years. Previously the conservatives had been toying with the idea of jumping on the Home Rule band wagon since it held out a prospect of power, but now they were delighted to be able to leap the other way and to start vigorously preaching the gospel of imperialism and the indissolubility of the United Kingdom. In their campaign against Home Rule, one of the main weapons was a racialist anti-Irishism, which coincided with the Ulster Orangemen's view of the ethnic inferiority of the Catholic Irish. The Catholic Irish were the first « inferior race » to be created by the English colonialist mentality, and anti-Irish feeling has survived into British society today, to be revived during the present « troubles » in Ulster.

In fact much of the propaganda material used by the conservatives in England had its inspiration in pamphlet and leaflets produced by the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union, a grouping of anti-Parnell southern Protestants from the provinces of Leinster, Munster and Connaught who came together in May 1885 to fight the general election in the south. The only plank in its platform for the election was « maintenance of the Union ». The southern Protestants who were much nearer to Home Rule agitation and could judge its strength better than the Ulster Protestants, had a much narrower social base than their northern co-religionists.

Firstly there were only 250,000 of them scattered thinly (except in the two large towns, Dublin and Cork) amongst the Catholic population who numbered 2,500,000; in fact, they could not muster more than 10% of the vote in the election despite vigorous campaigning. (Nevertheless their electoral activity was not entirely wasted since they had demonstrated that both liberals and conservatives could co-operate in a common cause and their activities had attracted favourable attention in England so that the association felt confident enough to extend its activities in 1886).

Secondly they formed an élite within southern society, consisting of aristocrats, landowners and big businessmen, whereas the Ulster Protestants were represented in all sectors of society. The southern protestants' isolated position meant

that they were never able to contemplate unconstitutional action which would antagonize the nationalist majority amongst whom they lived. Up to 1914 the southern protestants were able to oppose Home Rule because what they lacked in local strength they made up for by their influence in the English parliament, particularly in the predominantly conservative House of Lords over one hundred peers possessed land in, or were sons of families in, the south of Ireland. Thus, when Gladstone's administration of 1892 (once again dependent on the Irish parliamentary party for its tenure of office) introduced the second Home Rule Bill and got it through the House of Commons, the southern Unionists were able to pressurize the lords to reject it.

In Ulster the opposition to Home Rule was slower to take political shape. As already noted Parnell's candidates took 17 of the 33 Ulster seats in the 1885 election, and this was partially due to the fact that there was no co-ordination amongst the anti-Home Rule candidates, who fought each other as well as Parnell. The shock of the election result, together with the imminent possibility of Home Rule after Gladstone's conversion, galvanized the anti-Home Rulers into activity. The conservatives organized the Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union which soon teamed up with the Orange Order and tried to identify itself with the Protestant churches. It grew rapidly thanks to a series of extremely militant public meetings at which there was talk of armed resistance to imposed Home Rule (it was at this time that the slogan « Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right » was coined). The Ulster Liberals were slower to throw in their lot with the newly emerging Unionist movement, but when Gladstone's Home Rule bill was introduced into the House of Commons in April 1886, they broke with him and joined with the conservatives in a mass meeting held later in the month to condemn the bill. Although the Liberals preferred to maintain a separate organization, the Ulster Liberal Unionist Committee, the joint meeting sowed the seed of an alliance which was to survive for many years until it was formalised in the establishment of the Ulster Unionist Council in 1905/5.

The Home Rule Bill never became law because Gladstone was deserted, in the parliamentary vote, by two sizeable minorities in his party, the right wing (as had been predicted) and the radical wing led by Joseph Chamberlain who believed that progress lay in a sort of social imperialist expansion and development of the British Empire. Following the defeat of

the bill in June 1886 there was another general election which returned the conservative party to office with a large majority (added to by the defection to it of the right-wing Liberals, and the Chamberlainites who were now calling themselves Liberal-Unionists — in time this coalition, which was united by the conviction that the integrity of the United Kingdom had to be preserved, came to call itself the Unionist Party).

Although the Home Rule issue had now been shelved because of the results of parliamentary votes and elections, the prospects for the Nationalists under Parnell did not seem too bad. Parnell cultivated the Liberal connection and made sure that the British « progressive » party, and particularly Gladstone, remained committed to Home Rule and to its link with the Irish parliamentary party. Meanwhile, due to bad harvests and low prices land agitation directed against evicting landlords was building up again in the poorer districts, and leading members of the National League had formulated a new Plan of Campaign (though it was not publicly approved by Parnell) to channel the strength of the fresh agitation in their direction.

Suddenly, however, events started going badly wrong for the Nationalists: the Pope was persuaded to denounce the Plan of Campaign, and two weeks later Parnell did the same so as to preserve his constitutional respectability. But then a scandal broke in which Parnell was implicated in an adulterous relationship with the wife of one of his political colleagues. At first both his party and the Roman Catholic hierarchy were willing to overlook the scandal so long as Parnell remained the driving force of Nationalism, but then the Non-Conformist wing of the English Liberal party threatened to withdraw its support from Gladstone if he did not withdraw his from the « adulterous » Parnell. Gladstone complied and the Roman Catholic hierarchy dropped Parnell like a hot brick. Parnell, who was more enamoured of his own power than of anything else, fought like a titan to retain his leadership of the party but the only results of his efforts were the splitting of the party into warring factions, his own resignation and his early death.

In fact the new land war had been a failure for reasons I will go into the second part of this article, and by the time Gladstone was re-elected in 1892, again dependent on the support of the Irish parliamentary party, the only reason that the Nationalist party had enough parliamentary seats to oblige Gladstone to attempt once again unsuccessfully to introduce

a Home Rule bill, was that no new party had arisen to take its place. There were new movements concerned with the imposition of a more radical nationalism than that represented by the Nationalist party. Parnell's brilliant co-option of social-revolutionary Fenianism into his constitutionalist project had not eradicated the more purely nationalist spirit of Fenianism from Irish Catholic consciousness. Also in this decade the Catholic church was consolidating its secular base and its financial power, and was ready to support a more radical nationalism in return for the creation of a theocratic state.

Meanwhile large industrial and agricultural interests in Ulster were building the political instruments to resist the project gathering strength in the south, by all means necessary, including war. Unless an alternative were found, conflict was inevitable: The second part of this text will examine the failure of the « social democratic » managers of capitalism to come up with any real solution in Ulster.

January-February 1977.

RESUME

L'article retracé l'évolution de l'Ulster, à travers la politique coloniale du gouvernement anglais et de la résistance de la population catholique gaélique. C'est pendant cette période que sont survenus la plupart des événements célébrés chaque année par les protestants pour clamer leur suprématie sur les catholiques en Ulster.

Jusqu'au milieu du 19^e siècle, les sources de l'évolution séparée de l'Ulster sont à chercher dans le développement général de l'Irlande. Une différence nette tient à l'afflux de colons écossais protestants (presbytériens) dans l'Est de la province. Pour le reste, au 18^e siècle l'Ulster partage l'expansion générale de l'île. Bien que l'Angleterre n'ait pas bloqué, semble-t-il, l'économie irlandaise d'alors, une partie de la classe moyenne irlandaise en juge ainsi, ce qui fait gagner du terrain à l'agitation pour l'indépendance du Parlement irlandais. Cela acquis, une fraction radicale comprenant des presbytériens de Belfast conclut une alliance tactique avec la classe moyenne catholique en formation, avec pour objectifs le renversement de la classe dirigeante anglicane et l'indépendance de l'Irlande.

La révolte échoue misérablement: pour désarmer les rebelles, la classe dirigeante se sert de l'ordre d'Orange, société secrète protestante composée en majeure partie de paysans et de travailleurs agricoles violentement opposés à toute égalité avec les catholiques. Le gouvernement anglais, pour « résoudre le problème irlandais », incorpore alors l'I-

lande dans le Royaume-Uni, la soumet aux lois britanniques et autorise sa représentation au parlement, ce qui est accepté par la majorité de la population de l'Ulster.

C'est l'époque du démarrage économique de l'Ulster; les importations de technologie anglaise permettent de mécaniser partiellement l'industrie textile. Quant au reste de l'Irlande, il connaît une forte expansion démographique suivie à une prospérité agricole sans précédent et au maintien artificiel de prix élevés par des mesures protectionnistes, après les guerres napoléoniennes. Vers le milieu du 19^e siècle, toutefois, de mauvaises récoltes provoquent une famine qui aura des effets irréversibles sur la structure sociale de l'Irlande du Sud, l'Ulster étant moins touché. Les émigrés, provenant des couches sociales inférieures, forment en Amérique une communauté de nationalistes farouchement anti-anglais, qui financent des mouvements insurrectionnels; les Fenians en seront la première expression. Mais deux mouvements contradictoires apparaissent au Sud: les propriétaires fonciers souhaitent agrandir leurs fermes d'élevage, les petits fermiers veulent des baux stables et de bas loyers. Leur antagonisme ira jusqu'à la guerre paysanne. Une partie de la classe moyenne du sud saura détourner ces forces en faveur de l'agitation pour l'autonomie (Home rule) de l'Irlande au sein de l'empire britannique, avec des barrières douanières qui protégeraient la petite industrie. Si le Sud est de plus en plus agricole, l'Ulster développe ses industries: textiles, chantiers navals, etc., qui attirent vers les villes des populations rurales, dont un fort contingent de catholiques. La croissance des villes, surtout de Belfast, est explosive et l'ordre d'Orange apparaît pour la première fois en milieu urbain. Bientôt Belfast connaît ses premières émeutes, qui continuent aujourd'hui. Elles éclatent lorsque les processions orangistes traversent les districts catholiques, mais sont alimentées par les prêches des évangélistes.

En 1885, la campagne de Parnell pour le Home Rule réalise une Sainte-Alliance entre partis politiques, ordre d'Orange et églises protestantes de l'Ulster, par dessus les différences de classes, afin de conserver le lien d'Union avec l'Angleterre.

RIASSUNTO

L'articolo traccia l'evoluzione dell'Ulster attraverso la politica coloniale del governo inglese e la resistenza della popolazione cattolica gaelica. E' durante questo periodo che si è verificata la maggior parte degli avvenimenti celebrati ogni anno dai protestanti per ribadire la propria supremazia sui cattolici nell'Ulster.

Fino a metà del 19^e secolo, le origini dell'evoluzione separata dell'Ulster sono da ricercare nello sviluppo generale dell'Irlanda. Una netta differenziazione trova origine nell'afflusso, nell'est della provincia, di coloni scozzesi protestanti (presbiteriani). Per il resto, nel 18^e secolo l'Ulster condivide l'espansione generale dell'isola. Nonostante l'Inghilterra non abbia realmente bloccato, l'economia irlandese del tempo, una parte della classe media irlandese non è di questo avviso, e ciò fa guadagnare terreno all'agitazione per l'indipendenza del Parlamento irlandese. Così, una frazione radicale composta dai presbiteriani di Belfast

conclude un'alleanza tattica con la nascente classe media cattolica, con l'obiettivo di rovesciare la classe dirigente anglicana e ottenere l'indipendenza dell'Irlanda.

La rivolta finisce miseramente: per disarmare i ribelli, la classe dirigente si serve dell'ordine di Orange, società segreta protestante composta in maggior parte di contadini e lavoratori agricoli violentemente contrari a qualsiasi forma di parità con i cattolici. Il governo inglese, per «risolvere il problema irlandese», incorpora allora l'Irlanda nel Regno Unito, sottponendola alle leggi britanniche e autorizzandone la rappresentanza in Parlamento, cosa che viene accettata dalla maggioranza della popolazione dell'Ulster.

E' questa l'epoca del decollo economico dell'Ulster; l'importazione della tecnologia inglese permette di meccanizzare parzialmente l'industria tessile. Nel resto dell'Irlanda, si verifica una forte espansione demografica, in seguito ad una prosperità agricola senza precedenti ed al mantenimento artificiale del livello dei prezzi con misure protezionistiche, dopo le guerre napoleoniche. Verà la metà del 19^e secolo, però, una serie di cattivi raccolti agricoli provoca una carestia che avrà effetti irreversibili sulla struttura sociale dell'Irlanda del Sud, mentre l'Ulster viene toccato meno. Gli emigrati, provenienti dagli strati sociali inferiori, formano in America una comunità di nazionalisti ferocemente anti-inglesi, la quale finanzia alcuni movimenti insurrezionali; i Fenians ne sono la prima espressione. Ma due movimenti contraddittori appaiono al Sud: i proprietari fondiari che sperano di ampliare i loro allevamenti, e i piccoli proprietari che vogliono contratti stabili e affitti bassi. Tale antagonismo arriverà fino alla guerra contadina. Una parte della classe media riuscirà a deviare queste forze a favore dell'agitazione per l'autonomia (Home Rule) all'interno dell'impero britannico, con barriere doganali a protezione della piccola industria. Mentre il Sud diventa sempre più agricolo, l'Ulster si industrializza: filande, cantieri navali, ecc., attirano verso le città la popolazione rurale, con un forte contingente di cattolici. La crescita delle città, soprattutto Belfast, è esplosiva, e l'ordine di Orange appare per la prima volta nel contesto urbano. Ben presto Belfast conosce i primi sommovimenti, che continuano ancor oggi. Essi scoppiano quando le processioni orangiste attraversano i rioni cattolici, ma sono alimentati dai sermoni degli evangelisti.

Nel 1885, la campagna di Parnell per l'Home Rule provoca la formazione di una Santa Alleanza tra i partiti politici, l'ordine di Orange e le chiese protestanti dell'Ulster, al di sopra delle differenze di classe, allo scopo di conservare il legame dell'Unione con l'Inghilterra.

RESUMEN

El articulo relata la evolución del Ulster en relación con la política colonial del gobierno inglés y de la resistencia de la población católica gaélica. Durante este período se sitúan la mayoría de los acontecimientos festejados cada año por los protestantes para recordar su supremacía sobre los católicos del Ulster.

Hasta la mitad del Siglo XIX, los factores determinantes de la evo-

lución propia del Ulster se encuentran en el desarrollo general de Irlanda: colonos escozeses protestantes — presbyterianos — se instalan en gran número al este de la provincia, pero se puede decir que durante el Siglo XVIII el Uster participa al desarrollo general de la isla. A pesar que no hubo oposición a la expansión económica de Irlanda por parte de Inglaterra, gran parte de la clase media irlandesa se quejo de cierto bloqueo, con la consiguiente agitación en favor de la independencia del Parlamento irlandés. Una vez obtenida esta autonomía, una fracción radicál, incluyendo presbyterianos de Belfast, pacta tácticamente con la clase media católica en formón para tentar de provocar la caída de la clase dirigente anglicana y lograr la independencia de Irlanda.

La sublevación fracasa lamentablemente: para aplastarla, la clase dirigente dispone de una sociedad secreta protestante (*The Orange Order*), formada en gran parte por campesinos y peones agrícolas que rechazan cualquier forma de igualdad con los católicos. El gobierno británico « para resolver el problema irlandés », incorpora Irlanda en el Reinado-Unido, le impone las leyes británicas, acepta su representación en el Parlamento, medidas que la mayoría de la población del Ulster acepta.

Es la época del despegue económico del Ulster: la introducción de la tecnología inglesa favorece la mecanización parcial de la industria textil. Las otras provincias irlandesas conocen una fuerte expansión demográfica, resultado de una prosperidad agrícola excepcionalmente larga y de las tarifas elevadas de los productos, mantenidas artificialmente después de las guerras napoleónicas. Sin embargo, malas cosechas, en la mitad del Siglo XIX, provocan la hambruna, y tienen efectos irreversibles sobre las estructuras sociales de Irlanda meridional (el prospero Ulster está menos afectado). Los emigrados, en proveniencia de las capas sociales las mas pobres, forman en América del Norte una comunidad de nacionalistas fanáticamente anti-ingles, que va a ser la fuente de financiamiento de los movimientos nacionalistas armados. Los « Fenians » serán la primera expresión de lo que será luego tradición.

Dos movimientos contradictorios surgen en el Sur: los terratenientes quieren agrandecer sus haciendas para cría de ganado; los pequeños propietarios exigen contratos estables y arriendos bajos. Los dos movimientos choquen hasta la guerra civil: expulsiones, resistencias, enfrentamientos. Una fracción de la clase media trata de captar esas energías para alimentar la agitación en favor de la autonomía (*Home Rule*) de Irlanda, dentro del marco del Imperio Británico, y la obtención de protección aduanera en favor de la pequeña industria.

El Sur es cada día mas agrícola. En cambio, el Ulster desarrolla sus industrias textiles, construcciones navales, etc. Lo que provoca un movimiento de la población rural hacia las ciudades, población católica en su mayoría. El desarrollo de las ciudades es de carácter explosivo, especialmente en Belfast, y « *The Orange Order* » se manifiesta por primera vez en el ambiente urbano. En Belfast se producen los primeros disturbios. Siguen hoy día. Surgen cuando los desfiles protestantes cruzan por los barrios católicos.

En 1885, el movimiento de Parnell en favor del « *Home Rule* » conduce una Santa-Alianza entre los partidos políticos, « *Orange Order* » e Iglesias protestantes del Ulster, solidarios, a pesar de las diferencias de clases, en la voluntad de mantener los lazos entre Ulster y Gran Bretaña.

Document

El nuevo poder en España

Reproducimos aquí un capítulo del libro « *Poder Social en España* » (Tucar Ediciones, Madrid 1976) de Carlos Moya Valgañon, que nos parece muy interesante para la comprensión de la situación española hoy.

Los nuevos directores tecnócratas y ejecutivos

CARLOS M. VALGAÑON (*)

En el marco de la sociedad industrial « occidental » la dialéctica de la racionalización burocrática disuelve la vieja dicotomía clásica que durante toda una larga etapa histórica ha racionalizado ideológicamente la propia estructura del poder típica para el desarrollo capitalista: la oposición « Sociedad Civil-Estado » parece reconciliarse definitivamente en el marco del Estado Gerencial del Mercado Libre Organizado. Esta dialéctica de la racionalización instrumental, a la vez que amenaza disolver toda trascendencia simbólica capaz de fundar la legitimación de un sujeto colectivo de la historia universal — la Nación, la Clase Social — y pone en cuestión el propio concepto de sujeto — « la ilusión del sujeto », que dice Lacan —, mitifica semánticamente la definitiva reconciliación de la subjetividad con la gran organización, identificándola con la eficacia individual al servicio del mantenimiento y expansión del poder organizado. El « manager » y el « tecnócrata » son las dos imágenes así acuñadas que la moderna sociedad industrial propone a sus individuos para su más alta identificación con el movimiento colectivo del propio sistema. Se trata de dos imágenes progresivamente convergentes en un mundo en el que el desarrollo industrial se define como máxima legitimación política a la vez que se produce la simbiosis de la burocracia pública y la burocracia empresarial como cumplimiento de la razón políticoeconómica. Pero a la vez que su contenido intencional tiende a ser el mismo — el de « líder organizativo » en una Sociedad Organizada — la génesis histórica de ambas palabras se bifurca hacia los dos grandes polos contemporáneos del

Mercado Libre: los Estados Unidos y el Mercado Común Europeo. Es en la sociedad norte-americana donde el « director gerente », como meta profesional del « ejecutivo dinámico », se ha convertido en el nuevo arquetipo humano de la « organización funcional », el modelo universal válido tanto para la Administración Pública como para la Corporación Privada. El « tecnócrata » es la correspondiente creación europea: reproduce el mismo ideal organizativo de la simbiosis entre la Administración y la Gran Empresa, como clave del desarrollo permanente.

* * *

En el modelo « gerencial » norteamericano se subraya su origen empresarial vinculado a la propia dinámica de burocratización de las Grandes Corporaciones en aquel país. Schumpeter, con su pesimismo de corte liberal, ha analizado este proceso como « crepúsculo de la función empresarial ». « El trabajo de las oficinas y de las comisiones tiende a sustituir a la acción individual (...) La unidad industrial gigante, perfectamente burocratizada, no sólo elimina las pequeñas y medianas empresas "expropriando" a sus poseedores, sino que, en último término, elimina igualmente al empresario y expropia a la burguesía en tanto clase que, en función de tal proceso, está destinata a perder no solamente su renta, sino además — lo cual es mucho más grave — su razón de ser: la función empresarial como función individual (Schumpeter, 1963, 187-188, 189-190). Pero el pesimismo liberal de Schumpeter, al analizar la burocratización de la función empresarial como colectivización y « marcha hacia el socialismo », no advirtió que la nueva generación corporativa, en su cancelación del tipo clásico de función empresarial individual, mantenía en su seno, radicalizando los, algunos de los rasgos fundamentales de aquel tipo de personalidad y papel social. El « automatismo » del « progreso capitalista », en cuanto proceso burocratizado, no es el de una maquinaria armónicamente ajustada cuyos elementos se atienden puramente a una jerarquía y a unas normas pre establecidas. El riesgo, la agresividad y la racionalidad individual, condiciones de la innovación empresarial clásica, son asumidos dentro de la propia organización, que impone una dinámica concurrencial en los sectores estratégicos de la propia maquinaria como concurrencia intragrupal de los « ejecutivos », responsables no sólo en términos de « lealtad », sino de « eficacia » y « éxito », como requisitos de su propia permanencia y carrera dentro de la organización.

La súbita aceleración del crecimiento de la Administración

CARLOS MOYA VALGANON nació en Córdoba el 10 de junio de 1936; tras la realización de los estudios de Derecho, cursó estudios de Sociología en Alemania (1959-1962) doctorándose en el año 1963 en la Universidad de Valencia. Profesor en las Universidades de Madrid y Bilbao, es Catedrático de Sociología en la Universidad española desde 1971.

Pública norteamericana — desde el New Deal de Roosevelt a la Guerra Fría — iba a resolver sus enormes demandas de nuevo personal burocrático mediante la masiva entrada de cuadros gerenciales procedentes de la empresa privada. En ausencia de una tradición burocrático nacional como el Civil Service inglés o el Staatsbeamtentum alemán — históricamente incompatible con los ideales americanos —, el propio ideal democrático empresarial de la gerencia de los negocios, racionalizado teóricamente como « gerencia y organización científica » daría la solución a una situación cuyas puras necesidades cuantitativas desbordan el personal público administrativo ya existente. Con la avalancha de los nuevos gerentes a la Administración Pública americana ésta sufriría auténtica revolución. Toda la práctica gerencial y todos los principios de la organización de la corporación privada se encarnarían en la Nueva Burocracia Pública Americana. El Estado Americano, de ámbito político-legislativo del mercado libre nacional, se convertía en Estado Administrativo (Waldo) de las grandes corporaciones empresariales « multinacionales », asumiendo, en función de su propia lógica expansiva de dominación racionalizadora, los propios criterios de racionalización burocrática de tales empresas. Así la nueva maquinaria burocrático-empresarial corrige los clásicos límites de la Burocracia Pública racional con esta dinámica permanente de autoracionalización y autodepuración, en la que la vieja dialéctica del poder estatal nacional se ha sustituido por el control rentable del mercado mundial. (Vid. Moya, 1972).

« La idea de un gobierno de tecnócratas es muy antigua. La palabra en sí vino de Norteamérica después de la Primera Guerra Mundial, pero la idea se remonta a los comienzos del siglo XIX en Francia. El primer profeta de los tecnócratas fue el excentrífugo conde de Saint-Simon, quien se inspiró, en parte, en la « Ecole Polytechnique » que, desde entonces, ha sido un plantel de tecnócratas y profetas de la tecnocracia. Saint-Simon veía una nueva Edad de Oro en la que la vida podría ser medida y controlada en términos científicos y no metafísicos. Creía en "el gobierno de las cosas y no de los hombres", y defendió la idea de que el Estado debía ser regido y planificado por expertos científicos, industriales, banqueros ». (...) el éxito de laissez-faire del siglo XIX pareció negar la necesidad de una planificación centralizada. Pero con la quiebra del sistema capitalista en los años veinte y la evidente incapacidad de los partidos políticos para resolver el problema, la idea de planificación volvió a gozar del favor de los intelectuales en Francia, Inglaterra y otros países. En Francia la Polytechnique volvió a ser el centro de

interés. Pero hasta el final de la guerra no empezaron, por fin, los planificadores, primero en Francia y luego en Inglaterra, a entrar en su reino. La economía se había complicado tanto y las industrias tecnológicas ampliado hasta tal punto, que dependían cada vez más del Estado. Los sueños de Saint-Simon parecían hacerse realidad, en parte al menos, casi dos siglos después. El gobierno de De Gaulle, con su cortejo de ex funcionarios públicos, empezó a parecerse a un consejo de planificación y los planes quinquenales franceses empezaron a tener, cada vez más, un tono moral más confiado. La planificación trae consigo nuevos campos para los tecnócratas porque al tratar de un futuro lejano pueden escapar, cada vez más, del control del Parlamento y de los políticos. Los gobiernos ingleses, primero con Macmillan y luego con Wilson, miraron con cierta envidia la tecnocracia francesa. Industriales y periodistas se quejaron más y más de los desórdenes del Parlamento. En 1968 hubo incluso una breve campaña capitaneada por lord Robens y Cecil King destinada a crear un "gobierno de tecnócratas". En Italia hubo un intento de aplicación de la planificación francesa e incluso en Alemania, en especial después de la crisis del Ruhr en 1967, la palabra planificación dejó de ser sospechosa. En el Mercado Común el tecnócrata se convirtió en un duende especial ». (Sampson, 1971).

* * *

Frente a un contexto internacional presidido por la formación del Mercado Común, en España se produce la crisis política de 1956 a 1957, que lleva al Gobierno al llamado « equipo de tecnócratas ». Será el equipo que oficialmente va a protagonizar el proceso de liberación y nacionalización neocapitalista de la economía nacional. La conciencia de protagonismo de tal grupo queda bien patente en estas declaraciones de Ullastres. « La Estabilización la hicimos en julio del 59, pero la empezamos a poner en marcha mucho antes. El objetivo de la Estabilización fue reajustar la economía. Siempre he reconocido que el progreso económico español no lo iniciamos nosotros « exnihilo ». Desde el año 39 y hasta el 57, hubo que poner el motor en marcha, dinamizar la economía; ahora bien, esa economía se había lanzado desordenadamente, descoordinadamente, avanzando a saltos, produciendo inflaciones, perdiendo gran cantidad de productividad a causa de su desorden. Teníamos un motor en marcha, pero era un motor que tan pronto funcionaba con cuatro pistones como con tres; su rendimiento mecánico era pobre. Había terminado el periodo de la postguerra mundial —

periodo que, en todas partes, fue de inflación y de desorden — y ya los otros países habían conseguido controlar la situación, pasando al multilateralismo y a la convertibilidad de monedas. El 31 de diciembre de 1958 entró en vigor el Tratado de Roma. Felizmente, la prensa española mostró mucha sensibilidad y galvanizó a la opinión pública con grandes titulares. Comprendí que aquel era el momento adecuado para lanzarse a fondo y poner orden en la casa. No el orden por el orden, sino el orden como punto de partida para un proceso de desarrollo, primero, y de integración a Europa después. En mis discursos de aquellas fechas ya se anunciaban las cuatro fases del proceso: convertibilidad, estabilización, liberalización, integración. Lo cual, por cierto, me da alguna autoridad en Europa, ya que puedo probar que, desde el primer momento, aquella liberalización que ellos tanto alabaron iba encaminada a la integración » (Ullastres, en Paniker, 1969, 25).

Alberto Ullastres, Catedrático de Economía y Hacienda Pública, y más tarde de Historia Económica en la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Económicas de Madrid (en cuya fundación intervino), fue uno de los protagonistas de la nueva política que a partir de 1957 iba a cambiar la economía española. A Ullastres se le identifica con el Plan de Estabilización; a Navarro Rubio, con la Nacionalización del Banco de España; a López Rodó — que no sería ministro hasta 1965 — con la Reforma Administrativa primero y, en seguida, con el Plan de Desarrollo. El cuarto hombre clave en esta galería de personajes políticos decisivos para la liberalización de nuestra economía sería Gregorio López Bravo, ingeniero, ejecutivo empresarial, nombrado director general de Comercio Exterior por Ullastres (1959), de donde pasó en seguida (1960) a dirigir el Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera, organismo clave para la estabilización que en aquellos momentos estaba protagonizada públicamente por Ullastres y Navarro Rubio; en 1962 sería nombrado Ministro de Industria, puesto desde el cual iba a dar un giro radical a la estructura organizativa del I.N.I.: su originaria y burocrática gestión paramilitar se orientaría ahora hacia la « burocracia empresarial » de los « nuevos ejecutivos ».

* * *

Insistamos en la crisis de 1957: allí hace quiebra definitiva la política económica autárquica y aparece el primer gobierno económicamente « liberalizador », con ministros que serán calificados como « tecnócratas ». Dejemos la palabra a Brian Crozier, periodista y biógrafo de Franco, y oficioso cronista histórico

de nuestra política nacional. « El punto que más atrajo la atención, primero en España y luego en otros países, sobre el nuevo Gabinete de 1957, no fue el pasado de Castiella ni el nombramiento de tres profesores universitarios, sino el hecho de que López Rodó y dos de los nuevos ministros — Ullastres y Navarro Rubio — fueran miembros de la "Sociedad Sacerdotal de la Santa Cruz y Opus Dei", usualmente conocida como Opus Dei. Durante los últimos años, esta Asociación de fieles de la Iglesia Católica había sido tema de conversación en las reuniones sociales de Madrid. Yo mismo oí hablar por primera vez de ella en una cena celebrada en la capital de España en 1955, de labios del elocuente profesor irlandés del British Council, Walter Starkie. De hecho, había sido fundada hacia ya tiempo, en 1928, por un sacerdote español, Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer, aunque no había salido de su oscuridad inicial hasta pasados algunos años. En un aspecto fundamental, se diferencia de las numerosas órdenes religiosas que habían surgido en España a través de los siglos, especialmente de la tantas veces perseguida Compañía de Jesús. Los jesuitas, los dominicos, los franciscanos y otros, eran órdenes religiosas o monásticas cuyos miembros utilizaban hábitos o vestiduras de distintas clases. El Opus Dei, por el contrario, era una Asociación de fieles cuyos miembros eran y seguían siendo civiles; es decir, laicos. Sus miembros, por tanto, no tenían por qué retirarse del mundo o dedicarse corporativamente a una misma tarea, sino que continuaban en el mundo sirviendo a Dios en el ejercicio de su profesión y oficio y procurando desempeñarlo lo mejor posible. Un buen seguidor de "monseñor" Escrivá de Balaguer — título que hoy posee — no se refugia tras la tradicional humildad de cristiano o cuenta todas sus cuitas a su párroco, como la tradición católica española recomienda. Por el contrario, se enfrenta él mismo con sus propios problemas y los resuelve. El Opus Dei enseña así — indirectamente — una filosofía del éxito muy poco española, ofreciendo la alternativa de un trabajo duro en lugar de la pasiva aceptación de la voluntad de Dios, que tantas veces ha apartado a los españoles devotos del yunque y el martillo.

« Que la Asociación — en cuanto suma de sus miembros — se ha desarrollado enormemente y es poderosa, no puede negarse. Tiene su propia Universidad en Pamplona — la "Universidad de Navarra" — y controla un Banco (el Banco Popular, donde Navarro Rubio tuvo un cargo destacado), una agencia de noticias y numerosas publicaciones, algunos diarios entre ellas. Se ha dicho, también, que ha logrado obtener poder político a través de la presencia de algunos de sus miembros en los círcu-

los más íntimos del régimen de Franco, pero esta afirmación merece ser objeto de un cuidadoso análisis.

Ahora bien, si el Opus Dei no es un partido político ni un grupo de presión, es indudable que constituye un vivero de intelectuales tendente a producir, por selección natural, una élite no sólo en el terreno de la política, sino en todos los aspectos de la vida, especialmente en las profesionales. Esto lo logra de dos maneras: atrayendo a personas cuyos dones naturales les llevan a evitar la mediocridad y animando a aquellos que se unen a la Asociación a dedicarse decididamente a triunfar en el servicio, viviendo las virtudes de castidad y pobreza para reforzar esa dedicación. (En la práctica, la forma de vivir la virtud de la pobreza es que el patrimonio de los miembros del Opus Dei que permanecen célibes pertenece al Opus Dei, recibiendo ellos el dinero que corresponde a su "status" social). Sería sorprendente que esta combinación de circunstancias no diera origen a una élite natural » (Crozier, 1969, II, 243-246).

La presente cita ha de tomarse como lo que es: el juicio de un cronista histórico de la política contemporánea española, cuya biografía « Franco », lanzada en formato de bolsillo por una editora nacional, ha tenido un gran éxito. Por lo demás, el problema de la dimensión política o no del Opus sigue siendo una « cuestión disputada », en términos políticos y teológicos, con una resonancia que ha alcanzado masivamente a la opinión nacional. Anteriormente hemos enunciado algunas hipótesis sociológicas sobre la génesis y desarrollo de este movimiento religioso-secular — uno de los fenómenos más relevantes que se han producido en los últimos treinta años de la historia española —.

Lo que desde ya se puede decir — y por ahora nos basta — es que tal movimiento va a tener un impacto decisivo para la racionalización tecnoburocrática del Estado español y de la economía española en su salto hacia un « Capitalismo Organizado » internacionalmente viable. Un hecho reconocido por la propia opinión pública de los medios políticos del país, que ha nacionalizado el ambivalente término de « tecnócratas » para designar a la nueva élite político-burocrática que va a cristalizar con el paso de los hombres del Opus Dei en el Gobierno. Que de 1957 a 1972 mantendrán la continuidad de una serie de equipos y líneas de gobierno, haciendo posible la consolidación de la Administración-Pública como poder relativamente autónomo.

El lanzamiento periodístico de la palabra « tecnocracia » iba a acuñar en los medios políticos la conciencia de la aparición

de este poder relativamente autónomo que es el de la Administración. Portador, por otra parte, de una clara pretensión de liberalización económica que disuelve los problemas que para nuestra inserción en el mercado internacional suponen las viejas estructuras autárquicas del sistema político-económico español. Paradójicamente, es el propio Estado el que impulsa la liberalización de la Economía nacional, desde la íntima colaboración entre la Administración y el gran capital financiero-industrial, que intenta salvar la situación crítica, insostenible de los años cincuenta.

Emilio Romero — gran protagonista periodístico en su día de la ofensiva « ideológica » contra la « tecnocracia » ascendente — ha recapitulado desde su nueva « perspectiva » estos años de transformaciones decisivas para nuestra sociedad. « Por los años 60 es cuando comienza a verse la nueva sociedad española, y empieza a ser residual la España de 1936. Ya está en la calle la protesta estudiantil y el desacuerdo obrero. Ha terminado el tiempo de los silencios incondicionales. Ya no hay dogmas intramuros del Régimen y por eso los políticos dogmáticos o retóricos están en baja. Los dogmas solamente están fuera. Aparecen los solucionadores, los gerentes, los muchachos que se han hecho estos últimos años en las Universidades, principalmente en las Facultades de Ciencias Económicas, en los Bancos, en las grandes empresas, y en las zonas técnicas de la Administración pública. Empiezan a llegar los tecnócratas, esa nueva clase de políticos que pediría urgentemente Stalin por los años treinta para hacer los planes quinquenales, la planificación de la economía, las obras públicas, y la investigación, mientras purgaba a la vieja guardia de los retóricos » (Romero, en Equipo MUNDO, 1970, 13-14). No ha habido purga estalinista en nuestra sociedad — no es el Partido, sino Franco y sus sucesivos gobiernos quienes protagonizan el poder político —, pero sí « renovación de dogmáticos por gerentes » (Romero, loc. cit., 14). En el ritmo acelerado de la expansión económica, con su frenética circulación de hombres y posiciones que se reproduce en el reflejo caricaturesco del tráfico rodado madrileño, se disuelven tantas grandes palabras, se consumen tantos lenguajes, que muchas fórmulas absolutas de ayer apenas perduran hoy como residuos dogmáticos, vaciado su contenido en la esquemática racionalidad burocrático-empresarial, incomparable semántica para la organización eficaz. Emilio Romero es un testigo de excepción, convertido ahora a la nueva Razón de la Economía Política. Que empujada desde las burocracias públicas y privadas, desde la Administración y desde el Capital financiero,

cuenta en su haber el papel protagonista de la transformación en marcha de nuestro país en una sociedad industrial.

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A nivel de imagen pública, son los hombres del « Opus Dei » con su entrada en la Administración y en el gobierno los que han protagonizado políticamente la racionalización tecnocrática del Estado y de la economía nacionales. A partir de su acuerdo inicial con la élite financiero-industrial, el nuevo equipo de « tecnócratas » impulsará oficialmente la racionalización liberalizadora del mercado nacional en el marco político-ideológico de la Planificación para el Desarrollo. En un apartado anterior nos hemos referido ya a la singular ética religiosa que impulsa y motiva este nuevo liderazgo organizativo dentro de la sociedad española, la ascensión política del « equipo tecnócrata ».

Laureano López Rodó es quizás el hombre más representativo de todo este movimiento. Quizá se pudiese resumir toda su estrategia como una síntesis del modelo tecnocrático y del modelo gerencial occidentales inmediantemente compatible con los específicos supuestos tradicionales del Estado Nacional: « Mientras que el problema políticol-social de nuestros días se cifra en una reorganización de la sociedad que permita poner orden en las fuerzas y movimientos sociales que han surgido en un clima apolítico, el problema político-administrativo consiste, de otra parte, en el reajuste de la estructura de la Administración Pública, con objeto de asentarla sobre la realidad social y acomodarla mejor a sus actuales responsabilidades (...) ».

La Administración Pública es una gran empresa que cuenta con una extensa red de oficinas y servicios, cuya estructura y funcionamiento obedecen no sólo a principios y reglas jurídicas concernientes a las atribuciones de cada órgano, poderes jerárquicos, normas de procedimiento, derechos de los administrados, etc., sino también a principios y normas de organización empresarial, tales como los referentes a la dirección, la programación, la coordinación, el régimen del personal, las relaciones públicas y tantos otros (...). La Administración puede y debe estudiarse también como una gran empresa, sujeta a los principios y normas de la Teoría de la Organización » (López Rodó, 1963, 66, 67, 85, 86).

Altamente significativas serán sus palabras en la presentación en las Cortes del III Plan: « La política de desarrollo — que pretende servir el III Plan — funde así tradición y modernidad al mismo tiempo. Tradición: puesto que su contenido se inspira en los principios de nuestro sistema político. Modernidad: por-

que la aplicación de esos principios a la planificación nos lleva justamente hacia donde la técnica y la teoría del desarrollo han colocado las metas a las que debe aspirar el hombre de nuestro tiempo ». (López Rodó, 1972, 59).

La imagen proyectiva de las « metas del hombre de nuestro tiempo » implican la integración de la sociedad española en la sociedad industrial occidental. La racionalización instrumental se cumple como racionalización burocrático-profesional de la estructura social: « Fenómeno característico de nuestra época es la profesionalización de las actividades sociales. La mayor parte de las actividades que se desarrollan en el seno de la sociedad se convierten en profesiones, entendidas como formas de actuación que responden a un sistema racional perfectamente delimitado. Los adelantos técnicos contribuyen a un más alto grado de regionalización de las profesiones. La profesión nace en el momento en que un esquema racional determina la estructura de una dedicación humana. Con la profesión, dicho esquema racional pasa a constituir la estructura de un sector de la sociedad. »

La sociedad profesional no se compone de hombres que se dedican a alcanzar unos objetivos determinados, sino que radica en los objetivos mismos; se los ha asimilado, y, en consecuencia, se compone de estructuras profesionales y configura a los individuos como servidores de esas profesiones. En la medida en que la sociedad se tecnifica, las profesiones se dilatan y las relaciones humanas tienden a convertirse en una red de dedicaciones técnicas » (López Rodó, 1963, 36-37).

« La evolución hacia la "objetividad" racional, hacia la "humanidad profesional y especializadora", con todas sus múltiples consecuencias, es impulsada muy intensamente por la burocratización de todo dominio » (Weber, II, 1964, 749). La burocratización de la existencia colectiva impulsada por la Administración planificadora y el desarrollo empresarial ha de llevar a alcanzar el modelo occidental de la Sociedad de Consumo de Masas: « Nuestra ilusión se cifra en contemplar a España desde ahora mismo en 1980 sin ninguna magia de adivinación, sino por el propio dinamismo planificador. Por ello es reconfortante pensar que en 1980 todas las familias españolas tendrán teléfono, televisor y vivienda, y que ocho de cada diez familias contarán con automóvil. La renta por habitante será de 2.000 dólares; habrá desaparecido el analfabetismo, y la Universidad será asequible a todos los dotados intelectualmente. (...) la expansión de la economía, al ensanchar las posibilidades de elección de los españoles, habrá enriquecido su libertad, su

seguridad frente al infortunio y su independencia frente a todo determinismo materialista» (López Rodó, 1972, 58). La racionalización burocrática de la economía y de la política nacionales se legitima así como disolución a escala colectiva del reino de la necesidad material e ingreso en la libertad de la sociedad afluente del consumo.

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Conocemos ya el significante religioso que sirve de supuesto carismático y organizativo a la gestión del llamado «gobierno tecnócrata» en España. Sin esa subyacente dimensión religiosa que implicaba la pertenencia formal al Opus Dei no hubiere sido posible la coerencia organizativa que el «equipo tecnócrata» iba a imponer en la Administración Pública. Sólo en función de esa dimensión carismática se alcanza un nivel de racionalización objetiva del comportamiento burocrático, capaz de imponerse sobre el tradicional particularismo de la sociedad española, disolviendo en «grupos» y «clanes», «familias» y «clientelas», todo proyecto de organización formal. Lo que ahora debo destacar es la específica dimensión de racionalización científico-social en el comportamiento público de los llamados «tecnócratas». Ullastres y López Rodó son catedráticos de universidad — como también lo era Fraga Iribarne, el «tecnócrata liberal del movimiento». Con ellos se produce la irrupción expansiva del significante «ciencia social» en el lenguaje público de los proyectos y legitimaciones de la actividad política. Siquiera en este primer momento de improvisación de una política de tipo «tecnocrático» las dos ciencias sociales claves van a ser la Economía Política y la Ciencia de la Organización. Esta última es el contrapunto con que López Rodó triunfa sobre el lenguaje weberiano de la Sociología de la Burocracia, manifiesto en el lenguaje público de Fraga y en proyecto de reforma de la Administración Pública que, habiéndose preparado en el seno del Instituto de Estudios Políticos (García Enterría, Garrido Falla), sería desplazado por la Reforma Administrativa del que había de ser Comisario del Plan de Desarrollo. El propio lanzamiento de la planificación indicativa supondría el lanzamiento oficial de un lenguaje en el que los términos científico-económicos y científico-sociales desplazarían sistemáticamente el vocabulario poético con que los herederos del lenguaje joseantoniano invocaban la Revolución Nacional Sindicalista. A partir de ahora las estadísticas y los pronósticos de tipo «estructural» y «coyuntural» iban a constituirse en instrumento de gobierno y en lenguaje

oficial del Estado, desplazando la «poética revolucionaria» de los «políticos del Movimiento».

La Ley de Reforma Educativa del ministro Villar Palasí —«tecnócrata» y catedrático de Derecho Administrativo— es, en su propio lenguaje y en su intencionalidad objetiva, uno de los máximos exponentes de esta radical secularización y racionalización científico-social de la semántica política oficial. De 1958 en adelante, el viejo integrismo católico que había perdido la propia enseñanza universitaria empezaría a perder terreno frente a la irrupción del lenguaje de la «ciencia moderna» en las clases y en los claustros. Con la lógica de la Economía Política y de la Organización Racional volvía a entrar en la enseñanza superior la Lógica Científica contemporánea, en su propia incompatibilidad estructural con la Lógica Escolástica y el pretendido «retorno a Menéndez y Pelayo, Donoso y Balmes» (Calvo Serer) que en un primer momento llegó a configurar académicamente la «metafísica teológica» del Estado español. Incompatible epistemológicamente con las nuevas necesidades de tecnología científico-social impuestas por el propio desarrollo económico estatalmente impulsado. La invocación mágico-ritual de la Contrareforma Imperial, daba paso ahora a un progresivo reconocimiento de la Razón Científica Moderna —cuatrocientos años más tarde de las guerras de religión y de la «tibetanización» (Ortega y Gasset) de la cultura nacional, con la leve excepción de los chispazos liberales que desde 1830 a 1936 se sucedieron en nuestro pasado.

Supuestos los objetivos económico-políticos de la «Administración para el Desarrollo», la importación de la racionalidad científico-tecnológica occidental se convertía en una necesidad del propio Estado. La reproducción social de sus cuadros, capaz de enfrentar técnicamente las nuevas tareas planteadas por una industrialización y una urbanización expansiva, exigía la formación académica de toda una masa social a partir de los supuestos de la «Razón Científica Moderna» —ese fantasmal espíritu conjurado a lo largo de cuatrocientos años de Contrarreforma político-religiosa. A nadie debe extrañar el papel clave que iba a cumplir la expansión del alumnado en las Facultades de Ciencias Económicas, en el contexto del «boom» educativo determinando el proyecto de reforma de Villar Palasí. Los «tecnócratas» sólo son posibles —antes, ahora y en el futuro— a partir de un sistema académico enseñando el «progreso» de la ciencia moderna en la Sociedad Industrial contemporánea. Un Estado que afronta el desarrollo industrial es inviable si no impulsa la modernización científica de su repertorio académico

y de su sistema educativo. La Ciencia Moderna — ya lo vio Hegel — es el instrumento de la necesaria racionalización política del Estado Industrial. La tecnología científica es una necesidad social impuesta por el propio desarrollo acumulativo del Capital Financiero.

« El Crepúsculo de las Ideologías » — escrito por el « tecnócrata » Fernández de la Mora, antes de acceder al Ministerio de Obras Públicas — es el más radical exponente de la necesaria reconciliación del integrismo católico tradicional con la modernidad científico-tecnológica impuesta por la industrialización. « Conviene acelerar todo lo posible el proceso de sustitución de las ideologías por las ideas concretas que suministran la ética y las ciencias sociales... A finales del siglo XIX la política se hacía, como la farmacopea, con sencillas recetas ideológicas: la liberal, la socialista, etc. Hoy el 90 por 100 de la política es tecnología y economía » (Fernández de la Mora, 1965, 23; 1968, 346). No puede extrañar el que a nivel de un tan acentrado pensamiento conservador no se pueda percibir la incompatibilidad epistemológica entre la restauración ética del Antiguo Régimen y la modernización científica de la tecnología industrial en el « Estado de Obras ». Pero el nivel de claridad lógica exigida para entender la epistemología científica contemporánea resulta incompatible con niveles altos en la « escala F » del carácter autoritario (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, Sanford, 1950). Si aquí se recogen los textos de este ministro, crítico del « pensamiento español » en las páginas de « ABC », es en cuanto exponente sociológico del carisma político que la Ciencia Moderna y la Tecnología Científica habían de cobrar con los « tecnócratas » en el poder.

* * *

Si extremásemos el rigor de los términos más allá del cliché periodístico socialmente establecido, deberíamos matizar radicalmente el sentido de ese substantivo y adjetivo que es « tecnócrata ». Propiamente, López Rodó es un « tecnócrata de la Organización Científica » proyectándose política y burocráticamente sobre el campo de la Economía Política, respecto de cuya « ciencia » y « tecnología » era, profesionalmente, un « amateur ». Propiamente, la « razón tecnocrática » del autor del « crepúsculo de las ideologías » es pura ideología tecnocrática basada en el más radical amateurismo a nivel de Ciencias Sociales. Si queremos escuchar un discurso auténticamente tecnocrático a nivel de la aplicación política y económica de la tecnología científica contemporánea, debemos reproducir las declaraciones

de Barrera de Irimo a Salvador Paniker en sus « Conversaciones en Madrid ». La singular ventaja de la elección de tal personaje radica en que a la vez que es un « tecnócrata » de la Administración, es un alto « ejecutivo » en la Empresa Privada.

Con 36 años, Antonio Barrera de Irimo, que ocupaba la Secretaría General Técnica del Ministerio de Hacienda, fue nombrado Presidente Ejecutivo del Consejo de Administración de la Telefónica: « La Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España es la empresa más importante del país. En números redondos, tiene cuarenta mil empleados y cuarenta mil millones de pesetas de capital propio. Es decir, más empleados que todas las empresas eléctricas juntas, y más capital propio que todos los Bancos españoles reunidos » (Paniker, 1969, 191). La carrera profesional de Barrera de Irimo es uno de los más brillantes exponentes de la movilización ascendente de los Nuevos Directores en el horizonte de la racionalización tecnocrática de la economía española. Nacido en Ribadeo (Lugo), en 1929, estudió Derecho y Economía en la Universidad de Deusto, en cuyo Universidad, así como en la Facultad de Derecho de la de Madrid fue Profesor de Hacienda Pública. En 1957 fue nombrado Vicesecretario General Técnico del Ministerio de Hacienda, y en 1960 designado Director del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Posteriormente, en 1962, pasó a ocupar el puesto de Secretario General Técnico del Ministerio de Hacienda, desde cuyo puesto, en 1965, pasó a la Presidencia de la Telefónica. En ese marco, su lenguaje es uno de los máximos exponentes del desarrollo de la nueva racionalidad como supuesto y resultado de la ascensión de la nueva élite cuyo destino va unido a la etapa actual de la industrialización nacional. En este sentido puede resultar esclarecedor comparar con los esquemas proyectivos de López Rodó la imagen de la sociedad organizada contenida en las declaraciones de este gran « manager ».

« Mi aparición en la Telefónica fue un poco fruto del azar. En 1965 la Telefónica atravesaba por una crisis de imagen pública; aquél momento coincidió con mi cese en la Secretaría General Técnica del Ministerio de Hacienda, y se me sugirió hacerme cargo de la empresa. Al principio creí que aquel iba a ser un mundo monótono, una suma de pequeñas cosas, un microcosmos de teléfonos. Luego he podido ver la cantidad de repercusiones que tiene este negocio, que pertenece a uno de los sectores donde la tecnología evoluciona con más rapidez.

Sobre todo ahora que empiezan los diálogos de los ordenadores y los procedimientos de transmisión de impulsos, con infinidad de aplicaciones.

« La importancia que pueden tener las técnicas de la comunicación es enorme. Se podría llegar a una organización de la sociedad, a base de maximizar, digámoslo así, el cuerpo social, a través de un sistema nervioso y de unos canales de comunicación, y de impulso, suficientemente racionales. Poniendo un ejemplo; en este mundo tan fragmentado del transporte por carretera español, el día que tuviéramos a todos estos pequeños minifundistas, que son los camioneros, suficientemente ordenados a través de un sistema de control en los puntos esenciales de los fletes y de las cargas, podríamos conseguir una racionalización importante de un sector del país. Hoy en día, una flota mercante es una flota teledirigida. Los barcos no saben ni a dónde van, ni la velocidad que deben seguir; todo esto se les comunica sobre la marcha: lo determina un ordenador a mucha distancia.

* * *

« En este sentido, todo el sistema nervioso que tiene en su mano la Telefónica puede ser un instrumento, no sólo para dar al final de sus hilos la expresión de la voz, sino para conseguir un cuadro de impulsos que puedan gobernar racionalmente todos los movimientos, actualmente atomizados, del país. Estamos, por ejemplo, considerando la posibilidad de ofrecer un sistema, para la Comisaría de Abastecimientos y Transportes, que permita la transparencia de los mercados: crear un mundo de información tan amplio que, en todo momento, la ruptura que implica la distancia y la dispersión geográfica de los mercados, se convierta en una unidad, por la simultaneidad de los procesos de información. Y todo esto a base, quizás, de un sistema tan sencillo como el de pizarras interconectadas entre sí.

« Cuando uno ve el caudal de quehaceres que puede circular por el cable, por el hilo, por la anchura de banda que en definitiva administraremos — porque, a la larga, terminaremos siendo los administradores de una anchura de banda, de la cual cada persona hará el uso que le parezca conveniente — uno se da cuenta del enorme porvenir de este sector. En aplicaciones pedagógicas, por ejemplo. Hay que tener en cuenta la escasez, no sólo en número sino en calidad, de pedagogos: de ahí la necesidad de multiplicar sus posibilidades de expresión a través de unas herramientas que permitan el acceso de la educación a todos los medios. En definitiva, acercar Mahoma a la montaña. Desde una simple pizarra a distancia hasta procesos más costosos. Esto puede permitir la inmediación entre el profesor y el alumno; la corrección, la consulta.

« ¿Más aplicaciones? Hace poco apareció un mecanismo, en virtud del cual, por el hilo del teléfono se pueden proyectar los impulsos necesarios para hacer dormir a los que sufren de insomnio. Están, también, las aplicaciones de la medicina a distancia. En fin, hemos vivido con los astronautas la perfecta sincronización de todas sus reacciones físicas mediante procesos de telemedida y telemundo. Se trata siempre de la superación de la barrera que impone la distancia y el tiempo en un mundo radicalmente nuevo.

« Claro que éstas son tareas pioneras, y se tropieza con la resistencia, habitual en nuestro país, frente a una transformación profunda de nuestra estructura social. ¿Qué tipo de resistencias? En unos casos es la medicina rural, en otros la estructura de la educación, en otros la organización de los transportes, el sistema de reserva de plaza en los hoteles, y en general, de toda la vida administrativa, a la cual se pone en tensión.

« Todas estas actividades paralelas rompen caminos, abren caminos, e incluso son interesantes desde el punto de vista empresarial. Hay que tener en cuenta que todos estos instrumentos se abaratrarán notablemente y servirán para una transformación de la vida; para una vida intelectual distinta que permita afrontar el problema del ocio y de la educación. Es muy probable que el estudiante del día de mañana, a unos precios populares, tenga resuelto el acceso a un ordenador electrónico de distancia, con un simple pupitre de consulta en donde pueda formular sus problemas y obtener sus respuestas. Y ello en términos módicos. Y todo eso, que hoy parece una simple actividad en beneficio de la cultura, en el futuro será una actividad perfectamente comercial. Por lo tanto, de nuestra agilidad y capacidad de promoverla y anticiparla depende que estemos anticipando también nuestros propios mercados. Hay que vencer las inercias y las rutinas de la vida española. Es posible que la misión de los servicios públicos, en las empresas del Sector Público, sea promover, avanzar, arriesgar » (Barrera de Irimo, en Paniker, 1969, 191-192-193).

En el marco de la Gran Organización que disuelve la diferencia entre lo público y lo privado, el riesgo y la innovación empresarial adquieren una nueva figura: la tecnología científica hace posible la racionalización instrumental de medios y decisiones como dinámica en que la propia expansión de la gran empresa exige la movilización colectiva hacia una más alta racionalización instrumental de la existencia social. Desde esta racionalidad proyectiva el futuro se define como expansión y en

la no expansión estriba el riesgo absoluto, frente al cual carece de relevancia la posibilidad de pérdidas inmediatas en las áreas de innovación. Y la seguridad de tal expansión hacia adelante sólo se alcanza con la impulsión a escala de la sociedad global de una progresiva reconciliación instrumental que vaya configurando una demanda coherente con la estrategia de la movilización burocrática de la innovación empresarial: « Si hay que crear en el país la conciencia de que el estudiante lo que necesita es un pupitre ordenador electrónico en su mesa, lo que procede es empezar por poner ese pupitre. Y eso es lo que hemos hecho en varios casos con algunas de estas herramientas e instrumentos: empezar por comprarlas, traerlas y demostrar su uso. Una central telefónica es un instrumento lógico que obedece a la regla de conectar dos personas habida cuenta de sus diferentes códigos: con un código de llamada se busca a otro. Y se la encuentra. Es un proceso lógico muy sencillo: seleccionar de la memoria aquello que se tiene que encontrar. Pues bien; creo que no está lejano el día en que en vez de montar centrales telefónicas montaremos ordenadores de barrio, de acceso múltiple y compartido. Sin duda, una parte de nuestra central se dedicará a esa tarea sencilla de servir de referencia, de commutador, para enlazar a las gentes; pero habrá una capacidad residual importante que será memoria lógica al servicio del público. Cerebros electrónicos al servicio del público para que éste vaya a formular sus consultas y obtener sus informaciones. En París funciona un sistema en virtud del cual, por una cantidad módica, introduce uno las diez variables de su vivienda ideal, y el ordenador le responde diciéndole que es lo que se ofrece en la ciudad entre tantos y tantos metros cuadrados, con tal tipo de calefacción, etc. Este señor se ahorra, así, de leer todas las páginas de anuncios de los periódicos. Acude simplemente a su computador de barrio, el cual le da resuelto el problema. Y este es un caso de primer grado. El ingeniero de la zona podrá formular consultas más complejas al ordenador a distancia.

« Cabe pensar, incluso, que en el futuro nuestra capacidad de lógica y nuestra capacidad de memoria puedan enriquecerse mediante unidades adicionales. Es posible que algún día el hombre pueda hacer uso de esa corriente de estímulos e impulsos, conectando con los centros motores del cerebro, para conseguir esta capacidad adicional. También la idea de tener un gallup permanente, es cada día menos utópica, y se ha calculado que, en 1970 el volumen de información que se transmitirá por medio de un código de datos y señales será ya igual al trans-

mitido por la palabra hablada y escrita » (Barrera de Irimo, en Paniker, 1969, 193-194).

En la cúspide de las decisiones, el nuevo Director, autoconsciente de la simbiosis que representa entre lo público y lo privado, legitima su propio poder no sólo en función de la expansión de su empresa, sino en la definición de tal expansión como contribución a la impulsión del proceso racional de modernización científico tecnológica. Pero esa legitimación sólo es posible, a este nivel de racionalidad instrumental desde una lógica de previsión proyectiva que se traduce en la necesidad de planificar socialmente los resultados de la propia expansión empresarial en el contexto de una planificación nacional.

« Tiene que haber una previsión social sobre cual va a ser el impacto de todas estas nuevas circunstancias técnicas. A mí me causa dolor contemplar el desarrollo urbanístico, en el que todavía seguimos apegados a la pura inercia que determinó la concentración urbana, cuando la preocupación primordial era defenderse. Me apena esta inercia del apiñamiento y esta locura colectiva de hacer agujeros para meter los automóviles dentro del recinto de nuestra ciudad amurallada. Y todo esto en un mundo donde la distancia y el tiempo van a quedar superados por la técnica. Y temo que estemos construyendo una gruesa infraestructura que no esté de acuerdo con los elementos esenciales de previsión que podíamos ya tener estudiados. Puede que estemos dando soluciones que no sean las que se deben aplicar mañana. El sentido de la planificación de la vida política en su conjunto, parece tan indispensable como el de la propia proyección en la vida económica. Es probable que, a la larga, no se puedan resolver muchas de las incógnitas de nuestra vida económica sin haber realizado previamente una planificación social (...) (Hay que ser) lo suficientemente avisado para prever, no sólo aquello que se nos encargó sino todas aquellas cosas que, dentro de un concepto dirigente de la gestión pública, deben ser prevenidas. Las grandes unidades empresariales que, como la nuestra, están a caballo entre lo público y lo privado deben tener un sentido muy agudo de creación y de iniciativa. Y, en ese sentido, tenemos en España una oportunidad nueva ya que nos asomamos a un mundo en donde el poderío no va a estar influenciado por las riquezas naturales, sino por la tecnología intelectual. España debería tomar el atajo de la revolución industrial que ya ha perdido des veces. Porque lo notable es que la nueva tecnología tiene un coste barato; los nuevos instrumentos son baratos, y la dificultad esencial sólo reside en la capa-

ciudad de organización y en el sentido de iniciativa y de imaginación para servirse de ellos. En una palabra: convertirse en un país rico, hoy, puede ser barato. (...).

« Se ve cada día más el entreverado entre lo público y lo privado, en las grandes empresas, hasta conseguir una simbiosis recíproca. El mundo de la gran empresa, además, se ve obligado a caminar con absoluta identidad de acción con los poderes públicos. Las grandes operaciones financieras, la fijación de precios, los grandes comportamientos a todos los niveles, los créditos, no pueden consentirse si no se adecuan de alguna manera al bien público general. De manera que yo entiendo que en los próximos años tendremos que superar el dilema de la estatización frente a la privatización, y encontrar algo que garantice el mantenimiento en tensión de todo ese entramado, apuntando hacia los objetivos superiores. (...).

« La determinación de los volúmenes de producción y el comportamiento de la empresa no debe apuntar solamente al propio beneficio, sino también a los beneficios derivados de este comportamiento. Las empresas están llamadas a tener conciencia de las repercusiones de todas y cada una de sus acciones. Es posible, que, desde un punto de vista de convivencia particular, sea indiferente que una empresa se suministre de un producto de importación o de un producto nacional; ahora bien, a veces puede ser conveniente correr el riesgo de suministrarse con el producto nacional, atendiendo al proceso de demanda inducida que se genera. La empresa debe tener conciencia de todos los procesos inducidos que de sus acciones de desprenden » (Barrera de Irímo, loc. cit., 199, 201).

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La autorracionalización expansiva de la gran empresa, a la vez que impone su íntima conexión con el poder público, impone la nueva estructura de su legitimación, como sujeto colectivo del desarrollo y del bienestar general. Frente a la clásica legitimación en términos de interés particular por los beneficios alcanzados, y, en términos de interés colectivo, por su contribución a la producción nacional, la nueva legitimación de esta expansiva organización, a caballo entre lo privado y lo público, radica precisamente en su función al servicio de « la justicia externa » (Barrera de Irímo), esto es, al servicio del bien común como generalización colectiva del bienestar. Una meta que se reconcilia absolutamente con la dialéctica de la racionalización instrumental del mercado en cuanto el crecimiento del bienestar común se identifica con el crecimiento colectivo del consumo,

esto es, con la expansión nacional de la demanda. La Sociedad de Consumo es el modelo proyectivo de sociedad que constituye la última legitimación para la dinámica expansiva de la gran empresa.

« Hace falta contar con un elemento que daría plenitud de sentido público a la empresa: la presencia del consumidor. La presencia del destinatario. Personalmente me repugna un procedimiento simplificador como es el de la estatización. Creo que la estatización, como idea a priori, es un procedimiento demasiado fácil de eliminar complejidades. No digo que en algunas ocasiones no sea el único remedio para imponer rápidamente ua solución de justicia; pero sí digo que estamos obligados a encontrar soluciones más complejas, más difíciles, más orgánicas, y más vivas. Soluciones no únicamente basadas en que el Estado presume la voluntad de todos. Lo que hay que conseguir es integrar a las personas que participan en la vida social dentro de un conjunto de decisiones que sea, al mismo tiempo, coherente con el fin público.

« Las grandes empresas deben encontrar la fórmula de dar presencia al consumidor. El consumidor es, para mí, la parte más interesada en el perfeccionamiento de las propias estructuras productivas. Y no creo que debamos hacer una empresa en beneficio exclusivo de los que aportan el capital — aunque sí hay que tratar con justicia la aportación de esa herramienta —; tampoco creo que debamos hacer una empresa exclusivamente pensada en beneficio de los que en ella trabajan — que también es importante —. Lo que creo es que la justificación de la empresa, en relación con el bien común, está también en relación con todos los que de ella se sirven.

« La experiencia de la participación de los consumidores en las nacionalizaciones inglesas y francesas de la postguerra fue mediocre; pero creo que ahí está el principio de superación de la dicotomía entre lo público y privado.

« ¿En la participación del consumidor? — pregunta Salvador Paniker —.

« Sí. Y tener conciencia de que uno de los fines de la producción — aparte el proceso de distribución de rentas — es el de atender a los objetivos generales de la comunidad a través de su propio proceso. Ha habido un momento histórico en que la producción — en los momentos más exaltados del nacionalismo — tenía como finalidad potenciar la capacidad económica de un país frente a su contorno internacional. Ha rabido otro momento en que quisimos hacer de la empresa una unidad productora, con justicia interna, en sus relaciones con el personal y

en sus relaciones con el capital. Creo que ha llegado el momento de pasar a la justicia externa. Es decir, que ese comportamiento no sea de unidades perfectas en sí mismas, sino de unidades perfectamente trabadas con el conjunto. Esta es la problemática más importante que hoy tiene planteada la empresa » (Barrera de Irímo, loc. cit., 200-201).

Si el último nivel de legitimación subyacente a todos los esquemas de racionalización tecnocrática de López Rodó es la singular racionalización de la ética católica propia del « Opus Dei », a través de la entrevista de Paniker queda también claro un momento eticorreligioso subyacente a todo el discurso de Barrera de Irímo y cuyos orígenes son otros que la vinculación religiosa con la Obra. La « justicia » y el « bien común », tal y como ahí se emplean, son dos términos cuyo sentido procede de la ética católica tradicional. Sino que ahora la definición de todas esas categorías pierde su vieja connotación de tradicionalismo económico en cuanto vinculadas decisivamente a la lógica de la pura reproducción familiar en el marco posttestamental de un Estado autoritariamente paternalista. « Erigir al Estado en gestor y definidor de estos objetivos (a aquellos mediante los cuales contribuyen las empresas al bien común), es simplificar demasiado » (Barrera de Irímo, loc. cit., 203). Sólo en una expansiva movilización empresarial, capaz de configurar el futuro colectivo como reconciliada sociedad de consumo, se consigue la realización del bien común.

— « El pecado capital es la inercia » — resumiría Salvador Paniker en la entrevista que estamos analizando.

« Y la "gracia" es la aceleración. La aceleración que nos convierte en hijos del futuro » (Barrera de Irímo, en loc. cit., 203) —.

Una clara importancia estratégica para la expansión de la nueva racionalidad gerencial en el marco de la empresa privada la han tenido los diferentes institutos y escuelas de estudios empresariales y administrativos, que van a aparecer a partir de 1957. « El Instituto de Estudios Superiores de la Empresa (IESE) es el primer centro que nació en España, de iniciativa privada, dedicado al perfeccionamiento de altos dirigentes de empresa. El IESE tiene su sede en Barcelona y forma parte de la Universidad de Navarra, fundada y dirigida por el Opus Dei. Desde 1958 hasta hoy, por el IESE ha desfilado gran parte de la más selecta clase dirigente catalana » (Paniker, 1967, 85). La entrevista de Paniker a Antonio Valero Vicente, director del IESE, puede servir como documento de algunos de los supuestos y motivaciones de la nueva racionalidad « tecno-

crático-gerencial ». Para Valero « existen unas aptitudes fundamentales de directivo que generalmente son ya de nacimiento ». Desde estos supuestos el IESE lo que hace es recibir « personas ya formadas y como resultado de una selección natural hecha por la sociedad » (Valero Vicente, en Paniker, 1967, 85). Así el Instituto de Barcelona funciona con una clara vocación de movilización de una élite, como centro de reunión y de racionalización de directivos, a los que se les va a configurar conciencia de élite como supuesto de su dinamización empresarial. « De la misma manera que todos los actos del hombre tienen una vertiente ética, de la misma manera que todos los actos del hombre pueden tener un valor sobrenatural, igualmente casi todos tienen una vertiente económica. Y a mi entender, en una sociedad libre, el elemento más importante para que sus actos sean económicamente buenos es la capacidad y la actitud de los directivos de empresas. Esto es más importante que un plan de desarrollo o que una legislación básica.

« ¿Por qué es tan importante el directivo? — pregunta Paniker.

« Porque el mayor número de decisiones las toma él, porque el que un billete de mil pesetas sea rentable o se queme depende de él. Más que del Estado y más que de otras agrupaciones, el país puede depender de sus directores de empresa. (...) En la sociedad contemporánea se está configurando una nueva clase social importantísima, que es la constituida por los directivos de empresa profesionales y responsables » (Valero en Paniker, 1967, 86, 87, 89).

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La conciencia de « élite directiva », al margen de su más o menos irreal cumplimiento, es una de las ofertas simbólicas que contribuye decisivamente a movilizar la identificación de los gerentes y ejecutivos con su carrera dentro de la organización y por tanto, con su dedicación excluyente a la « eficacia organizada ». La propia organización burocraticoempresarial funciona como un sistema motivacional impulsando la racionalización y movilización de sus cuadros con su constante oferta simbólica de promoción individual, exigida de otra parte por la típica carrera del consumismo ejecutivo, en que se satisface y se recrea simbólicamente esa propia necesidad psicosocial de « ascender » en la inacabable pirámide del status. La posible autoidentificación gerencial como élite colectiva desplaza el techo de su posible ascensión desde el nivel de la más alta dirección de la empresa, a la dirección última de la sociedad

global. En esta manera, la carrera gerencial resulta interminable — siempre tiene una meta más allá —. Y así queda asegurada la permanente movilización de los ejecutivos y directivos más allá de toda la tentación de estabilización que impregna toda la dinámica de reproducción de las estructuras familiares tradicionales.

Al cabo, en la cúspide objetiva del nuevo sistema económico y como condición de su propio funcionamiento, se da la simbiosis entre la élite política, la élite burocrática y la élite empresarial de los Nuevos Directores, cuya propia racionalización instrumental exige una cierta circulación de unos mismos directivos entre esos distintos puestos como requisito de la propia configuración de la nueva élite tecnocrática y de su específica identificación con los objetivos público-privados que plantea la « sociedad organizada ». En el sistema español resulta clave la circulación de ida y vuelta de los « nuevos directores » entre la empresa pública y la empresa privada, según la pauta establecida por el modelo americano, e importada a escala nacional por el equipo « tecnócrata » como una de las líneas claves de su estrategia. « En Estados Unidos es frecuente el transvase de hombres de negocios a puestos de mando de la Administración y viceversa. El intercambio de experiencias entre uno y otro campo es extraordinariamente provechoso. Creo que en Barcelona se comprende mejor que en ningún otro lugar la fecundidad de una franca colaboración entre el mundo de la economía y la Administración Pública » (López Rod, 1961, 223).

La conciencia de esa estrategia de racionalización burocrático-empresarial queda bien clara en uno de nuestros entrevistados madrileños tipificado como « nuevo director ». El Plan de Desarrollo « ha sido el mejor de los intentos para hacer de los administradores públicos más y más hombres con mentalidad de empresarios y hacer de los hombres de empresa más y más hombres con mentalidad política, digamos pública ». Un papel clave en esa simbiótica circulación de ida y vuelta entre lo público y lo privado ha sido el jugado por el Ministerio de Industria desde la llegada de López Bravo, y por el INI, dependiente ahora de tal Ministerio. Con López Bravo se produciría en el INI, paulatinamente, el desplazamiento de los « viejos » gestores paramilitares por los « nuevos ejecutivos ».

Valero Vicente, empresario de la racionalización tecnocrático-gerencial, definía: « El empresario es un filósofo en acción » (Valero Vicente, en Paniker, 1967, 86). Como requisito de la capacitación objetiva y de la legitimación subjetiva y pública de los nuevos ejecutivos, resulta clave su formación profesio-

nal. Cada vez resulta más impensable un alto directivo empresarial sin títulos de enseñanza superior. En nuestras entrevistas se ha registrado sistemáticamente la importancia que los ejecutivos y nuevos directores otorgan a su currículum académico profesional. La específica disciplina en que se sublima y racionaliza la teoría y la práctica de la « eficacia organizada » es la Ciencia de la Organización. La Universidad, como institucionalización de la racionalidad científica, es necesaria para la nueva conciencia directiva en cuanto conciencia de « élite racionalizadora ». Si para los Empresarios Autárquicos resultaba fundamental la *imago paterna*, como supuesto originario de toda racionalización y legitimación empresarial, para los ejecutivos y nuevos directores va a ser clave la autoconciencia de su específica formación profesional y de sus estudios científico-académicos. Las escuelas e institutos de estudios empresariales tienen garantizada una clientela creciente.

* * *

Nuestro análisis se ha movido fundamentalmente a nivel del análisis sociológico del significante ideológico del comportamiento ejecutivo-tecnocrático, singularmente, de su expresión verbal. Apenas hemos tenido en cuenta aquí sino la dimensión ideológico-política y ético-religiosa de la actividad social todo un sector de tecnócratas y nuevos directores. Se ha dejado por analizar toda otra serie de variables, entre ellas, todo el específico sistema motivacional que la propia organización burocrático-empresarial produce con su constante oferta simbólica de promoción individual compulsivamente impuesta por la típica carrera del consumo, en que se satisface y se recrea simbólicamente esa propia necesidad psicosocial de « ascender » en la inacabable pirámide del « status ».

Otro problema decisivo aquí sería el análisis de la « modernización » real, o si se quiere, de la práctica racionalización burocrático-empresarial de tales « ejecutivos » y « tecnócratas », que se registra en su comportamiento y actitudes profundas, más allá de su aprendizaje de la nueva « semántica gerencial ». Al cual habría que añadir el análisis de la circulación de ida y vuelta de tales « Nuevos Directores » entre la empresa privada y la empresa pública, siguiendo la pauta del modelo norteamericano.

RIASSUNTO

A partire dal 1957, il panorama politico spagnolo ha visto l'ascesa di una nuova classe di dirigenti, portatori del progetto di liberalizzazione tendente ad inserire la Spagna al livello delle nazioni europee industrializzate. I principali rappresentanti di questa classe, formatasi in seno alle grandi industrie private, sono entrati nell'amministrazione statale, sostituendo progressivamente la vecchia classe politica «dogmatica» di origine franchista, e portandovi concezioni e orientamenti manageriali, capaci di adeguare le strutture sociali ed economiche spagnole alle nuove esigenze di industrializzazione e sviluppo. Attraverso tali uomini, si realizza in Spagna la «riconciliazione» tra gran capitale finanziario ed industriale e lo Stato, senza la necessità di ricorrere a nazionalizzazioni incompatibili con la tradizione spagnola successiva al '39. L'autore mette in risalto l'importanza dell'*Opus Dei*, cui molti dei nuovi «tecnocrati» appartengono, in questa operazione di rammodernamento, e svolge interessanti annotazioni circa le modalità con cui il nuovo potere giustifica se stesso, sostituendo il mito della tecnologia e della scienza alle concezioni di tipo religioso, tipiche del franchismo. Il nuovo potere tecnoburocratico tende infatti a presentare il proprio monopolio delle conoscenze tecniche, scientifiche e organizzative come l'unico mezzo per realizzare il «bene comune».

SUMMARY

From 1957, on, the Spanish political scene has witnessed the rise of a new class of leaders whose programme is the liberalization of the country to bring it up to the level of the industrialized European nations. The main representatives of this class, moulded by their experience in large private enterprises, have entered the State administration, gradually displacing the old «dogmatic» political class, of Francoist origins, and have introduced managerial concepts and outlooks into the state system which are designed to adapt Spain's economic and social structures to the new needs of industrialization and development. These men are bringing about the «reconciliation» in Spain of large industrial and finance capital and the State without having to resort to nationalizations which would have been incompatible with the post-1939 Spanish way of doing things. The author highlights the importance of *Opus Dei*, to which many of the new «technocrats» belong, in this modernization process, and gives many interesting examples of the methods used by the new ruling class to justify itself, replacing typically Francoist religious concepts by the myth of technology and science. Indeed, the new technobureaucratic ruling class tends to present its own monopoly of technical, scientific and organizational knowledge as the only way of bringing about the «common weal».

RESUME

Depuis 1957, le panorama politique espagnol a vu apparaître une nouvelle classe dirigeante, qui a pour but de permettre à l'Espagne, par une certaine libéralisation, d'atteindre le niveau des pays industrialisés d'Europe. Les principaux représentants de cette classe viennent de l'industrie privée et sont entrés dans l'administration publique où ils remplacent peu à peu la vieille classe politique «dogmatique» d'origine franquiste et où ils amènent des conceptions et des orientations techniques, qui doivent permettre d'adapter les structures sociales et économiques espagnoles aux nouvelles exigences d'industrialisation et de développement. Ces hommes «réconciliant» en Espagne le grand capital industriel et financier avec l'Etat, sans qu'il soit besoin de recourir à des nationalisations incompatibles avec la tradition espagnole depuis 1939. L'auteur souligne le rôle de l'*Opus Dei* (auquel appartiennent nombreux de nouveaux technocrates) dans cette opération de modernisation, et fait d'intéressantes remarques sur le mode d'auto-justification du nouveau pouvoir, qui remplace par le mythe de la technologie et de la science les conceptions quasi religieuses qui caractérisaient le franquisme. De fait, le nouveau pouvoir techno-bureaucratique voudrait présenter le monopole des connaissances techniques, scientifiques et gestionnaires comme le seul moyen pour réaliser le «bien commun».

Document

Aspects of U.S. exploitation of Mexican labor

This is the second of a two part series (see Interrogations n. 9) on the current struggle of peasants and farmworkers in Mexico's northwest. The authors, staff members of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA, P.O. Box 226, Berkeley, Ca. 94701, USA), have recently completed a 32 pg. study entitled "Harvest of Anger; Agro-Imperialism in Mexico's Northwest" (Vol. X, No. 6, July-August 1976 of NACLA's Latin America and Empire Report).

Harvest of anger

part II

PETER BAIRD
ED MC CAUGHAN

CULIACAN, MEXICO

« I leave home at two or three in the morning and walk to the road where a company truck passes by. At four I climb up and ride with the pigs and cattle until we arrive at the ranch several hours later. I work until six or seven in the evening, then ride again on the truck and arrive back to my village at ten or eleven at night. I don't see my house or family by daylight ».

These words were spoken with slow determination by Jose Luis Zuñiga, one of the ½ million wage-earning farm workers who toil the U.S. controlled agribusiness ranches of northwestern Mexico. Like scores of other **campesinos**, Jose Luis has been forced by poverty to become a day laborer on the vast vegetable growing operations of Sonora and Sinaloa. The tomatoes Jose Luis picks are sold thousands of miles away in U.S. supermarkets.

Jose Luis' younger sisters and thousands of other young women work in the large packing sheds where conditions are hardly better than in the blistering fields. For \$16 a week they work in the 100 degree-plus weather to prepare the tomatoes, cucumbers and bell peppers for loading onto refrigerated railcars and trucks for the 20 hour trip to Nogales, Arizona. There the shipments are met by buyers from Safeway, Lucky's, McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken and other U. S. food monopolies.

Low pay and inhumane working conditions, coupled with runaway inflation and the recent devaluations of the Mexican peso have sparked a resurgence of efforts by farm workers of the Northwest to organize themselves into militant and independent unions. These efforts have paralleled the numerous land occupation that have threatened to shut down the factories in the fields.

« We see every day that we can't live on the miserable salary that they pay us », continued José Luis. « It barely buys us enough food, much less to send our little ones to school, or to buy them clothes and shoes ».

The Mexican growers and their U.S. backers fear the spectre of independent unionization. Their profits come directly from the low wages and high rate of exploitation they can force upon the disorganized and largely migrant work force. Militant unions not only raise wages and demand improved social conditions, which cost money; they also control the degree of exploitation by limiting the hours and intensity of farm work. Above all, they take the control over the workers lives and return it to the workers themselves.

The worried growers meet in their luxurious haciendas and sip nescafe from sterling silver cups while they plot how the « outside agitators » can be stopped. Phone calls are made to U.S. partners in Arizona and California.

« Unionization is very dangerous to us », explained multi-million dollar tomato grower and exporter Hector Gonzalez, who hires 2000 workers at peak season at his ranch in Culiacan.

« We are not a factory that can stop its production and recuperate later. A strike during the harvest season can break us. These new labor leaders around here are very adept and present a danger to our whole operation. These organizers around here could give lessons to Chavez! ».

Gonzales and the other agribusiness growers of Mexico are very aware of the gains made in the last decade by the United Farm workers Union in the U.S., and are determined to prevent such a movement in Mexico. Workers who lead strikes and land occupations one day are often discovered floating face down in irrigation ditches on the next.

The most powerful weapon and sinister ally of the growers against independent unionization, however, is not outright violence, but **sindicalismo blanco**, or sell-out unionism. For a dozen years the growers have paid « dues » to the corrupt leaders of the government controlled Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) for the admitted purpose of preventing genuine unionization of farm workers.

« Here it is the same (as in the U.S.) where they use the Teamsters to stop the Chavez Union », Gonzales candidly explained during a recent interview on his ranch.

« Here we have the CTM, which is our best defense against the other associations that want to get in, like the UGOCM (Ge-

neral Union of Workers and Peasants), only that the CTM is a little less aggressive than the Teamsters — with their ties to the mafia, you know ».

« The week before last the UGOCM planted their strike flags in the four corners of one of my tomato fields and they didn't let anyone enter. Well, right away we called our CTM delegate and we told him, "Go and fix up this situation however you can, because they're invading your territory". He went right away to the state CTM office and together they went to see the governor. Then the governor himself went and told the UGOCM: "That's enough boys, you don't have any right being here because the CTM already has a contract. You'd better move along".

« And so that's how we got rid of a problem ».

A HISTORY OF CLASS COLLABORATION

The CTM was created by the progressive President Cárdenas in the 1930's with the help of communist organizers in order to create a rural popular base for his agrarian reforms. Close to 40 million acres of land owned directly by corporations like the United Sugar Company and by wealthy North American and Mexicans were expropriated and distributed to some 800,000 campesinos.

The massive distributions were in large part aimed at quelling the militant strikes in the areas of Mexico where large scale capitalist agriculture had created a strong and class conscious force of wage laborers.

The agrarian reforms and concessions to the unions abated the struggle in the countryside for a time. But under Cárdenas' successors after 1940, capitalist export-oriented agriculture was given exclusive preference over production of basic commodities like corn and beans by small producers. And foreign companies once again came to dominate the rural economy.

The CTM leadership also took a sharp turn to the right, since then breaking strikes instead of leading them, while retaining a militant rhetoric of class struggle. These CTM **charros**, as they are called by the workers (the name coming from a corrupt labor boss who liked to dress in charro outfit) are without a doubt the most formidable roadblock to potential organizing in the countryside, just as in the cities.

The list of abuses committed by the charros against field and packing-shed workers is seemingly endless, ranging from signing seetharst contracts to protecting growers from federal

labor laws. Workers are often blacklisted by the CTM and must pay CTM dues without receiving any protection in return.

But the obvious class-collaboration of the CTM labor bureaucrats over the past 40 years may be their undoing in the decade ahead. According to leftist organizers in the northwestern states who are giving direction to the spontaneous outbursts of the rural population, rural workers no longer follow the leadership of the CTM officials. Furthermore, they report, the true anti-worker nature of the entrenched Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) now in power, has demonstrated to farm workers the need for union that are truly independent of the government.

The 4000 employees of the Wilson/Bustamante tomato exporting operation in Sinaloa, for example, declared a strike protesting against both the U.S. controlled company and its CTM union two years ago. The strike was violently broken by the ARMY and its leaders were jailed, but the unified action of the workers send out shock-waves throughout the area. Similar actions have followed, occasionally winning specific wage and working conditions demands, though rarely collective bargaining agreements.

The recent confrontations have raised the consciousness of many workers, and pointed out the need for organization and a strategy that goes beyond simple wage and trade union demands. They have also shown that significant political and economic gains can only be won if the isolated strikes, protests, land occupations and walkouts become one coordinated and class conscious movement.

DEVELOPING A REVOLUTIONARY ALTERNATIVE

Traditionally the demands of left opposition groups in Mexico have focused more on the distribution of land than on the unionization of agrarian workers — this due largely to the strong peasant ideology of the Mexico Revolution of 1910.

Today more emphasis is put on organizing the rural proletariat, as one left organizer explained:

"We consider agricultural workers important because of their growing numbers, because their relation to the means of production gives them economic leverage, and because their demands are closest to those of workers in the cities".

Several new political parties and labor unions have made important strides in recent years towards the task of organizing

peasants, wage-earning farm workers and the unemployed in the countryside.

- The Party of Socialist Workers (PST), one of the groups which supports outgoing President Echeverria and his successor as "left" forces within the PRI, has been active in the mobilization of thousands of cane and tobacco workers in the states of Veracruz and Puebla over the past few years.

- The UGOCM continues to have an important base of workers and peasants who have precipitated many strikes and land occupations, despite a leadership which appears to be moving more and more into the sphere of government control.

- The Mexican Workers Party (PMT) is a mass-based revolutionary party led by ex political prisoners Heriberto Castillo and Demetrio Vallejo, who are strongly opposed to any association with the PRI. Since their release in 1971, the PMT has been organizing regional committees in many parts of the republic, including Sonora, Sinaloa and Baja California. Part of their program is the independent unionization of agricultural workers.

- Also active in the Northwest is the recently created Independent Union of Agricultural Workers and Peasants (CIOAC), which has so far demonstrated its independence from government controlled organizations. This national organization, some of whose leaders come from the Mexican Communist Party, has defined a program which focuses on the independent unionization of farm workers. It is also trying to unify the struggle in the countryside by relating well to the different demands of squatters, small farmers and the unemployed.

"THE PATRONES KEEP US SEPARATED"

The current land revolt just south of U.S.-Mexican border has long range implications for the future of the anti-imperialist struggle in Mexico and in the United States. It will decide not only **who** owns the land, but **what** will be grown on it and **for whom**.

The bloody land struggle is also woven into the lives of most North Americans, as the fruits and vegetables harvested by the poor of one country are exported and resold at inflated prices to the poor of another country.

The relationship with farm workers in the U.S. is even more

direct. Not only do many farm laborers work the crops on both sides of the border and have blood ties with the battles being fought there, but the corporations that exploit them are the same: Del Monte, Tenneco, Deardorf Jackson, Anderson Clayton & Co., etc.

Furthermore, as farm workers in the U.S. win their democratic rights and just wages, U.S. growers will strive to export the production of certain labor intensive crops like tomatoes, asparagus and strawberries to Third World countries like Mexico, just as U.S. industry has done with the runaway shops (*).

In the long run, the only solution to this dilemma is through the independent political organization of the working class of both countries, and the international coordination of their struggle. The capitalist class in Mexico and the U.S. are unified around their mutual interests; the workers too will find that their strength lies in such an international alliance.

As one farm worker employed by a company of U.S. and Mexican partnership expressed it, "The patrones are very much interested in keeping us separated. And as long as we are disorganized they will keep taking advantage of us. One little movement over here, another over there doesn't harm them much. But the day that we are united... then it will be different".

(*) See «The reserve army of labor», by the same authors, on *Interventions* n. 9.

RESUME

Seconde partie du document du NACLA sur la pénétration coloniale des Etats-Unis au Mexique. L'article décrit brièvement les conditions d'extrême misère des ouvriers agricoles qui travaillent dans les gigantesques plantations maraîchères dont la production s'écoule sur le marché nord-américain. Ce sont ces conditions qui permettent les bénéfices élevés des importateurs nord-américains — et, par conséquent, des propriétaires terriens — grâce à leur contrôle sur la production mexicaine.

Les mouvements de révolte se sont jusqu'ici heurté aux limites de la violence terroriste et, surtout, au syndicalisme blanc, encadrement des travailleurs dans des syndicats corrompus et pro-patronaux. La politique de la centrale syndicale CTM est quasiment collaborationniste, ce qui lui a fait perdre tout crédit chez les ouvries agricoles. Aujourd'hui apparaissent en dehors d'elle des mouvements syndicaux autonomes, nés de la prise de conscience et de la volonté de lutte des

travailleurs mexicains exploités. Cette tendance au syndicalisme auto-nome, qui cherche à se coordonner avec des mouvements analogues dans d'autres pays, représente aux yeux des auteurs une base sur laquelle édifier une alternative radicale à l'exploitation.

RESUMEN

La segunda parte del documento NACLA sobre la penetración norteamericana del tipo colonial en México examina las condiciones miserables en las cuales trabajan los obreros en las inmensas plantaciones agrícolas cuyos productos están destinados al mercado de Estados Unidos. Estas condiciones significan ganancias elevadas para las empresas importadoras de los EE-UU que controlan la producción mexicana, y, desde luego, para los propietarios.

Los movimientos de rebeldía contra tal situación han sido contrarrestados por la violencia y el terror, y más que todo por el sindicalismo blanco, es decir por el control de los trabajadores por los sindicatos a las órdenes de los intereses patronales. La organización mayor, la CTM — Confederación de los Trabajadores Mexicanos — ha llevada a cabo una política francamente colaboracionista, hasta el punto de perder todo crédito entre los peones. En cambio, surgen movimientos sindicales autónomos, que resulten de una progresiva toma de conciencia y de la voluntad de intervención de los explotados mexicanos. Esta tendencia hacia un sindicalismo autónomo, el cual trata de ligarse con movimientos de mismo tipo que actúan al otro lado de la frontera, representa, según los autores, una base sobre la cual se construye una solución revolucionaria a la explotación.

RIASSUNTO

La seconda parte del documento NACLA sulla penetrazione coloniale statunitense in Messico. L'articolo esamina brevemente le condizioni di estremo disagio in cui versano i braccianti agricoli che lavorano nelle gigantesche piantagioni di prodotti ortofrutticoli destinati al mercato americano. Tali condizioni sono il presupposto degli elevati profitti che il controllo della produzione messicana permette agli importatori USA e, di conseguenza, ai proprietari terrieri.

I movimenti di rivolta contro questa situazione sono stati finora contenuti con l'uso della violenza terroristica e soprattutto col sindacalismo bianco, cioè con l'inquadramento dei lavoratori in sindacati corrotti fedeli agli interessi padronali. Il principale di tali sindacati, il CTM, ha svolto però una politica così scopertamente collaborazionista da perdere ogni credito fra i braccianti. Al suo posto, vanno sorgendo oggi movimenti sindacali autonomi, frutto dell'aumentata consapevolezza e volontà di lotta degli sfruttati messicani. Questa tendenza al sindacalismo autonomo, che cerca di collegarsi con movimenti analoghi che sorgono al di là della frontiera, sta diventando, a giudizio degli autori, la base per la costruzione di un'alternativa rivoluzionaria allo sfruttamento.

DANS LES PROCHAINS NUMEROS / EN LOS PROXIMOS
NUMEROS / IN THE VERY NEXT ISSUES / NEI PROSSIMI NUMERI

- CLAUDIO VENZA - Elementi tecnoburocratici nelle Forze Armate italiane.
- DAVE MANSELL - The Ulster conflict (part II).
- CARLOS S. MAURA - Esquisse d'une politique libertaire pour l'Espagne d'aujourd'hui.
- ARGENTON A. - Psichiatria, antipsichiatria e alternativa libertaria.
- KAN EGUCHI - Le mouvement des etudiantes en Japon.
Document sur la dissidence sovietique.

TRANSLATIONS AND REPRODUCTIONS / TRADUZIONI
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TRADUCCIONES Y REPRODUCCIONES

La Lanterne Noire (P. Blachier - Boite postale 14 - 92360 Meudon-la-Forêt) a publié dans son numéro double 6/7 de novembre 1976, les extraits du programme des Groupes Anarchistes Fédérés (**Interrogations** N° 8).

Analisis & Documentos de Lisbonne, a publié en langue portugaise le texte de Pierre Clastres (**Interrogations** N° 7) sous le titre « A questão do Poder nas Sociedades Primitivas ». (Septembre '76).

Le même centre a traduit et publié l'article de Heinz Zimmermann (**Interrogations** N° 8) « Republica Democratica Alema - Sobre o sistema de Trabalho » (octobre '76). Livraria « Contra a corrente » - Rua da Atalaia 204 - Lisboa.

L'Association Noir, de Genève (Case Postale 167 - Genève 4) et le Groupe le Mai d'Annecy, ont publié en brochure la version française du texte de Fernando Gomez Pelaez (**Interrogations** N° 2) sous le titre « Santiago Carrillo ou l'Histoire falsifiée ».

L'articolo di L. Pellicani « Critica bakuniniana del Marxismo come ideologia di classe dell'Intellighenzia proletarizzata » (**Interrogations** N° 9) è disponibile in opuscolo, pubblicato a cura della redazione.